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PRELIMINARY MEMO

(

March 22, 1985 Conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 84-1244
DAVIS, ET AL.
officials)

Three-Judge District Court

(state

v.
BANDEMER/. (members of
Democratic party)
~\.

e+

1.

SUMMARY:

Appeal from S.D.Ind.
(Nol~nd, D.J., Brooks,
D.J. : Pell, dissenting in
part)
Federal/Civil

Timely

Appts challenge the lower court's decision

that an Indiana statute apportioning districts for state
elections is an exercise of political gerrymandering that
discriminates against Democrats in violation of the Equal

1 The authorship of the majority op1n1on is not stated, nor is

the opinion labeled "per curiam."

-2-

Protection Clause.
2.

FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW:

The Indiana state

legislature consists of a 100-member House of Representatives and
a 50-member Senate.

In 1981, in response to the 1980 census, the

legislature enacted a new apportionment law altering the
districts used for state elections.

Two bills were introduced,

one in the House and one in the Senate, but these were so-cailed
"vehicle bills," devoid of content.

The purpose of introducing

these essentially blank bills was to refer the matter to
conference committee.

All members of the committee were members

of the Republican party, which had a majority in both houses.
Four Democrats were appointed as non-voting "advisors."

(

The

Republican State Committee then commissioned a study from a
computer firm to aid in the process of legislative map-making.
Democrats had no access to the computers or their output, but
they did begin drawing their own map from census compilations
provided by the

u.s.

Census Bureau.

The Republicans revealed

their computer-assisted plan during the last week of the 1981
legislative session.

At the same time, the Democrats revealed

their proposed maps in the House and Senate.

The conference

committee report was adopted in both houses along party lines.
The Governor signed the bill into law, and minor changes were
subsequently made in the 1982 session.
In January, 1982, appees, members of the Indiana Democratic
party (which is heavily black), filed this suit alleging that the
apportionment law was political gerrymandering that had the
purpose and effect of discriminating against Indiana Democrats,

-3-

{

thereby violating their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection. 2 They also alleged violations of state
constitutional provisions.

After the suit was filed, but before

any decision had been rendered, the 1982 elections were held
pursuant to the challenged statute.

A three-judge panel,

convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2284, heard testimony and
received evidence in the fall of 1983.

In December, 1984, a

majority of the panel held that the reapportionment plan was
unconstitutional.
The court first noted that in the 1982 House election,
Democratic candidates received 51.9% of the vote statewide, but
only 43% of those elected to the House were Democrats.

In the

Senate election, Democrats received 53.1% of the vote, and 13 of

(

the 25 Senate seats up for election were filled by Democrats.
The court recognized that this kind of vote analysis presented
dangers of misrepresentation -- for example, a heavy turnout of
Democratic voters in a heavily Democratic area could skew the
total vote figures -- but in this case, the dataindicated that
the Republicans had been able to draw maps permitting them to win
close races by "stacking" Democrats into a minority of heavily

2Another suit, filed by the state NAACP, challenged the plan as
racially discriminatory under the federal Constitution and §2 of
the Voting Rights Act. That suit was consolidated with this one
below. The court below rejected these claims, apparently under
the mistaken belief that §2 required proof of discriminatory
intent.
(Judge Pell concurred in the holding that §2 had not
been violated, on the ground that black voting strength had not
been diluted.) In any event, the claims raised by the NAACP
plaintiffs are not at issue in this appeal.

-4-

i

Democratic districts.

("Stacking" would result in a waste of

Democratic votes -- in a 75% Democratic district, 24% of the vote
would be superfluous, since anything over 50% would be
unnecessary to elect a Democrat.)
The court further observed that the shapes of the districts
were "unusual" and did not reflect consideration of "community of
interest" principles or of existing political subdivisions.
Although it was clear that the legislature had been guided by the
principles of "one person-one vote" and "no retrogression" (i.e.,
black members' constituencies were to be preserved), other
motivations were also evident.

Statements made by Republican

legislators established that the Republican majority focused on

(

protecting its incumbents and creating every "safe" Republican
district possible, either by "stacking" or by "splitting" (i.e.,
fragmenting strong Democratic districts).

The use of multi-

member districts was particularly effective in accomplishing
these goals.
The court recognized that this Court has yet to address
directly the constitutional ramifications of a political
gerrymander in the context of a state legislative
reapportionment, but relied on the analysis of Justice Stevens'
concurring opinion in Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2653 (1983).
(The majority opinion in Karcher relied on Article 1, §2, which,
unlike the Equal Protection Clause, applies only to
reapportionment for federal elections.)

The constitutional

impingement in a gerrymandering claim lay not in any inequality
of votes, but rather in the shapes of the districts as they

-5-
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served to disadvantage a cognizable class of voters.

Here, the

plaintiffs had proved that both the purpose and effect of the
plan was to discriminate against Democrats.

Under Justice

Stevens' test, plaintiffs claiming unconstitutional
gerrymandering must prove three things:

First, they must

establish that they belong to a "politically salient class."
Democratic Party was clearly such a class.

The

Second, they "must

prove that in the relevant district or districts or in the State
as a whole, their proportionate voting influence has been
adversely affected by the challenged scheme."

The plaintiffs

had demonstrated both that their voting strength had been
fragmented among districts, and that their members had been overconcentrated in single districts.

(

Third, they must make a prima

facie showing that raises a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination.

Here, such a showing had been made through

evidence of "uncouth" and "bizarre" district configurations, lack
of compactness, disregard for traditional political subdivisions,
and the use of multi-member districts to stack or split
concentrations of black Democratic voters.

Further prima facie

evidence was provided by the majority's exclusion of the minority
from the process by which the plan was drawn up.

The burden

therefore shifted to the state that the plan as a whole embodied
"acceptable neutral objectives."
(Stevens, J., cone.).

See Karcher, 103 S. Ct. at 2675

None had been shown.

Accordingly, the

court declared the House and Senate acts unconstitutional, making

'

the decision prospective only, and enjoined the state from
holding elections pursuant to them.

The court did not address

-6-

f

appees' state constitutional claims, because they were mooted by
the declaratory and injunctive relief.
Judge Pell dissented on the ground that the facts did not
demonstrate a political gerrymander, not reaching the question
whether a cause of action exists for political gerrymandering
under the Equal Protection Clause.

Appees had failed to prove

that the plan had diluted their voting strength as Democrats.

A

comparison between the percentage of Democratic votes cast
statewide and the number of seats actually won, standing alone,
failed to prove vote dilution.

Justice Stevens had himself

recognized that this method of identifying gerrymandering was
flawed, in that the difference between the two figures might be

(

the result of "natural advantages," such as the inordinate
concentration of partisans in one place.
n.l3.

See 103 S. Ct. at 2672

The method recommended by the authorities cited by Justice

Stevens was to measure a party's voting strength by isolating
"typical" statewide races and using an average figure.

Applying

that method here, the Democrats' "base voting strength" was 46.8%
[actually 47.8%], and they had won 43% of the House seats and 52%
of the Senate seats.

Thus, even if the purpose of the plan was

to favor Republicans, the result was to advantage and
disadvantage both parties equally.

The fact that Democrats

gained few seats in some multi-member districts did not prove
that appts had used multi-member districts unconstitutionally:
Democrats' base voting strength in at least one of these counties
was considerably less than their strength statewide.

Multi-

member districts were not unconstitutional per se, and here there

-7-

.
(

was no evidence that they had been used to deny a group equal
access to the political process.
1 , 15-17 {1975).

See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S.

Appts had adhered to "neutral, legitimate

interests" --i.e., the principles of "one-man one-vote" and "no
retrogression," and the protection of incumbents, which was a
permissible state interest.
lines in most cases.

Appts had also preserved township

The Supreme Court had emphasized that,

despite the presence of constitutional constraints, redistricting
remained essentially a political task, and that a plan should not
be invalidated on the basis of discriminatory purpose without any
discriminatory effect.

Judge Pell went on to reject appees'

state constitutional claims for essentially the same reason.
Appts filed a Motion to Modify or Amend, claiming that the

(

opinion left them unclear as to what they were supposed to do.
The court denied the motion as a request for an advisory opinion.
Judge Pell would have granted the motion, treating it as a
challenge to the correctness of the opinion.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Appts contend that this Court and the CA7

have consistently held that claims of political gerrymandering
are not justiciable.

In any event, Justice Stevens' concurrence

in Karcher involved substantially different facts.

There, it was

undisputed that the majority party purposely attempted to place
incumbent members of the minority party in the same district, and
an alternate plan had been approved by the lower court.

Here, no

incumbent Democratic Senators were placed in the same district,
and House members of either party were placed in the same

-8-
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district only when it was necessary to comply with the "one man,
one vote" requirement.
Moreover, the court below found that the legislature relied
on approved, neutral criteria, specifically, the "one man, one
vote" and "no retrogression" princples.

There are findings of

"stacking" in only two counties, and there is no evidence that
this "stacking" was any more than necessary to preserve black
voting strength.

Nor is there any finding that a lack of

"compactness" in certain districts favored Republicans.

In

addition, the acts followed the neutral criterion of "least
changed plan" by preserving the cores of prior districts,
avoiding contests between incumbents of both parties, and

(

preserving multi-member districts in the House unless the
representatives from such districts requested a change.
The court below also made no finding on how to measure the
baseline strength of a political party, a task that Justice
Stevens recognized would be difficult in the case of a political
party, as opposed to a racial group.

See 103

u.s.

2672 n.l3.

The court also erred in basing a finding of discriminatory intent
on the remarks of two Republican legislators, when there was no
reason to believe that they were authorized to speak for the
legislature as a whole.

Nor is there any evidence that the

reapportionment plan actually disadvantaged Democrats.
The court further erred in shifting to the state the burden
of proof that its reapportionment plan was necessary in order to
preserve the "one man, one vote" principle.

Justice Stevens'

concurrence in Karcher calls for such burden-shifting, but under

-9-

Mobile v. Bolden, 446

u.s.

67 (1980), the burden never shifts to

the state to prove the absence of racial discrimination.

Lastly,

the remedy ordered was overbroad in that it invalidated the
Senate plan as well as the House plan.

The court made no

specific finding that the Senate plan was unconstitutional, nor
could it have done so.
Appees argue that the decision below should be affirmed.
This Court has long stated that an apportionment plan that
invdiously discriminates against a political group violates the
Equal Protection Clause.

The record supports the lower court's

finding of invidiously discriminatory purpose and effect.

The

Republican leadership announced its intention to have "as many

(

Republican districts as possible"
much as possible."
and "cracking."

and "to hurt the Democrats as

The plan relied on bizarre shapes, "stacking"

The 1982 election results may appear "fair,"

superficially, . but they actually reflect extreme bias against the
minority.

Although the Democrats did win 13 of the 25 Senate

seats, those 13 seats were Democratic in composition.

In

contrast, only 7 of the 25 seats up for election in 1984 were
Democratic in composition.

Even if Democrats received a slight

majority of the statewide vote again in 1984, they would have
gained only another seven seats for a total of 20 of the 50
seats.
The decision below is supportable on either of two equal
protection rationales:

First, the state intentionally

disadvantaged a class of citizens in the exercise of its
fundamental right to vote.

Second, the apportionment law is a

-10-
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wholly irrational and arbitrary legislative classification,
unsupported by any permissible justification.
behind "one man, one vote."

Appts cannot hide

The creators of the plan clearly

believed that as long as the districts contained populations in
proportion to their representatives, they were free to design a
plan that would keep them in power indefinitely.
Amicus Assemply of the State of California urges the Court
to vacate and remand.

The lower court ignored previous rulings

of this Court summarily affirming three-judge DC rulings that
partisan gerrymandering is not justiciable.

The court's

reliance on Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Karcher was
misplaced.

That concurrence and Justice Powell's separate

dissenting opinion argue for judicial review of political
I

gerrymandering, and Justice White's dissent mentions "racial or
~

political groups" in a general discussion of persons protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.

But that does not mean there were five

votes in favor of justiciability.

On application for a stay from

subsequent orders in Karcher, Justice White joined a dissent by
Justice Brennan that implied that gerrymandering claims were
nonjusticiable.

That view is the correct one.

Political

gerrymandering raises issues that are much more difficult than
those raised by racial gerrymandering.

There are no manageable

standards for evaluating such claims.
4.

DISCUSSION:

This case is clearly far too complicated

for summary affirmance, or, for that matter, for summary
reversal.

The application of the Equal Protection Clause to

situations such as this is, as the court below recognized, an

-11(

important issue that has not been squarely addressed by this
Court.

Although a GVR is a possibility, as amicus suggests, it

seems to me that the Court has sent out enough conflicting
signals about the justiciability of gerrymandering claims that
plenary review is warranted to clear things up.

The lower

court's opinion is not particularly well thought out, and in that
sense this case may not be the best vehicle for resolving the
issue, but given that this is an appeal, I think a note is in
order.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend NPJ.

There is a motion to affirm.
March 7, 1985

(

Wexler

Opin in petn.
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R1EVH1EW & OUTLOOJK
Gerrymandered Dynasty
Like "Dynasty," the saga of Indiana's Eighth Congressional District
continues. Thus does Tip O'Neill, the
Blake Carrington of the House (we
leave it to our readers to flesh out the
.rest of the cast), take every opportunity to perpetuate the Democrats'
dynasty in his chamber.
· Yesterday, Republicans in the
House of Representatives lost on a
motion to have the contested Indiana
seat vacated and to hold a special
election for the disputed seat. The

vote was 229 to 200, with 19 Democrats, led by Texas conservative Rep.
Charles Stenholm, voting for the new
election. Today, if things go according
to plan, the Democrats will vote to
. seat Frank McCloskey, who was just
declared the four-vote winner of a
Democratic-l!ponsored recount of last
-November's close election in the
Eighth District. Yesterday Tip's majority was 70 seats. Today it will be 71
seats.
Most likely, though, the Republican
insurrection will continue. Beltway
analysis this week holds that Newt
Gingrich and his Young Turk allies
have somehow intimidated Bob Michel and the "m<>Qerate" Republican
leadership into pursuing a strategy of
confrontation. Rep. Gingrich's strategy not only looks justified to us, but
inevitable. For what the war in the
House is all about is a majority party
abusing its majority status. The
American political system moves forward only if there is some sense of restraint by the majority party, which
always is in a position to abuse the basic rules of the game. The minority's
recourse is to yell and scream, threat-

smothered minority-sponsored legislation.
The Republicans also feel cheated
by the gerrymandering of congressional districts by Democratic state
legislatures. In the 367 congressional
races both parties entered last November, the Republicans got 500,000
more votes, but the Democrats got 30
more seats. Other factors enter the
partisan balance, including Republican lethargy in not contesting 'more
.seats, but gerrymandering has been
rampant.
That weird flying creature illustrated in our columns was the work of
famed painter Gilbert Stuart, reacting
in 1812 to what a r - - - - - - - ,
historian at the
time called the
"dragonlike contour'' of an electoral district created by the Massachusetts. legislature. It was a redistricting so abusively partisan that 32nd Congressional
it opened itself to
District
obvious ridicule, ...__ _ _ _....,
coining the term gerrymander in
honor of Gov. Elbridge Gerry. Compare the district with what now exists in California, which happens to be
the home of two of Tip's most reliable
Republican-bashers- Tony Coelho and
Leon Panetta.
Take a look at the current shape
of California's 32nd Congressional District in the Los Angeles area, represented by Glenn Anderson, California's former Democratic lieutenant
governor. The dragon returns. And
how about the elastic 27th District?
The respected California Journal described the 27th: "This district, ere~
a ted for former Assemblyman Mel··
Levine, goes to sea at Redondo Beach.
sails around the Palos Verdes Peninsula and lands at
San Pedro to pick
up the harbor populations." The "harbor populations" is
that area floating
at the bottom of the
27th. It isn't land;
those are docked
boats.
Some analysts 27th Concreesional
believe about half
Dilltriet
of the Democrats'
71-seat maioritv l':m hP l:lttrihnt~>fl t/\
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Charles Stenholm, voting for the new
election. Today, if things go according
to plan, the Democrats will vote to
seat Frank McCloskey, who was just
declared the four-vote winner of a
Democratic-sponsored recount of last
November's close election in the
Eighth District. Yesterday Tip's majority was 70 seats. Today it will be 71
seats.
Most likely, though, the Republican
insurrection will continue. Beltway
analysis this week holds that Newt
Gingrich and his Young Turk allies
have somehow intimidated Bob Mi·
chel and the "mo<terate" Republican
leadership into pursuing a strategy of
confrontation. Rep. Gingrich's strat·
egy not only looks justified to us, but
inevitable. For what the war in the
House is all about is a majority party
abusing its majority status. The
American political system moves for·
ward only if there is some sense of re·
straint by the majority party, which
always is in a position to abuse the ba·
sic rules of the game. The minority's
recourse is to yell and scream, threat·
ening the majority with the "fairness
issue" in whatever elections are com·
ing. What is happening in the House is
the American system at work.
The House Democratic leadership
has lost any sense of restraint, with
the Indiana election the last straw.
Since losing the presidential and Senate elections in 1980 and then losing
again on the groundbreaking 1981 tax
and budget bills, Speaker O'Neill and
his lieutenants have squashed theRe·
publican minority. Early-session com·
mittee assignments have been de·
signed to virtually eliminate the mi·
nority party's voting leverage. Democratic committee chairmen and the
speaker's scheduling power have

,.,t..::> m "-'iiluunua, wmcn nappens to oe
the home of two of Tip's most reliable
Republican-bashers-Tony Coelho and
Leon Panetta.
Take a look at the current shape
of California's 32nd Congressional Dis·
trict in the Los Angeles area, repre·
sented by Glenn Anderson, California's former Democratic lieutenant
governor. The dragon returns. And
how about the elastic 27th District?
The respected California Journal de·
scribed the 27th: "This district, ere~
ated for former Assemblyman M~Levine, goes to sea at Redondo Beach.
sails around the Palos Verdes Penin·
sula and lands at
San Pedro to pick
up the harbor populations." The "harbor populations" is
that area floating
at the bottom of the
27th. It isn't land;
those are docked
boats.
Some analysts 27th Concreeeional
believe about half
J>ildrlet
of the Democrats'
71-seat majority can be attributed to
this kind of gerrymandering. Without
such abusive finagling, Republican
strength would surely increase. And
with those added numbers, it's very
likely that more conservative Demo·
crats like Rep. Stenholm would side
often enough with the minority (or officially go over to the other side) to
swing the House.
There is plenty of reason to doubt,
in short, that Tip O'Neill's House ac·
tually represents the opinions of the
American electorate. And when he
uses his artificial majorities to trampie the minority, the Republicans
have not only a right but a duty to call
him to account with whatever re·
sources he has left them.
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CHAMISERS 01'"

..JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , ..JR .

84-1244

July 22, 1985

Davis etal, Appellants v. Brandemer etal,
Appellees

Dear Al:
I invite your attention to the Jurisdictional Statement
filed in the above case. First, the Statement of Questions
Presented is not in conformity with our Rule requiring brevity and clarity. I would not, however, suggest rejection of
the Jurisdictional Statement solely for this reason because
there are other deficiencies.
This is a reapportionment case presenting, among other
questions, a gerrymandering issue that is similar - at least
in some respects - to the issue before the Court two Terms
ago in Kracher v. Daggett, 462 u.s. 725. You will remember
our insistence in Kracher that counsel provide - in "living
color• - the redistricting map that is now included in the
u.s. Reports. In this case, at least in the Jurisdictional
Statement, the only maps are found at A-54 and A-55. These
are illegible and unintelligible. The Appendices generally
suffers the same defects.
Absent objection from other members of the Court, I
suggest that you call these deficiencies to the attention of
the Attorney General of Indiana and request - as a minimum that he reframe and refocus the Questions Presented and that
he provide an appropriate number of copies of maps - in color - showing the redistricting of the Indiana House and Senate that are at issue in this case.
I add, perhaps as a footnote, that the Jurisdictional
Statement is bound in a way that makes it difficult to open
the pages to read them. I am left - as I hardly need add with a rather negative feeling toward the Jurisdictional
Statement.
Sincerely,
Copies to the Conference
cc - To my clerk
LFP/vde

>
t

,.

Julv 22, 1985

84-1244

Davis etal, Appellants v. Branderner etal,
Appellees

Dear Al:
I invitP vour att~~tion to the Jurisdictional Statement
filec in the ~bove ca~e. First, the Statement of Ouestions
Present~d is not in conformity with our Rule reauir nq brPvity and clar.itv. I wonla not, hm·Jever, sugqest reiection of
the Juri~r1ktiona1 St=?.t.ement solelv for this reason because
there are 0ther ~eficiencies .
reanno~tfonm~nt casP presen~ina, amona other
a q"rryman?erina issu~ that is similar -at least
in some respects - to the i.<:;sue ')E'fo.re thE> rourt t\tm 'T'erms
ago 1n Kracher v. D.'3gqett, 462 u.s. 72fj. You will rememher
our insigtence in Kracher that counqel provide - in "living
color"- the renistr:ictinq maP that 5.s no'' include(! i.n the
u.s. RePorts. In this cane, at least in the Jurisdictional
Statement, the onlv maps t:'rt:? founn l'!t A-S4 an~ A-55. ThP.se
ar.e illegible and unint~lliqible.
'l'h~ 1\oo~ndices qeneraJly

Thfs ts a

qu~st1onR,

suffers

th~

sam~

n~fects.

Ah~ent obiection from ott.er meT"lherr: of the Court, I
suggest that vou call these defjcienci~~ to the attention of
the Attornev General of In~iana and request - an a minimum that he reframe and refocus the Oueqt4ons P~PRPnted and that
he oroviile an appropriate number of copi.~s of maP~ - in col...2.!:. - showing the recHstr i.ctinq of the Ina ian a. House and Senate thnt are at issue in thts casp.

add, perhaps as a footnote, that the Jurisdictional
Statement is bound in a way that ma~es it difficult to open
the pages to read them. I am left - as J ha~aly need and with a rather neqative feeling toward the Jurisdictional
Statement.
I

Sincerely,
Copies to the Conference
cc - To my clerl<
LFP/vC!e

July 22, 1985
DAVIS GINA-POW
84-1244

Davis

etal,

Appellants

v.

Brandemer

etal,

Appellees
TO:

My Clerk

FROM:

LFP , Jr.
'Ihis

is

the

Indiana

reapportionment

case

that

may

present an opportunity to put a court together consisting
of

the

four

of

us

who dissented

in Kracher

v.

Daggett,

.-;:

plus Justice Stevens whose concurring opinion could well
have been a dissent.
I have read the opinion of the three-judge court, and
also

Pell' s

Judge

dissenting

in

part.

opinion
I

have

concurring
skimmed

in

the

part

brief

and

of

the

Indiana Attorney General, but see no purpose at this time
in my studying the briefs carefully.
a summer bench memo from my clerk.
this case

-

at

least on

the

I would like to have
The gerrymandering in

basis of

the

more or

untelligable appendices to the Court's opinion -

:Bwr

less

may not

be as extreme as that in Kracher., /\it is evident that the
Republican

majority

in

the

Indiana

Senate

and

House

indulged in gerrymandering the sole purpose of which was
to

discriminate

against

Democrats.

The

opinion

of

the

'I

2.

court
that

suggests,
Indiana

and

this

confirms

my

own

is a notable

.. swing -

state ..

recollection,
and whichever

party happens to be in control has no hesitation to .. rig ..
the voting districts to the disadvantage of the minority
party.
As was made clear in the several opinions in Kracher,
the

Court

long

has

accepted

the

view

uncritically

that

gerrymandering per se is essentailly a political question
to

be

left

largely

to

the

party

system.

In

my

view,

however, gerrymandering presents an equal protection issue
when - in additon to its political purpose - it disregards
/\.;

all

other

example,

relevant

the court found

to assure
none

requirement
in

In

this

case,

one

always
Kracher,

consideration

to

vote..
has
the
the

for

that the enly consideration was

Republican control by str ick adherence

person,

evident

considerations.

requirement
seemed

to

(dubious

me

to

be).

to the
as

that

As

was

Republicans

in

Indiana gave

no

.. community

of

interests ..

or

.. compactness of districts .. that are components of a fak
~stern

of

electing

a

legislature.

The

Republicans

without even a single Democratic member of the cornrni ttee
that

drew

up

the

plan

unbashedly

pursued

objective of maximizing Republican control.

the

sole

3.

In add i ti ion to the gerrymandering equal protection
~sue,

a

separate

suit

was

certain black citizens.
at all

closely,

I

brought

by

the

NAACP

and

Although I have not examined this

judge

that

the

three-judge court was

unanimously of the view that there was no violation of the
Voting

Rights

Act

or

the

Equal

Protection

Clause

with

respect to the relatively few blacks in Indiana.
I
care,

suggest that my clerk not only read Kracher with
and all of the opinions written in it, but take a

close look at the map that I insisted be included in the

u.s.
"fun"

Reports

in

"living color".

a

good deal of

indicating our respective views as to what the map

really looked like.
that

We had

it could

running

with

be
a

The majority vote,

viewed

as

football.

a

as I recall, was

caricature

The

only

of

map of

a

halfback

the

Indiana

districts available to us at this time is untelligible.

I

am requesting the Clerk to obtain and circulate - in color
-maps that will be more helpful.

In

sum,

"impartial"

it
judge

gerrymandering,
where

more

is
in

aided

often

than

evident
my

view

that

I

of

the

by computers,
not

it

is

am

has

used

not

extent
reached
by

the

a

wholly

to

which

a

point

party

in

4.

control to violate the voting rights - and hence the Equal
Protection Clause - of the minority party and of minority
groups.

This may not be the case in which to set the law

"straight", but I would like for my clerk to take a close
look at whether an opportunity is afforded to restore some
commonsense and

rationality

to what has happened

to the

"one man one vote" doctrine as manipulated with the aid of
computers.

LFP, JR.

LFP/vde
- to file

cc

To

_,_

___

-

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20543

July 31, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JUSTICE POWELL
FROM:
RE:

Per your note of July 22 in the above case, I have
contacted counsel for the appellants and he will furnish colored
copies of the two maps for the use of the Court.
I suggested
that the size be made approximately 16 x 20 and directed his
attention to the Karcher opinion as a guide. I note that in the
merits brief of the appellants, the number of questions presented
has been reduced by counsel to five, whereas in the jurisdictional statement he had listed ten.
For your information, when I received the joint appendix,
I refused to accept it because printed data including the maps,
did not meet the Court's print size and counsel was so notified.
By copy of this memorandum, Mr. Gullickson is being
instructed to transmit the maps to the Court in advance of the
argument, scheduled for October 7, 1985.

Copies to the Conference
cc:

Bill Gullickson

'.

arne 09j22j85

arne

09/22/85

BENCH MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:
No.

September 22, 1985

Anne

84-1244, Davis v. Bandemer

(s~Jct- ~~)

( <9-c.t 7, ( t}g~)
Questions Presented
(1)

Is

a

claim

of

partisan

political

gerrymandering

justiciable?
(2)
tionment

Did the DC correctly hold that the Indiana reappor-

law violated

reapportionment

the

equal

constituted

protection clause

partisan

political

because

the

gerrymandering

that the State failed to justify on the basis of neutral criteria?
Background
This action was commenced by appellees, individual citizens of

Indiana who are members of the Democratic party, chal-

2.

lenging the 1981 Indiana law that reapportioned the state's legislative districts.

Appellees alleged that the law was intended

to and does discriminate against Democrats

in violation of the
gq~

equal protection clause of

Fourteenth Amendment .1 The 6 is-

"'

trict Court for
sent of Judge

the

the Southern District of Indiana, over the dis-

Pell,

agreed with appellees and declared the law

unconstitutional.
The

DC essentially

.llstice Stevens'

u.s.

725,

belonged

744

to an

followed
opinion

(1983).

the analysis set forth
in Karcher v.

Daggett,

in
462

First,

the DC determined that appellees
(~)
identifiable political group whose geographical
.

~

distribution was sufficiently ascertainable to have been considered in drawing district boundaries.
established that,

Second,

the appellees had

in relevant districts or the State as a whole,

their proportionate voting influence had been adversely affected
by the challenged scheme.

At this point in its analysis, the DC

relied solely on statistics showing that the number of Democratic

Appellees also include black Democrats (the "NAACP appellees")
who alleged that the reapp~ plan intentionally
~ fragmented black voting concentrations in violation of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and perpetuated dilution of
black votin~ strength in violation of the Voting Rights Act of
1965. The DC found that the NAACP appellees were entitled to
relief under the Fourteenth Amendment, not because of racial
gerrymandering, but because the plan ha
adverse impac on
them as Democrats.
The DC found no violation of the F1 eenth
Amendment-o r of the Voting Rights Act. The NAACP appellees have
elected not to file a cross-appeal from that portion of the
judgment denying their Fifteenth Amendment and Voting Rights
claims.
Instead, they have filed a brief in support of the DC's I~
judgment that the plan discriminated against Democrats and blacks
as Democrats.
1

3.

candidates elected was disproportionate' to the number of Democratic votes cast.
tice

Stevens'

Third, based on the factors specified in J~s l

opinion

in

Karcher,

the

appellees

made

a

pr 1m,

facie showing that raised a rebuttable presumption of discrimination.
Then

the

DC shifted

the

burden

to

the

that the plan was supported by neutral criteria

State to show ~
n-...
justifying the sM

plan's discriminatory impact on the elective process.

The expla-

nations advanced by the State, adherence to the "one person, one
vote"

requirement

and

maintaining

black

representation

in

the

legislature, were not sufficient to overcome appellees' showing.
Judge Pell dissented because he believed that appellees
had

not

established

strength as Democrats.

that

the

plan

had

diluted

their

voting

A comparison of the percentage of Demo-

cratic votes cast statewide

for

legislative candidates and the

number of seats actually won did not, by itself, prove vote dilution.

Judge Pell used a different method of evaluating Democrat-

ic voting strength: that method revealed that Democratic vote had
not been diluted.

Accordingly,

he concluded that there was no

need for the State to justify its reapportionment plan.
Discussion
I.

Justiciability
Appellants argue that a claim of partisan political ger-

rymandering is nonjusticiable.

The core of this argument seems

to be that there are no judicially manageable standards to guide
inquiry in this area.

I believe that a claim of partisan politi-

cal gerrymandering is justiciable and that the Court should have

"f

4.

qu ~ion

tools

to evaluate such a claim.

m
erl

a

~/

Baker v. Carr, 369

similar

argument

in

u.s.

186 (1962), the Court reject-

connection

with

an

equal

protection

claim premised on the state's failure to reapportion state legislative districts despite substantial growth and redistribution of
population.

The Court held that this challenge to apportionment

did not present a nonjusticiable political question.
protection
shown,

claim

was

justiciable,

and,

if

The equal

discrimination

was

the right to relief was not diminished merely because the

discrimination related to political rights.
I

The argument that the claim in Baker was nonjusticiable
relied
pointed

on cases
o1:1t

decided

that

under

review of

the Guaranty Clause.

those

and other

The Court

political question

..
.
d octr1ne
.
cases revealed t h at \ ·t h e pol1t1cal
quest1on
arose ou t o f

the

relationship

between

the

judiciary

and

the

coordinate

l:ranches of the Federal government, not out of the federal judiciary's

relationsh tf" to

question cases,

the States.
After reviewing political
t-.~~
the Court~ stated that the equal protection chal-

lenge to the apportionment law had none of the characteristics of
a political question:

(/

'!he question here is the consistency of state action
with the Federal Constitution.
We have no question
decided, or to be decided, by a political branch of
government coequal with this Court.
Nor do we risk
embarrassment of our government abroad, or grave disturbance at home if we take issue with Tennessee as to
the constitutionality of her action here challenged.
Nor need the appellants .
. ask the Court to enter
upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking.
Judicial standards under
the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, an
o en to courts since the enact-

'

I

!>.

~9

ment of the Fourteenth Amendment , to determine
that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply
arbitrary and capricious action. -u.s. at 226 (emphasis in original).
~ough

record,

Baker presented different facts from those in this

its analysis of

justiciability seems
-:j~t~le.

ase _.is

hold in

mpel a

the Court has determined that claims of racial gerrymandering
justiciable.

v

See Whitcomb v.

Chavis,

403

u.s.

124

(1971).

ar~·
The

standards governing inquiry in the racial cases could be adapted
to govern analysis of a dlaim of partisan political gerrymandering.

The Court's reluctance to intrude onto a state's legisla-

tive process and to inquire into state legislators' motive suggests that the test by which to evaluate a claim of partisan gerrymandering

should

be

tailored

to avoid

undue

intrusion.

But

that reluctance would not seem to justify holding nonjusticiable
a claim that the State deliberately manipulated district boundaries so as to discriminate against a politically weak group.
Many of appellants'
consider

arguments for why the Court should

this claim nonjusticiable

assert a

lack of

judicially

discoverable and manageable standards for evaluating the claim.
'!he Court has stated that,

in deciding

if a claim falls within

the political question category, "the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination" is a "dominant consideration."
Cbleman v. Miller,

307

u.s.

433,

454-55.

That concern seems to

arise in the context of deciding if the Constitution has assigned
a question to another branch of the federal Government.
no

doubt

that

identifying

equal

protection

1$~

~
Moreover, ~

violations

There is
is

the

6.

business of the federal courts even if the violation is asserted
with respect to a political right.
S:>rne of appellants'

arguments that there are no satis-

factory criteria by which to evaluate a claim of

gerryrnanderi~

~ern to boil down to the assertion that the claim may be hard to /~

prove.

In

this connection,

appellants assert

that the

factors

ooed by the DC were not effective measures of discriminatory irnpact on Democrats.

That statistics are often difficult to evalu-

ate or that no one factor suffices to raise a presumption of discrimination does not convince me that the claim is nonjusticiable
rut

only

that

plaintiffs

may

have

difficulty

establishing

the

claim.
Finally,

the

amicus

brief

of

the

California

Assembly

argues that the Court should decide that this claim of partisan
ger ryrnander ing

is nonj us tic iable,

while leaving open the possi-

bility that some such claims may be justiciable.

This approach

seems unwarranted and contrary to that taken by the Court in the
racial gerrymandering cases.

A claim of partisan

either is or is not justiciable.

rJ

gerryrnanderin~

Whether or not the record sup-

IOrts the claim, of course, is a separate question.
arguments seem to rely on a
~at

in

c:".d4

The~ arnicus

notion of rough political justice,

is, while the Democrats may have been discriminated against
Indiana,

~ese

they are in power

arguments miss the point.

in other states.

I

believe that

Democrats in Indiana are claim-

ing that they were discriminated against because of their politi-

---

cal beliefs.

The

fact

that Democrats

~~~

in other states have not

~

7.

been discriminated against does not seem to render

the

Indiana

Democrats' claim nonjusticiable.
II.

--

Equal Protection
_,
I believe that this case does provide the Court with the !

opportunity to show that reapportionment should take account of
CO~ e "one man, one vote" principle.

Merely recog-

nizing that partisan political gerrymandering may state an equal
protection claim would establish that an effort to avoid numerical

disparity

is

not

the

only

objective

of

reapportionment.

the Court could_ find/~

r.breover, depending on

an equal protection violation on the facts of this case,

s~of

which are egregious.
~

Plaintiffs-Appellees' Showi~ (~~)

A.

Appellees

the 11first

satisfy

. '\

step

of

analysis, showing that they are members of an

equal

protection ~

identi ~le grqup, ~
~

the D~mocra ~~arty.

The State argues that a protectible polit- ~

ical class cannot be adequately defined.
what disingenuous,
the

Republicans

since in

apparently

cognizable group for
their vote.
change and

I

This argument is some-

drawing up the reapportionment map,
believed

that

purposes of deciding

the

Democrats

how best

were a

to minimize

agree with the State that political affiliations

that voters

registered with one party may decide to

vote with another party,

but

I

think

1..

ll

that registered Democrats

can be viewed as constituting a group for these purposes.

gerrymandering cases; appellees must prove discriminatory purpose
~

and effect.

See Mobile v. Bolden, 446

u.s.

55 (1980)

(a reappor-

v.

e~l

tionment plan may be "perfectly acceptable under

p~on

standards, but invidiously discriminatory because • . • employed
to minimize • • • the voting strength of racial or politcal ele-

____

rrents").

other______,facts,

Among

appellees

came

forward

with

the

following:
(1)

The

law was

lacked fairness.
mittee

enacted

that adopted

in

the

to procedures

that

The political structure of the conference comthe plan was designed

elude, and did exclude, Democrats.
vealed

pursuant

final

hours of

the

intentionally to ex-

Details of the plan were relegislative

session,

leaving

little time for the plan to be scrutinized and debated.

Deposi-

tion testimony by Republican leaders revealed that th~ ppor- [ ~

tionment process was

J/

iercely partisan and

suggested

that

the )

only legislative goal was to maximize Republican control.
( 2)

The plan was

the product of

the majority party's

application of computer technology to mapmaking.

The Republican

State Committee, not the State legislature, hired a computer sys~m

that used a data base including the political complexion of

the State's voting units based on election returns.
(3)

~·

___

The

zarre"

shapes.
___..

Jersey

presented

l-(

House

'-\

map

is

~

-

filled

with

"uncouth"

The map is not as startling as
in

Karcher.

But

many

House

and

"bi-

the map of New
districts

have

ffiapes that are sufficiently irregular to require some explanation.
73.

See House Districts 20,

22,

25,

45,

46,

48,

62,

66,

70,

The DC found that these shapes could not be justified on the

basis of geographical distribution of population.

---

--

~.

-

(4)
l't

1.. .. AA ..A~AAA
/ VVV(l/7 v r ..,..,~-I

lines, ~_

While the plan generally preserves township

d1' sregards

coun t

----------..

s orne

b oun d ar 1es.
·

_____..-

of

t he

a number of townships from each.

d 1str
·
·
-req~
1cts
~

House

have tentacles ~hat meander through several count'

..._,

picking up ~

The DC observed that the county

government is the center of local affairs,

so the plan has the

effect of dissecting communities into abstract shapes lacking in
common interests.

This makes

it difficult

for

voters

to focus

fueir political activities and would likely lead to voter disillusionment and nonparticipation.

The Senate map also disregards

oounty lines.
(5)

The plan contains inconsistent and unexplained use
---~---------------~-..::--~--· --'of multi-member districts.
Multi-member districts were used in
-::...-

~

some urban areas and not in others, in some areas where they had
been used previously and not in others, and in some areas where
their

use

required

combining

from a different county.
tricts

were

designed

"stacking"

Democrats

ting"

among

them

to

rural

townships

with

urban

The DC found that the multi-member dis-

--

minimize

Democratic

voting

power

into large majority districts and

other

areas

districts.

This

by

"split-

discriminatory

impact

fell heavily on the black population because blacks had a predicta

candidates.

A black

Representative offered an alternative plan that would have eliminated all multi-member districts;

the plan received virtually no

attention.

{.U-1-

(6)

In th e

all 100 seats were up for

election.~

Democratic candidates received about 51.9% of the vote, with 43
Democrats

elected

to

the

House;

Republican candidates

tA.jt-

/1rv-

received~

.LVo

about

48.1%

House.

of

the

vote,

with

57

Rep,u blicans

elected

In the Senate, 25 seats were up for election.

candidates received about 53.1% of the vote,

to

the

Democratic

with 13 Democrats

elected; Republican candidates received about 46.9% of the vote,
with 12 Republicans elected.
(7)
with

respect

Appellees also presented some startling statistics
to

'---------------------------that the House

~~ es

plan carved

into

~

nulti-member districts.

In Marion

(House Districts 48,

49,

50,

51, 52) and Allen (House Districts 19 and 20) counties, the plan
~

used

{t~.fe ~}!~

In those counties, Democratic

didates for the House received 46.3% of the vote, but won only
of

21

seats.

counties

was

The

State

inevitable

explains
because

'
that

of

vote

dilution

residential

3

can- ~~ _1

in

these

patterns

where

Democratic voters are heavily concentrated in the urban areas.
In deciding whether or not appellees offered sufficient
proof of discriminatory purpose,

it will be necessary precisely
-t..

to define '~hat purpose is invidious in this context.

A question

can be raised as to whether there is anyth ~publi-~~~
cans "discriminating" against Democrats and vice-versa; in other

~

-z:

words, Republicans will always seek to strenghten their position
vis-a-vis Democrats and to pass Republican legislation over Democratic legislation.

Thus, dis: riminatory purpos ~n this context [ ~-

It

\\

must encompass something beyond party struggle.

The purpose that

is invidious is the purpose to exclude from the elective
individual voters who hold certain political beliefs.

~ purpose

rocess

Where

a

reapportionment plan,

~

~

~
that ~.

is shown and there is an absence of legitimate justifi: -

tion for

~f

the State may be held to have

~.

ll.

acted with discriminatory purpose.

Certain facts

particularly the procedures leading

up to enactment of

and

the

----- ----

statements

p.Irpose.

A difficult
have

offered

Republican

of

question

sufficient

leaders,

arises

proof

of

in

show

deciding

discriminatory

in this case,
the

law

discr ~ atory

if

appellees

impact:

the

Cburt will have to decide whether a plaintiff must make a strong
showing

of

vote

dilution based on statistics

before

the Court

will go on to consider other evidence of discriminatory impact.
The statewide statistics are fairly weak, even though they shouW
b=

considered

swing state,

from

the

meaning

perspective

of

Indiana's

history

as

a

that even a small amount of vote diluticn

could have an impact on election outcomes.
I believe that it is at this point in the analysis _that

---------- -

reap~ ess.

cpportunity to define

It is here that the Court will have the

the right in issue as more than the mere

guarantee that "one man" gets "one vote."

In doing so,

it will

be necessary carefully to explain that the Court is not announc-

-

ing a right to proportional representation or a right to be protected from political defeat.
75-80

(1980)

(opinion of

-

See Mobile v. Bolden, 446

Stewart,

J.)

u.s.

55,

(substantive right under

Equal Protection Clause to equal participation in elections does
not guarantee proportional representation) •
Under the cases, the Constitutional mandate of "fair and
effective representation," Karcher,

462

u.s.

at 788 (Powell, J.,

dissenting), guarantees the "right to exercise the franchise in a

~·

free and unimpaired manner."

Reynolds v, Sims, 377

u.s.

533, 562

Though one form of unconstitutional impairment may be

(1964).

demonstrated through population disparities, id. at 568, the mandate of

fair

and

effective representation also should prohibit
~'

/L

/(

'-\

fue State from enacting a law that has the purpose and effect of

------

erecting barriers to the franchise rights of a cognizable group

aE voters.
~-----r

were

Once a plaintiff shows that the

"conceived and operated

as purposeful devices

discrimination, Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
State

should

not

showing that the

be

permitted

franchise

reapportionment laws

to

u.s.

defend

to further"

124, 149 (1971), the
its

action

solely

barriers are not perfect,

that

by
is,

fuat the barriers do not totally impede the group's access to the
elective process.
Viewed

this

in

light,

statistics

showing
-----

disproportionality are not the only method of proving discrimina-

@

tory

impact.

lack

of

As

you

compactness,

explained

in

an~eviation

Karcher,

/

rregular

shapes,

from established boundaries

1

}{~

all are presumptive evidence of unconstitutional discrimination.
B.

State Justifications
The State basically justified its reapportionment plan

m

two grounds. 2

First, it adhered to "one man, one vote."

population deviations

between districts

in

the

House

The

plan was

2 The State claims that the plan may also be justified on the
grounds that it represented the "least changed plan," it
preserved the cores of prior districts, and it avoided contests
between incumbents.
I find nothing to indicate that these
purposes guided the legislature at the time of drawing up the
maps. The State also claims that appellees failed to show that
the bizarre shapes of the districts favored Republicans.

5~/.J-

13.

1.05% and in the Senate plan was 1.15%.

Based on the DC's opin-

ion, geographical distribution of population fails to justify the
irregular shapes of the districts.

Nor does "one man, one vote"

~stify the other factors contributing to the showing of partisan

gerrymandering.
Second,

the State claimed that its reapportionment plan

was designed to protect black electoral interests.

This was an

after-the-fact

that

justification based

on

the

accident

blacks

had achieved proportional representation in the 1982 elections.
The NAACP appellees claim that this justification is illusory and
that the reapportionment plan was designed to minimize

minori~

voting strength:
(1)

Black legislators unanimously opposed the reappor-

tionment plan.
(2)

The House plan fractures black population concen-

trations in large urban areas and then employs multimember districts to impair black voting strength.
ers

are

The

House plan

Thus,
groups,

concentrated

the

splits

black

each of

in Fort Wayne,
Fort Wayne

voters
which

from

is

sharing no community of

which

is

in Allen County.

between Districts

Fort

Wayne

then placed

white Republican populations,

For example, black vot-

are

in a

19 and

broken

into

district with

two

large

including persons from rural

interests with urban blacks.

20.

are~

A similar

strategy was followed in Indianapolis, which is in Marion County.
(3)

This

asserted

justification

does

not

explain

the

inconsistent use of multimember districts or the bizarre shapes
produced by the mapmakers.

( 4)
prior

to

Deposition

the

election

1982

~epublican

testimony of
reveals

no

concern

------------------representation.

blacks proportional

leaders
with

taken

ensuring

~

To evaluate the

justifications proffered by the State,

it is necessary to identify the level of equal protection scruti~

to be employed.

tiny the DC used.

It is not entirely clear what level of scruSince the DC stated that the right to vote

a "fair and effective manner"

is a fundamental right,

m

I assume

that the DC believed that strict scrutiny was appropriate.
Your

dissenting

opinion

in

Karcher

indicates

that

an

equal protection violation may be established where gerrymandering reaches the level of discrimination described by Justice Stewhere

vens:
favor

reapportionment

serves

one segment--whether racial,

"no purpose
ethnic,

other

religious,

economic,

or political--that may occupy a position of strength at a partieular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment
~

the community," it violates equal protection.

(emphasis added) •

~rcher

462 u.s. at 748

The "no purpose" language suggests a rational

basis level of scrutiny.

Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in

does not identify a level of scrutiny, presumably because

of his belief that the equal protection cases really apply only
me level of scrutiny,
~nter,

105 s.ct.

see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Li vinq

3249,

3260-62

(1984),

a belief that is appar-

ently not shared by a majority of the Court.
To avoid

-

esses,
1

(ra t

see

undue

Karcher,

462

intrusion
u.s.

at

into state
788

(Powell,

'
1 b as1s
'
' ' may b e appropr1ate.
'
1ona
scrut1ny

legislative procJ.,

dissenting),

Th 1s
'
1 eve 1 o f

~

~

scru-

tiny could be justified by reference to the broad discretion that

----- ---------------

states must have in regulating elections within their borders.
'---------Moreover, I suspect that some of the Justices will believe that
this case does not present a
lieve

that

the

right

basis with other
vote."

fundamental right,

to participate

voters guarantees

in

since they be-

elections

no more

than

on

an

equal

"one man,

one

Similarly, I suspect that some Justices will believe that ~

A~!
Since

-

Democrats are not a suspect class.

appellees made a fairly

strong showing of discrimination and since the State's justifications are weak, however, it is possible to conclude that the re-

'-------------------

.rEcent cases
~ck

Cb.

in which

the Court has invalidated state laws for

v

of a rational basis, see, e.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance
v.

Ward,

105

s.ct.

1676

(1985),

demonstrate

that

rational

heightened

scrutiny

basis scrutiny has teeth.
I can

think

of

arguments

should be invoked in this case.

for

why

For example, a State's decision

to classify people based on political affiliation seems to serve
no legitimate State purpose, no matter what context in which the
discrimination is made.

This analysis suggests that classifica-

tion on the basis of political belief is suspect, no matter what
the size of the political party involved.

Since discrimination

on the basis of political beliefs does not have the same invidious

history

as

racial

discrimination,

however,

I

doubt

that

strict scrutiny would be invoked.
Heightened scrutiny has the potential for undue intrusion

V1~
.
( -' 1nto

t he

s tate

legislative process.

I

feel

strongly

that

the

Court

should

take

therefor e:--;ould

the

least

require

a

intrusive

course

strong prima

facie

available

and,

showing of dis-

crimination before requiring the State to come forward with neutral justifications for the reapportionment.

Then, I would eval-

.

~
~

~

uate the State's explanation under rational basis scrut1ny.
Conclusion

I believe that claims of partisan political gerrymandering are justiciable.

to a

In evaluating an equal protection challenge

reapportionment plan,

avoids

undue

intrusion

the Court

into

should

adopt

a

test that

legisla~ e -2r 2cess

the

and

that

avoids creating the potential for litigation every time a political party suffers defeat at the polls.
tics

are

somewhat

weak,

their

Court decides that it will
partisan discrimination

~t

in

should

prohibit

the

claim may

not

be

upheld

if

the

go on to consider other indicia of

the

showing of vote dilution.

Since appellees• statis-

absence of a

strong statistical

But I believe that equal protection

State

from

seeking

to

impair

the

voting

rights of citizens because of political affiliation, so that the
oth er f ac t s
considered
case.

0

(Z)purpose and 1mpact s h ould be
.
d 1scr
.
. .
s h ow1ng
1m1natory
along

with

the

-

statistics as part of

a prima facie

On the facts of this case, I believe that appellees made a

sufficient showing
neutral

to require

expl m ation ' for

tlfe

the State to come forward with a

i?1 a; .

'Wtiet,; er ~ r

...

not

the

""-

State • s

justifications are adequate may depend on the level of scrutiny
adopted.

In my view, the State's justifications are weak and ...!!§Y
~

not survive rational basis scrutiny.

~d

sCi

....__

lfp/ss 09/25/85
Tentative Outline (9/25)
84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer (3 judge court Ind.

- Reapportionment)
1.

Political (partisan) gerrymandering is justiciable.

(a) An Equal Protection issue.
(b) Baker v. Carr rejected view of nonjusticiability.
(c) Whitcomb v. Chavis (1971) held racial gerrymandering to be justiciable.
(d) Democrats in Indiana claim discrimination because of their political beliefs.
2.

Appropriate Equal Protection analysis.

(a)
"One man one vote" relevant - not controlling.
(b) Other statistics also relevant but no~control
ling. E.g., 100 seats in House up for election: Democrats
received 51.9% of vote but elected only 43 members.
(not
unusual).
(c) Other factors relevant to whether there was
invidious discrimination against Democratic voters.
(i) The Plan was proposed in final
hours of session. Its proposal and
adoption were fiercely partisan, making
clear only purpose was to maximize
Republican control.
(ii) Although not as absurd as
Karcher, the House Plan in particular
resulted in bizarre shapes - no sense.
(iii) Although township lines
generally were preserved, countz boundaries
w~r~~%n9r~d.
Some of the ~rstricts meander
throug several counties - despite fact
that county governments (not the townships)
are in charge of local affairs.
Both House and Senate Districts ignore
county lines - only purpose to leave Democrats
out of elective process.
(iv) Inconsistent and unexplained use
of multimember Districts.
DC found purpose was to minimize
Democratic voting power by "stacking"
Democrats into large Democratic Districts
and "splitting" them in other Districts.
(v) Impact of this fell heavily on
black voters.

lfp/ss 09/25/85
Tentative Outline (9/25}
84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer (3 judge court Ind.
- Reapportionment}
1.

Political (partisan} gerrymandering is justiciable.

(a} An Equal Protection issue.
(b) Baker v. Carr rejected view of nonjusticiability.
(c) Whitcomb v. Chavis (1971} held racial gerrymandering to be justiciable.
(d) Democrats in Indiana claim discrimination because of their political beliefs.
2.

Appropriate Equal Protection analysis.

(a}
"One man one vote" relevant - not controlling.
(b) Other statistics also relevant but no~control
ling. E.g., 100 seats in House up for election: Democrats
received 51.9% of vote but elected only 43 members.
(not
unusual}.
(c) Other factors relevant to whether there was
invidious discrimination against Democratic voters.
(i} The Plan was proposed in final
hours of session. Its proposal and
adoption were fiercely partisan, making
clear only purpose was to maximize
Republican control.
(ii} Although not as absurd as
Karcher, the House Plan in particular
resulted in bizarre shapes - no sense.
(iii} Ali:hough township lines
generally were preserved, countx boundaries
w~r~~*nEr~d.
Some of the ~[stricts meander
throug several counties - despite fact
that county governments (not the townships}
are in charge of local affairs.
Both House and Senate Districts ignore
county lines - only purpose to leave Democrats
out of elective process.
(iv} Inconsistent and unexplained use
of multimember Districts.
DC found purpose was to minimize
Democratic voting power by "stacking"
Democrats into large Democratic Districts
and "splitting" them in other Districts.
(v} Impact of this fell heavily on
black voters.
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BAND SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Anne

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Feb. 6, 1986

84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer
Having

read

and

reread

BRW' s

opinion

and

your

draft dissent of 1/31/86, I have some doubts as to exactly
how

best

to

write

"gerrymandering",
redistricting

our

dissent.

Given

loosely defined,

plans

are

adopted,

the

fact

that

is a way of life when
as

your

draft

clearly

recognizes, all drawing of district lines for the purpose
of

political

concedes,

advantage

however,

gerrymandering
where

the

-

are

that

not
this

invalid.

Justice

practice

White

known

as

may violate the Equal Protection Clause

plaintiffs

may

prove

"both

intentional

discrimination against an identifiable political group and
an actual discriminatory effect on that group".
He has no difficulty
in this case.

in finding

P.

13.

"intent" to discriminate

It would probably be easy to show "intent"

in almost any gerrymandering of districts.

But,

as your

draft emphasizes, BRW does not make clear how a cognizable
group

(here

members

of

"discriminatory effect"

the
as

Democratic
that

party)

can

show

term is used by Justice

2.

He concludes there has been a failure to make the

White.

"threshold

showing

of

discriminatory

vote

dilution"

necessary to constitute an equal protection violation (p.
24) •

A basic
found,

point

in

his

memorandum

is,

as

the

DC

that in this case the plaintiffs below (members of

the Democratic party)

"claim that the 1981 apportionment

discriminates

Democrats

That is,

against

on

a

statewide

basis".

that Democratic voters "over the state as whole,

not Democratic voters in particular districts", have been
subjected to unconstitutional discrimination.
It

seems

to

me,

Anne,

that'

makes one of two basic errors.

this

P. 13.
is

where

BRW

If Democratic voters in a

number of critical districts are discriminated against (as
certainly

is

the

case

here),

the

effect

Democratic voters over the state as whole.
Democrats

lose

control of

the

entire

state

is

felt

by

In short, the
legislative,

administrative - and often judicial - components of state
government.

BRW seems

to over look

this entirely.

This,

it seems to me, is one of the fatal flaws in his opinion,
and

therefore

should be

the

focal point of our dissent.

Of course, your draft does make the point;
needs clarification and emphasis.

I believe it

3.

The

second

and

closely

related

flaw

in

BRW's

reasoning, perhaps necessary to his "statewide" argument,
is

that

if

one

man one vote

is

recognized

in the newly

created district there has been no discrimination.

Here,

his opinion - as your draft makes clear - is that Reynolds
v. Sims requires consideration of other "neutral factors"
in addition to one man one vote.

BRW does not mention any

other neutral factor.
If

I

am

correct

in

the

foregoing,

dissent requires some reorganization.

our

draft

Although I may not

have thought this out as carefully as I could if you and I
discussed

it

together,

I

suggest

the

following

as

a

possible outline for changes in your preliminary draft:
1.
on

p.

1,

Omit what is now the long paragraph beginning
and

substitute

something

along

the

following

lines:
"This
majority

of

redistricting
itself

case
a
plan,

presents

state
and

the

question

legislature
for

in power statewide,

the

in

purpose

whether
adopting

of

a
a

entrenching

may rely solely on the factor

of one man one vote, and ignore all other neutral factors
relevant to a nondiscriminatory redistricting plan."

4.

Justice
noted above

-

White's

with

the

memorandum

as

agrees

District Court

"that

1

have

in order

to

succeed the Democratic plaintiffs "were required to prove
both

intentional discrimination

political

group

that

group."

this

case

[against

and

The

an

actual

memorandum

supports

"a

Democrats]

against

indentifiable

discriminatory

agrees

finding

was

an

that

that

the

the

intentional."

effect

on

record

in

discrimination

P.

14.

Justice

White concludes, however, that there was a failure to make
a

"prima

facie

case

of

an

equal

protection

violation"

because the plaintiffs below failed to show that there was
statewide "discriminatory vote dilution".

Perhaps Justice

White would agree - though I do not think he has said so that

serious

strength

statewide

would

discrimination

occur
in

a

dilution
if

the

of

plan

sufficient

a

party's

at

number

issue
of

voting
involved

districts

to

achieve statewide control by one political group or party.
His memorandum appears to hold that no such discrimination
exists so long as the requirement of one man one vote is
met

in

the

relevant

districts.

In

short,

ignores all other relevant neutral factors.
you properly

have emphasized,

is

his

opinion

This view, as

irreconcilable with

the

5.

teaching

of

Reynolds

v.

Sims,

u.s.

377

533

(1964)

and

memorandum

along

the

other relevant cases. 1
2.

A

summary

of

BRW's

foregoing lines could establish the framework for the more
detailed discussion to follow.

Your Part I

(p. 3 to the

top of p. 5) is fine, and could follow.
3.
If

for

I will now comment,

Anne,

on your

Part II.

we conclude that the essence of what I suggest above
the

beginning

of our

dissent

is correct,

paragraph in Part II should be rewritten.

the

first

I suggest the

following as a rough draft:
"Gerrymandering is
distortion

of

partisan or
Prielsler,
The

term

district

personal
394

u.s.

• the deliberate and arbitrary

boundaries

and

populations

political purposes•
526,

'gerrymandering •,

538

(Fortas,

however,

is

Kirkpatrick

J.,

for
v.

concurring). 2

loosely

used

to

include the common practice of the party in power - when

1

Anne:
The foregoing merely purports to state in
conclusory terms my understanding of what BRW is saying in
his opaque memorandum.
You have emphasized his rejection
of statistics.
It seems to me this is subordinate to his
basic reasoning, namely that so long as there is one man
one vote provided in each district (and I suppose this is
a simplistic matter of statistics) , other factors are
~rrelevant.
We can talk about this.
Add here a dictionary definition of gerrymandering.

.·
6.

it has the opportunity to redistrict - to do so to its own
advantage.

The

always

almost
variety

of

intent
is

to

discriminate

present.

the

this

sense

depending

Moreover,

circumstances,

in

effect

of

on

a

redistricting

often is unfair in the sense that the legislative bodies indeed, this also occurred in Congress - do not accurately
reflect

the

political

popular

voting

parties.

gerrymandering

strength

Thus,

the

that generally

of

the

principal

difference

between

is accepted and that which

becomes discriminatory in an Equal Protection sense is not
easy to identify.

It is for

this reason that courts can

avoid their responsibility to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause

by

is

nonjusticiable.

(Here we will cite dissenting opinions) •

I agree fully,

however,

finding

with

presented

that

the

Justice White

by

the

justiciability of

issue

that a

allegations
an

Equal

justiciable

in

this

Protection issue

issue

case.
in a

is
The

voting

rights case is made explicitly clear by prior decisions of
this Court.
Baker

v.

Fortas'
properly

(Here,

Carr

and

definition
focused

'deliberate[ly]

and

Anne, start with Reynolds v. Sims and
add
of
on

several

other

discriminatory
whether

cases).

gerrymandering

district

arbitrari[ly]

Justice

boundaries

distort[ed].

In

is
are
this

7.

case,

the District Court expressly so found with respect

to a substantial number of districts, with the purpose and
the

result

of

participation

depriving

in

the

Democratic

political

voters

process

until

of

equal
As

1991.

noted above Justice White looked only to whether the oneman-one-vote rule of Reynolds v. Sims had been adhered to
each district and when viewed statewide."
The
to

rewrite)

foregoing
would

paragraph on p.

(that you,

be a

Anne,

substitute

5 of your

draft.

should feel free

for

the

Pages

6,

present
7,

8,

full
9 and

including the first full paragraph on p. 10 are very good.
My editing is stylistic.
Your

4.

Part

III,

p.

10-19,

thought than I have given it.
is

that

much

revision
views

of

it

suggested

expressed

can

in

I

Part

require

more

My present view, however,

be

above,

may

omitted
have

Ill.

entirely.

included

But

I

do

some
think

In
of
it

my
the
is

unnecessary to debate with BRW his definition of "intent",
though

I

agree

with

what

you

say.

He

agrees

that

discriminatory intent existed, and this is sufficient for
our purposes.
In view of changes suggested above,
omit the first paragraph

in Part

III.

I also would

Although we will

8.

certainly want to cite Gaffney somewhere,
now Part A (p. 11, 12) can be omitted.
improve on or

reframe

gerrymandering.
excellent

We

quote

omit, however,
14,

15,

Abe Fortas'
also

from

I would not try to

definition of

certainly

Justice

all of what is

want

to

Stevens on p.

invalid
use

12,

I

the
would

the remainder of Part B including pp. 13,

16

(critical

scholarship

is

excellent,

but

unnecessary), 17, 18, and through the first full sentence
on p. 19.
Some of the points made
and

can

be

incorporated

memorandum would afford

in these pages are good,

elsewhere.

I

agree

that

BRW's

little guidance to lower courts.

But rather than try to spell out new standards it is best
I

think

approved

to

in

rely

Reynolds

on
v.

the

"neutral

factor"

argument

Sims and strongly reiterated by

JPS in Karcher.
5.
paragraph
outline

Your Part IV is quite good.
may

is

require

adopted.

some
It

modification

could,

12,

neutral
Reynolds

making

clear

factors
v.

Sims.

must
If

that
be
the

JPS'

if

perhaps,

Justice Stevens' quote from Karcher
p.

The introductory

commence

above
with

that you now have on

view

considered

the

that
in

the

"neutral factor"

all

relevant

holding

of

argument has

9.

been

reiterated

should,

of

in any

course,

other

cite

it.

Supreme Court decision,
We

also

should

note

we

at an

appropriate place that BRW relies heavily on Reynolds for
his one-man-one-vote position but ignores all of the other
neutral factors.
Pages 21-23 in Part IV are repetitious,

but are

sufficiently important to be repeated.
I do suggest that it may be helpful to divide the
draft

of

Part

suggested.

into

subparts

A,

B and C -

as

I

have

My editing has been essentially stylistic.

6.
of p.

IV

I would have a Part V commence at the bottom

26 where you consider the House Districts.

Perhaps

it would be helpful to have a subpart "A" dealing with the
House

Districts

Districts, p.

(pp.

30,

26-29):

a

subpart

B on

the

Senate

and a subpart C as you now have

it in

your draft beginning at the top of page 31.
7.

Present

perhaps with my
could

repeat Abe

Republicans

have

Part V is

satisfactory as drafted,

suggested additions.
Fortas •

language

gerrymandered

in

It may be

that we

in describing how the
this

case

in

disregard of the Reynolds v. Sims neutral factors.

total

10.

I repeat, Anne, that the foregoing outline should
be reviewed by you with your

usual care and discernment.

I have dictated this with considerable interruptions both
from presence of gracious hosts and friends, and the fact
that

I

am

beautiful

looking

flowers,

out

in

green

80

foliage,

degree
and

weather

on

a wide expanse of

blue water.

A few minor
in

mind

that

the

stylistic thoughts.

parties

Democratic voters,

in

this

We should keep

case

are

a

not the Democratic party.

group of

It is best

to refer to the voters as a group.

After identifying them

as

does

a

cognizable

would

refer

to

group

(that

these

BRW

parties

as

the

not

question) ,

appellants.

I

The

appellees are not the state, but rather identified Indiana
state officials.
One major point that I have not mentioned above,
but

you

have

included

insufficient emphasis relies

rather

citizen

has

disproportionate

on

vote,
in

though

is the following:

strongly
one

it

the

the
and

number

that

districts
of

with

Justice White,

argument
the

perhaps

voters

if
are

every
not

(thereby

comporting in this respect with Reynolds v. Sims and Baker

11.

v. Carr), it is immaterial whether you happen to be on the
losing side in an election.
then are

represented,

fairly

the

-

He states that all citizens

and can be expected to be treated

losers as well as the winners

elections.

Coming

from

participated

in

politics,

astonishing.

He

must

Justice
this

have

had

wrote this utopian language.

the

legislative,

entire

You have

state

executive,

White,

who

has

little

less

than

"tongue

should give it greater emphasis,
controls

is

in political

in cheek"
indicated,

as

he

but we

that the party in power

government,

and often the

including

the

judicial branches.

All committees in the legislative body will be controlled
by the party in power, and the majority in any committee
can prevent almost legislative bill from ever reaching the
floor

of

ludicrous

the

House

to

suggest

or

Senate.

that

Moreover,

it

public officials are

is

almost

not more

responsive to the views of the party leaders and campaign
managers who helped
sum,

not to mention district and precinct leaders elect

this

discriminatory

sort

them
of

than

they

are

disadvantage

districting

does

victims of the discrimination.

to

the

losers.

resulting

adversely

affect

ss

from
the

No one who understands how

our political system works questions this truth.
L. F. P. , Jr.

In

End 'Judicialmandered' Redistricting
By BRIAN Miu.a
And MARVIN 0LASKY

Two cases now before the Supreme
Court pose striking questions about the fu·
'
ture of local government and equal voting
· · .,_ rights in the U.S. Court decisions, expected
this spring, will indicate whether federal·
ism and electoral fairness will be allowed
to coexist.
One case, Davis vs. Bandemer, developed in Indiana when Democratic candidates for the state House of Representatives won 57"/o of the statewide vote but a
minority of seats. Several Indiana Demo• crats and the Indiana National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People al·
D leged racial and political gerrymandering.
t The district court found no evidence of racial discrimination but demanded a new
redistricting plan, contending that the disparity between votes won and seats gained
showed that Democratic communities had
\ been treated unfairly.
Indiana's Republican officials appealed.
In their Supreme Court brief they acknowledged partisan political gerrymandering
but argued that judicial involvement tn
such traditional electoral maneuvering
sends the court system down a river of no
return. Hokum, said the Democratic and
NAACP briefs-the high road of righteousness demands that finagling stop.
Enter the other redistricting case be·
fore the Supreme Court, Thornburg vs.
Gingles. In this North Carolina case, the is·
sue is whether election-district boundaries
must be redrawn whenever possible to
guarantee "safe seats" for minorities.
Here, the other foot wears the shoe: The
high road of righteousness, a NAACP brief
argues, demands in this case that judicial
finagling be encouraged.
The North Carolina case has an interesting pedigree. It and similar cases grew
out of 1982 amendments to the Voting
Rights Act. Some judicial activists have
been using those amendments to pressure
state and local 'governments that currently
elect some officials "at-large." Their
' goal-in Chicago, Austin, Texas, and even
tiny Roswell, N.M. (pop. 39,676)-has been
a legally forced change to single-member
districts, with lines drawn to ensure one or
more "safe" districts for minorities (normally a district must have a minority 'population of 65"/o to 70"/o to be considered
safe).
Such court coercion is "judlcialmandering." Gerrymandering historically refers
to the majority minimizing minority voting
~wer through crazy-quilt drawing of voting districts. In judlclalmandering, however, It is minorities, backed up by courts,
that do the stitching in order to minimize
majority voting power.
·.
The juxtaposition of the Indiana and
North Carolina cases signals a potential
loss of fair and effective representation in
this country. Let's try to sort out the issues
by seeing where justice may lie in the judi·
cialmanderlng case, and then examining
how the court's decisions in both cases.
might come out.
Judlclalmandering has one thing going
for It: the old folk wisdom that "turnabout
is fair play." Since majorities fool around
with electoral boundaries when they
, have

le

'·

the power, why shouldn't minorities as dering and no to judiclalmandering. This
soon as they can get a judge on their side? will be called racist and reactionary, but
Shouldn't past violations of the Voting such a decision could save the courts a lot
Rights Act be "remedied"?
. of grief in the long run.
The problem with that reasoning,
If the justices want approval In liberal
though, is that judlcialmanderlng cannot circles and not to be held to standards of
remedy the past: It can only exchange vic- consistency, they will tum down gerry·
tims. Since representation is a zero-sum manderlng but accept judiclalmandering.
game, any favoring of one group disfavors That is the road to electoral serfdom at the
others. The slanting of an election to favor hands of the federal courts.
a minority dilutes the voting power of othBut If the court wants to be logically
ers. The favoritism induced in rigging consistent with its one-person, one-vote de"safe districts" slants how an election will · cisions, It will rule against both gerryman·
tum out. It remedies one type of inten- dering and judlclalmandering, and map
tional manipulation of the political process out one high road of electoral righteousonly by Imposing another. Or, in other ness: Election boundary lines should not
words, two wrongs don't make a voting deliberately be drawn to discriminate for
right.
or against any particular social group.
Ascending to a higher plane, judicial·
We will breathe a sigh of relief If the
manderers then assert that their practice court goes in that direction. Historically,
is merely an extension of affirmative acAmericans tend to adjust well to court de·
tion into the voting booth. Maybe so, but at cislons on number-crunching issues. Dred
least affirmative action in admission of Scott and Roe vs. Wade provoked strong
students, while unfair, does not necessarily reactions, because slaver)' and abortion
lead to unqualified graduates, as long as
are not questions on which houses divided
rigorous standards are maintained for
can stand. Numerical disputes about disgraduation. A legislature elected only by trict line-drawing, however, would appear
crafty boundary-drawing, though, has lost
to be readily compromisable, once the
its representative Integrity.
court sets firm standards. Expect, then,
Furthermore, judlcialmanderers should
that If the high court Issues a strong "no"
see that their short-run grasping will ento both gerrymandering and judicialman·
danger the long-run chances of affirmadering, local political groups will find ways
tive-action plans. After all, those favoring
to sign anti·SALT (Strategic Alteration of
reverse discrimination often defend It poUnes) treaties.
litically by arguing that, at least, the majority has willed such discrimination upon
Mr. Miller practices law in Roswel~
itself. Yet, by systematiqtlly favoring
N.M. Mr. Olasky teaches journalism at the
some political interests to the possible exUn!versity of Texas at Austin.
clusion of others, affirmative action in the
political process undermines the legitimacy of all legislation, even affirmativeST~E
action. programs. When the political process Is polluted, the question arises: Did WarrenH.PIIiW,. .2.
Ray8haw
the majority really will this?
Choirm1111, CIIUf Enculi
Prt1idrnt
The court should have no logical probPeter R. K.um
lem turning down judlcialmanderlng, since
Ez«Utiur Vi« l'lwidrlll/Auoriotr Pubu.Mr
the Tight to an equally weighted vote al· NOI'IDUl PeuWIDe
Robert L. Bartley
Editor
ready has been recognized by five justices Jllllllllin6 Editor
in Karcher·vs. Daggett (1983), which Inval- Stewart PIDkertoD
GeorJe MeUCNUI
/Jrpuly Editor,
idated a New Jersey gerrymander scheme. lNputy Jllllllllin6 Editor
Etlitoriol PG~r
The court merely has to adopt the reason- Paul E.lkelpr
KMIDetb L. Bllnllfa
ing of Justice John Paul Stevens In his con- 1Nputy Jllllllllin6 Editor
Vi« Prelidrnt/
. currence: . "Political gerrymandering is 8erDard T. Fluate
Circulation
one species of 'vote dilution.' "
Vier Prelidrlll/Jiorltrtinl
Frank C. 8 . . _ m
But what, then, of the Indiana case? Lee Heffner
Vi« Prtlilklll/
Oprralion.t
Will the court also have to oppose gerry- Vier Pre•itklll/Adwr~Uin6
mandering? Probably, and conservatives
PubUahed abace 1881 b)'
should bend on this just as liberals should
DOW JONES & COMPANY, INC.
be willing to bend on judlclalmandering.
Editorial Uld Corporate Headquartera:
Both clash with the right to an equally
U CortlaDclt Street, New York, N.Y.10007.
weighted vote. In both cases, the 'court
Telephone (UI) 116-6000
could rule that any election scheme delibWanoeD
H.
PlliWpe,
CMimuua; Ray 8baw,
erately designed to benefit one particular Preeitklll; Dould A.llacclcm;ald.
Vier CMimuua;
group is just not fair.
WlWalll L. Dlum, Peter R. K-, Encutiw Vi«
Such a vow of righteousness, of course, PrelilkiiU; Pl'ederick G. Harria, .JUDee H. OUaway
is easier made than carried out. Those con- .Jr., Senior Vice PraidnU.
cerned with federalism rightly worry about v~ee Pnlidellt.: Fruit c.a - m. OperatioM;
R Cony, Newr, Betty A. Duval, Staff
the court's overseeing of local political she- Edward
Robert A. Scbmita, Boob; Peter G.
nanigans. There is also a practical worry: Drwlopmmt;
Skinner, Corporatr ChMral COtUJMl; SterliDc E.
If the justices keep muscling into redis- Boclerlind, P~.
tricting cases, we might as well drive a A.IMdate lditor: LallftiiCe G. O"Dcnmell.
truckload of maps, rulers and calculators
w..w..- N-• ...s 8alee Oflloe:
up the steps of the court building-and lay
ltll c--dnt An. NW, w..w..-, D.C. 11011
,....,._.(HI) 111-tMO
in a to-year supply of sandwiches.
AND ADDRB88 CHANGES
So if the court wants to stand for local, 8U88CIUPTION8
be •nt to The WaU StrMt Journal, 200 BllrMit
decentralized political power regardless of llhouJd
Ro.d. Chlcopeo, M-. 01020, livinc old and new
consequences, It will say yes to gerryman- lllldna For aabocriftion nteo- Pqe 2.
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Rider A, p. 33

~I

(Bandemer~

BAND33 SALLY-POW
In concluding this dissent, 1 want to make clear
its limits.

Traditionally, the determination of electoral

districts within a state has been a matter left to the
legislative branch of the state government.

Apart from

the doctrine of separation of powers and the federal
system prescribed by the Constitution,* federal judges are
ill equipped generally to review legislative decisions
with respect to redistricting or apportionment.

As the

memorandum opinion makes clear, however, since the
decisions in Baker v. Carr, 369

u.s.

particularly Reynolds v. Sims, 377

186 (1962) and

u.s.

533 (1964), a

colorable claim of discriminatory gerrymandering presents
a justiciable issue under the Equal Protection Clause.

2.

Even so, federal courts should exercise restraint in
reviewing legislative redistricting, and should impose a
heavy burden of proof on those who claim a constitutional
violation.

In my view, this clearly is such a case.

Unless the Court is willing to reconsider Baker v. Carr,
Reynolds v. Sims and their progeny - including such
comparatively recent cases as Gaffney v. Cummings - this
case presents a paradigm example of deliberate
discrimination - both as to intent and effect - against
the political party that happened to be out of power.
Moreover, the findings of the District Court have not been
found to be clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of that
court.

3.

-,. ..Jce.~

"In my view, there is -.. gre-s..t-Eie~~~ merit
eloquent dissent of Justice Frankfurter in aker v. Carr,
joined by Justice Harlan. ~a ~e- ~ his tor ieal1¥

d

.

J

.

.

•

Similarly, had 1 been a member of the Court at the time, 1
nay also have been persuaded by the QP~i61'1" of Justice
Harlan in Reynolds v. Sims. But th se cases, and the
principles they enunciated, have be n repeatedly followed.
Unless and until this line of prec dents is reconsidered,
federal judges - including this
urt - are duty bound to
follow them.

k.~Urd.t

~~
~~-

lfp/ss 02/13/86

Rider A, p. 15 (Bandemer)

2nd draft
BAND15 SALLY-POW
It was freely conceded in this case by Republican leaders,
as the District Court found

(add citation), that the

purpose of gerrymandering a number of critical districts
was to assure Republican control of the legislative branch
of the General Assembly of Indiana until after the 1980
census.
Political reality is ignored when it is suggested
- as the Memorandum does, ante, at 18 - that members of a
losing party have as much influence politically as do
members of the victorious party.

One need not recall the

political adage that "to the victor goes the spoils", to
know that even the most conscientious state legislators do

2.

not ignore opportunities to favor or reward groups or
persons who were active supporters in the election
campaign.

I need not detail what we all know, namely,

that partisan politics play a significant part in the
enactment of legislation and the making of appointments.
In these respects, a state government is not essentially
different from the federal

government.~

In sum, one

cannot take seriously the Memorandum's suggestion as to
the degree of influence of the "losers" under our system.

~one example only need be mentioned:
The legislative
process is largely controlled through the operation of
committees, and the majority in a committee - in addition
to shaping legislation - often can prevent it even from
coming to a vote. Moreover, the judicial branch of
government maybe directly affected by discriminatory
gerrymandering in states that elect judges.

Memo to Anne:
This rider is intended to summary what you have
very well said on pages 15 and 16.

Justice White must

3.

have had "tongue in cheek" when he made this suggestion.
Its unreality will be obvious.

I am prompted to inquire,

Anne, do you think we are misreading Justice White?
Perhaps it would be well when we mention his suggestion on
p. 18 of the Memorandum, to quote it verbatim in a
footnote - if the quotation would be fair when taken out
of context.

lfp/ss 02/18/86

QUESTION SALLY-POW
Conference, February 21, 1986

Bring up the question as to the printing in 841244, the Bandemer redistricting case, and attached to the
memo I should have my memo to Conference in which I expressed the view that the map should be printed in color.

I

February 21, 1986

84-1244

Davis v. Bandemer, et al

Dear John:
Here is a Chamber's dra€t of my
this case.

pr.opos~d

O?inion in

As w~ were toqf't"l~r at Conf~rence, I would be grateful
if you would review the draft prior to circulation, and give
me the benefit of vour thoughts.

Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
LFP/vde

Fehruarv 22, 1986

84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer

Dear Henry:
The Conference has now approved the reproducing in
color of the two maps showinq the redjstricting in Indiana.

I

un~erstand

that you make the necessary arrange-

ments.
Slnc~relv,

Mr. Henry

c.

Lind

lfp/ss
cc:

The Chief Justice
Mr. Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr.

~ tc~......_~

~ttpr.tUtt

<qllurl ltf tqt ~ittb: ~bttt:s
JrNg4htgfun. !fl. <q. 20~~$
~ d

.44A"1 4 "'-~~~wj~~l

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

~.-.>~.

February 24, 1986

Re:

84-1244 - Davis v. Bandemer

Dear Lewis:
Confirming my telephone conversation with you on
Saturday, I think you have done a really excellent
job in drafting your opinion in this case. These are
the flyspecks that I mentioned on the telephone:
1. I think i t is Part I rather than Part II of
Byron's Memorandum that we will be joining.
2. In footnote 10 on pages 12-13, you refer to
Judge Pell as a resident of Illinois. He just moved
to Illinois at the time of his appointment to the
Court of Appeals and has the same kind of connection
with Indiana that you have with Virginia. He was
president of the Indiana Bar Association and a
practitioner in Indiana throughout his pre-judicial
career.
3. We are going to check past history to see if
the fact that there are one hundred House districts
and fifty Senate districts may in the past have led
the legislature to follow what would seem to be a
natural pattern of placing two House districts in
each Senate district.
4. At the end of the first sentence in the text
on page 12, you might want to append a footnote
citing to the maps in the Official Reports of Karcher
v . Daggett, and also Gomillion v. Whitefoot, in which
some truly grotesque shapes provide pretty convincing
evidence of gerrymandering.
(I may have failed to
make this suggestion when we talked on Saturday . )

..

- 2 -

5. On page 21, I think you should omit the
words "unless the Court is willing to reconsider" and
perhaps substitute something like: "It is perfectly
clear, however, that under the Court's precedents
such as Baker v. Carr, •••• " (I hope you can also
make a comparable change in n. 18 on page 21.)
6. I'll study the opinion again in the light of
Byron's writing, but you can definitely count on my
joining you.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell

,.

.:iupum~

<!fond of tlt~ ~nit~b .i'tm~s
'JIIasfrington. !9. <If. 2llbi~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOH N PAUL STEVE N S

February 26, 1986

Re:

84-1244 - Davis v . Bandemer

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

/
•;.

March 11, .1986

Dear Roland:
This is to say again how we appreciate your intelligent cooperation, and the cooperation of your fine associates, in working out a solution to the problem of printing, with the colors, the redistricting maps to accompany
the Court opinions i.n Davi_s v. Bandemet'.
The reproduction, in greatly reduced form, of the
maps that were introduced i.n evidence at the trial, will
facilitate an understanding by readers of the opinions in
this case.
With thanks and

a~miration.

Sincerely,

Mr. Ronald H. Goldstraw

lfp/ss
cc:

The Chief Justice
Mr. James R. Donovan

lfp/ss 03/18/86 ~R~i~d~e~r~A~,~P~·~----~(D~a~v~i=s~v~·-=B~a~n~d~e~m~e~r~)
DAVRB SALLY-POW
Anne:

We need some answer to BRW along the following

lines:

The Court, in Part D of its opinion, ante, at 2428, undertakes to answer this dissent.

It characterized

my opinion as holding "that the intentional drawing of
district boundaries for partisan ends and for no other
reasons violates the Equal Protection Clause in and of
itself". Ante, at 24. This misstates my opinion as I have
not approved - either explicitly or implicitly - any such
simplistic view of a complex issue.

My reasoning is based

primarily on Reynolds v. Sims that requires a close
examination of what in fact the legislature did in its

2.

redistricting.

In this case, the District Court made

detailed findings of fact as to the gerrymandering that
are relevant.

None of these findings is found to be

clearly erroneous, and they are ignored by this Court.
Having failed in the first 23 pages of its
opinion to identify a standard of analysis, the Court
finally attempts this.

See, ante, at 27.

In summary, the

Court analysis is reduced to conclusory statements.

It

merely "assumes" discriminatory intent at this point,
despite having explicitly found it to exist earlier in its
opinion, ante, at _____

Addressing the second

requirement, discriminatory effect, the Court finds "there
was insufficient discriminatory effect to constitute an
equal protection violation, and therefore [we] did not
reach the question of state interests (legitimate or

..

3.

otherwise) served by the particular districts
[c]onsequently, the valid or invalid configuration of the
districts was an issue we did not need to consider."
at 27.

Id.,

In a footnote at this point, the Court states "we

have rejected none of the District Court's subsidiary
factual conclusions.
the applicable law,

We have merely, based on our view of
disregarded those that were

irrelevant in this case and held insufficient those that
inadequately supported the District Court's ultimate legal
conclusions."

Ante, at 27, n. 17.

I must say, in all respect, I have rarely seen
more conclusory reasoning, if it can be called reasoning.
Even though in a gerrymandering case, the facts as to
where and why the legislature drew the lines of the new
voting districts go to the heart of the equal protection

4.

issue, the Court - without explanation - simply finds the
undisputed facts developed with care by the District Court
to be "irrelevant" or "insufficient".

No explanation is

offered as to why the facts upon which the District Court
based its judgment are peremptorily rejected in this
manner.

I will not repeat the facts that the Court

ignores, as they are summarized generally in Part ILI-B,
and particularly with respect to the findings with respect
to the House Districts in Part IV-A, and the Senate
Districts in IV-C, ante, at

and

---

(Anne,

please be more precise in these references.

Anne:

As always, this is a first try.

as to substance and form.

I want your views

lfp/ss 03/18/86
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BANDB SALLY-POW
Note to Anne:

Consider a note generally as

follows:

The Court's opinion appears to hold that although
the equal protection issue is justiciable, a court must
await several elections to determine whether a gerrymander
has had a discriminatory effect.

For example, the Court

states that a "mere lack of proportionate results in one
election cannot suffice" to show that a group is "in fact
disadvantag[ed] at the polls", ante, at 25.

Again, the

Court states that my dissent would allow a constitutional
violation to be found where the "only proven effect of a
political party's electoral power was disproportionate

2.

results in one (or possibly two) elections", ante, at 26.
The Court misreads my opinion, as I do not rely on the
outcome of one or two elections except to illustrate the
predictable effect of the legislature's studi e d
discrimination.

Its conceded purpose was to assure

Republican control until 1991.

Nor do I make any claim

for proportional representation, a result not even
required by §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1984.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 83-1968.

See

As should be clear from my

opinion, I have followed the rationale of Reynolds v.
Sims, repeatedly reaffirmed until today, see Chapman v.
Meier, 420

u.s.

Cummings, 412

1, 17 (1975), and particularly Gaffney v.

u.s.,

at 751.

Sims made clear that the

concept of "one person one vote" related only to gross
population disparities among districts.

This case does

3.

not involve such disparity, as computers now make it a
simple matter to accomplish this result in the bizarre
manner so vividly illustrated by the maps attached to this
opinion.
Sims and its progeny also recognize that
discrimination against citizens generally that minimizes
their ability to exercise political influence through
their vote and party affiliation, would violate the Equal
Protection Clause.

As my opinion emphasizes, there are

several neutral factors, initially identified in Sims,
that are highly relevant.

As stated more fully above,

these include compactness of districts, respect for
existing political subdivisions, and some reasonable
grouping of House Districts within the same Senate
District in the absence of identifiable reasons to the

4.

contrary.

For democracy to work well and fairly, citizens

must have an opportunity to become familiar with the
relevant boundary lines, familiar with voting precincts,
and there must be some rationality in these lines and
locations.

The party political system works to a large

extent because citizens, commencing at the precinct level,
become acquainted and work together for their respective
parties and candidates.

Confusion inevitably follows {as

so clearly will be the case in Indiana) when a citizen
finds himself or herself associated with different groups
of citizens depending on the election, and often required
to vote at different polling precincts.
The entire rationale of the Court's opinion
ignores the rights and interests of citizens, and the way
the democratic process is likely to work best.

All that

5.

is required under the Court's view today is that a
gerrymander, however irrational and unfair it may be, [see
maps attached] is not a violation of equal protection
unless - viewing the results statewide for several years there is no gross disproportionality in the vote of the
contending parties.
this view.

I know of no authority supporting

March 18, 1986
PERSONAL

l.

84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer
Dear Chief:
Before vou come to rest in this difficult case, 1
would welcome the opportunitv to have you take a look at the
original maps P.Ut in evidence in thi~ case.
ThP Clerk's Office obtained these and 1 have them
in my Chambers. They are dramatic, and - support the old
adage - t.hat a "pjcture" i.R more ef=fective than a thousand
word~.
~7hen you rea~ Byron'~ opinion anrt my rHssent, bear
in mind that this may be thP la~t chance the Court will have
to escape the straitjacket of "one person one vote" regardless of all other relevant factors.
1 am making a substantial replv to Byron's lat'=st
circulation, and thin~ you will find that he w~olly ignores
critical factu~l fi~dJngs of the District Court in a desire
to consider only whether redistricting comoorts with one
person one vote, and ~oes not result in anv statewide lack
of oroportionality.

You can see the maps in 10 minutes, and you would
be welcome.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

_,

~-----------------------------~·

·""'
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BAND SALLY-POW

84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer (Indiana Reapportionment)
Findings of the Three-Judge DC:

both Houses: bills introduced
purpose

Republicans control
"were blank", in effect, the

The legislative process:

l.

being

to

refer

bills

to a conference committee:

all conferees were Republicans: four Democratic "advisers"
were given no access to the map-making process:

2.

Computer

Paid

firm.

$250, 000 by Republican

state committee, and "no minority party members had access
to the computer information".
The Republican plan was

3.

week

of

the

regular

session.

The

introduced the last
DC

noted

that

the

Republican majority "felt insula ted from challenge merely
by adherence

to the one-man-one-vote principle",

applied

by a computer.
4.

Par tis an purpose only.

When the Speaker of

the House was asked for the reasons the plan was proposed,
replied:

"Political
--,.

we

wanted

to

save ~~ent
;'\

Republicans as possible".
5.

"Stacking" of Democrats

would carry in any event.

into districts

they

2.

6.
lack

of

Community

any

interest'

of

consistent

principles".

interest.1.

The

application

of

See

DC

found:

"A

'community

of

County.

Marrion

See

particularly districts 48 and 66.

-------

7.

DC found many districts "contorted", with no

consideration of "compactness".
8.

"Splitting"

of

Democratic

vote

to

give

Republicans a majority.
9.

Multi-member

that the disadvantaging
districts

falls

~

Stacking

The

court

"found

effect of the plan's multi-member

particularly

voters in the state".
10.

districts.

hard

and

harsh

upon

black

See A-18.
of

blacks

into

large

majority

districts.
11.

boundaries.

No

consideration

to

existing

political
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October 9, 1985
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Anne

Re:

No. 84-1244, Davis v. Bandemer
In Karcher v. Daggett, 462

u.s.

725 (1983), the DC's

opinion contained no findings of fact similar to the findings
made by the DC in this case.
F.Supp. 978 (D.N.J. 1982).

See Daggett v. Kimmelman, 535
From the DC's opinion in Karcher, the

challenge to the New Jersey congressional reapportionment plan
appears to have been based solely on the "one man, one vote"
guarantee embodied in Art. I, § 2 of the Constitution.

With

respect to the plaintiff's showing, the DC found that the plan
adopted by the legislature had a population deviation of .6984 %.
That deviation was not "unavoidable" because other plans with
smaller deviations had been introduced.

The DC then considered

whether population deviations were justified by legitimate
legislative goals.

The DC did refer to statements by legislative

leaders concerning the criteria they followed in adopting the
plan.

The leaders claimed in deposition testimony that they

sought to adhere to "one man, one vote," to protect minority
interests, to preserve the cores of pre-existing districts and
municipal lines, and to preserve the influence of Democratic
incumbents.

In deciding if the deviations were justified, the DC

focused only on the goal of preserving minority interests and of
anticipating population shifts, and concluded that these goals
did not explain the deviations.

The majority opinion in Karcher

states that the only justification pressed by the State was the
~~-·----~~~----------------goal of preserving minority voting strength.

------------~~--~----~~

In sum, from the opinions in Karcher, the DC made no

I

findings with respect to the factors considered in this case:
~

(1)

~ ·-~-·-

While referring to the fact that partisan goals

influenced adoption of the plan, the DC in Karcher made no
finding with respect to the legislative process leading up to
adoption of the plan and whether that process was designed to
exclude one political group.

(Justice Stevens' opinion in

Karcher observes that the legislative process was not neutral,
but that statement was not supported by a finding of the DC).
Obviously, partisan goals will always play a role in a
reapportionment process: but such goals do not seem to justify
the total exclusion of Democrats from the legislative process
that occurred in this case.

Moreover, based on an observation in

Justice White's dissenting opinion in Karcher, it appears that
there was some evidence in Karcher of legitimate legislative
goals beyond "one man, one vote."

Here, on the other hand, the

DC found that the plan was motivated only by partisan goals
through adherence to "one man, one vote."

The DC indicated that

other goals advanced by the legislature were pretextual.
(2)

The DC in Karcher made no findings with respect to

-

the bizarre map.

Of course, the map spoke for itself.

But the

record in this case is stronger for the DC specifically referred

to the map and explained why some of the bizarre district shapes
were likely to lead to voter confusion.

In connection with the

shapes of the districts in this case, the DC discussed lack of
compactness, failure to adhere to county lines, and disregard of
community of interest.
(3)

Karcher contained no finding concerning unexplained
~

-

--

and inconsistent use of multi-member districts.
(4)

Karcher contained no finding concerning the

r--

--

relationship between votes cast for candidates of a particular
party and the number of such candidates actually elected.

Finally, I do not find the "flood of litigation" arguments
at all convincing.

It seems to me that the Karcher analysis is

far more likely to produce a flood of litigation than would the
equal protection analysis advanced here.

Under Karcher, a plan

can be challenged on the basis of any population deviation, no
matter how small.

Then the State is required to come forward and

show that the deviation is justified on some neutral objective.
Here, the plaintiff's burden is much tougher to meet.

The

plaintiff must make a strong prima facie showing of
discrimination before the State is required to point to neutral
criteria.

In other words, I think that the equal protection

claim here is more susceptible to dismissal at the pleading stage
or at the summary judgment stage than is a Karcher claim.

No.

84-1244
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BANDE SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM

'1'0:

Anne

DA'l'E:

January 2, 1986

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer
read

1

dissent

in

commented

this

on

your

first

case

it.

As

draft

some

rather

1

Court opinion any day,

time

(November
ago,

and

expected

19)

of

should

Justice

a

have

White 1 s

thought perhaps 1 should await

1

it.
In quiet of New Year 1 s
to

take

a

second

look

at

Justice White cannot delay

Day,

your

I took the occasion

draft

believing

his opinion much longer.

that
In

general, despite considerable editing that may or may not
be

improvement,

excellent.

I

think

your

draft

substantively

is

Although I suggest that we defer further work

on it until we see the Court opinion, I make the following
comments at this time:
1.

Probably

the

first paragraph in the dissent

will require some revision.
2.

Part

suggests changes.

I

is

fine,

unless

the

Court

opinion

~.

3.
dispute

My

the

respect,

possibly

is

Justice

that

justiciability

challenge to a
this

guess

of

an

equal
If

reapportionment plan.
we

can

simply

omit

add

a

Part

II

White

of

footnote

will

not

protection

I am correct in
our

draft,

reaffirming

and
the

justiciability of this type of case.
4.

Do we need

to add a note saying that black

voters also challenged the apportionment plan, but are no
longer parties distinct from Democrats?
mind

exactly

why

the

black

groups

I do not have in
did

not

appeal

separately.
5.
is quite

Part Ill

good.

I

(probably to be Part II), pp. 7-12,

have

done

a

fair

amount of stylistic

editing, but the substance of your draft - and the use of
authorities

is

persuasive.

particularly helpful.

Reynolds

v.

Sims

is

Are there any subsequent cases that

reiterate what the Court said in that case with respect to
the relevance of criteria other than "one man one vote"?
6.

I suggest, at least tentatively, that we omit

the full paragraph on p. 12.
probably

can

be

best

said

Something along these lines
at

or

near

dissent after we see what the Court says.

the

end

of

our

.:>.

7.
p.

Part IV (probably will be Ill), beginning on

13 also is well written.

I do suggest that we limit

this to pages 13 to end at the top of page 17.

What is

said in these pages applies to the entire reapportionment
plan, and focuses primarily on the procedure - the grossly
partisan procedure by which the plan was adopted.
8.
have

It

seems

two separate

to me,

Roman

Anne,

that we

numeral parts,

then should

one dealing with

the effect of the plan on House Districts, and the second
with

the effect of

read the draft,

the

plan on Senate

Districts.

As

I

pages 17-through the first half of page

21, deal solely with House Districts - and you have done
this very effectively.
9.

I had expected that what we might call Part

IV, beginning on page 21, would address the effect of the
plan on Senate Districts as you did the House Districts selecting only the two or three worst.
the draft correctly,

the

Rather, if I read

only separate treatment of the

Senate portion of the plan is inclusion the result of the
two elections of 1982 and 1984.

This is helpful, but my

recollection is that although the gerrymandering of Senate
Districts was

not

as widespread as

the House Districts,

there were at least some Senate Districts that merit our

'So

attention.
-

agreed

Justice White - in addition to Justice Stevens
that

one

of

the

Senate

Districts

was

a

gross

example of gerrymandering.
When
better

idea

we

how

see

the Court

to deal

with

opinion we

the

Senate

will

have

a

apportionment.

This should be in a separate Part of our opinion as it may
attract

the

vote

of

a

Justice

who otherwise goes along

with the remainder of the apportionment.
10.
full

The

paragraph

discussion

on

22

commencing

and going

contains some time points.

with

to the end of

the

first

the draft

These deal generally with the

entire plan and could be included in a separate final Part
of our dissent.
11.

A

few

miscellaneous

observations:

When

stating what the DC "found", where there is particularly
helpful language it might be well to quote it - probably
in notes.

Also some citations to what the DC found may be

desirable.
12.

At

the

appropriate

place

we

should

repeat

that the DC's findings of fact must be accepted unless the
Court

finds

they

are

clearly

erroneous.

In

this

connection, Anne, my guess is that what is written in the
Thornton case as to acceptance of the DC' s findings will

.Jo

be

helpful

to us

in this case.

we should keep this

in

mind, and perhaps try to arrange for the two cases to come
down together.
as

to

Of course, Thornton is a racial case, but

acceptance

of

the

DC's

findings

the

cases

are

might

quote

the

analogous.
13.
dictionary
state,

In

final

definition

county,

"unfair

our

or

of

city

advantage"

to

section

we

"gerrymandering"(to
into

one

voting
party

districts
in

divide
to

a

give

elections).

In

addition, as you have said and as Justice White certainly
will

emphasize

that

courts

traditionally

have

accorded

substantial deference even to gerrymandering decisions by
legislative bodies.

Despite this deference, and perhaps a

presumption of validity of legislative action, courts have
not hesitated to review - even with heightened scrutiny plans that appear to discriminate against minorities.
a

given

state

at

a

particular

time,

members

of

In
a

particular party may constitute a "minority" on the basis
of registration or voting patterns.
non-racial

cases

is

well

The justiciability of

established,

and

therefore

despite the deference owed the political processes of the
legislative branch,

we have

a duty

to enforce

the Equal

o.

Protection Clause

(Reynolds made this explicit), and this

is a particularly egregious example of its violation.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

.,

January 13 , 1986

84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer

Dear Byron:

In due tirnn I will circulate a dissenting view .
Sincerely,

Just i C'?

~Jl-t

i. te

lfp/ss
cc :

The Conference

.ittllrttttt Qfltltri cf tq t ~ttitdt .§tab~
'Jluftingtctt, ~. <!f. 2llp'!~
January 15, 1986 '

CHAMBER S OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'C O NN O R

Re:

84-1244

Davis v. Bandemer

Dear Byron,
My vote at Conference was to reverse either
on the grounds that political gerrymandering claims
are nonjusticiable or on the grounds that the
apportionment scheme at issue in this case survives a
highly deferential rational basis scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause. On reflection, and with the
benefit of your helpful Memorandum, I am now inclined
to think political gerrymandering claims should be
held to be nonjusticiable because I do not think the
Equal Protection Clause supplies any judicially
manageable standard in this context.
Many of the reasons you offer for requiring
plaintiffs bringing a political gerrymandering claim
to make a threshold showing of serious effects
requiring intervention by a federal court seem to me
equally applicable to the prior question whether such
claims are justiciable. Certainly this is so of your
observation that it would be unwise to "embroil the
judiciary in what has consistently been referred to as
a political task for the legislature." Memorandum, at
19. The presumption you suggest that elected
candidates will not ignore the interests of voters for
the losing candidate, and your assertion that "the
power to influence the political process is not
limited to winning elections," Memorandum, at 17-18,
support the view that political gerrymandering should
not be seen as causing intolerable harm to the ability
of political groups to advance their interests. As
you note, we tolerate equivalent disproportionalities
between a political group's voting strength and its
direct representation in the legislature when caused
by district-wide election systems • . And once it is
conceded that "a group's electoral power is not
unconstitutionally diminished by the simple fact of an
apportionment scheme that makes winning elections more
difficult," Memorandum at 18, it seems to me that the
virtual impossibility of reliably distinguishing

between degrees of difficulty in winning elections
cuts in favor of holding such chall~nges
nonjusticiable. Moreover, I see no basis for treating
supposed diminution of the statewide voting influence
of a political group as constitutionally cognizable
when a scheme that tended to "deny safe district
minorities any realistic chance to elect their own
representatives," Memorandum at 17, was upheld in
Gaffney. Although Gaffney treated a political
gerrymandering claim as JUsticiable, the opinion's
observation that "districting inevitably has and is
intended to have substantial political consequences,"
412 U.S., at 753, and its reluctance to undertake "the
impossible task of extirpating politics from what are
the essentially political processes of the sovereign
States," id., at 754, would equally support a holding
that whatever harms political gerrymandering may
sometimes occasion are inextricably associated with
the business of redistricting. Legislative
redistricting thus yields ·a variety of real benefits
but it cannot be subjected to judicial supervision
without great cost.
The standard you propose exemplifies the
intractable difficulty in deriving a judicially
manageable standard from the Equal Protection Clause.
I know of no way to measure "a voter's or a group of
voters' influence on the political process as a
whole." Memorandum, at 18. To allow district courts
to strike down apportionment plans on the basis of
their prognostications as to the outcome of future
elections or future apportionments invites "findings"
on matters as to which neither judges nor anyone else
can have any confidence. You reject proportionality
between voting strength and electoral outcomes as a
standard, but it seems to me all but inevitable that
courts will look for "undue" disproportionality or the
like if political gerrymandering claims are
justiciable.
It seems to me these difficulties, and the
even greater ones that would attend any imposition of
supposedly neutral criteria on legislative choices as
to apportionment, justify treating . the vote dilution
claims of mainstream political groups as
nonjusticiable. Where a racial minority challenges an
apportionment scheme, the stronger nexus between
individual rights and group interests, and the greater
warrant the Equal Protection Clause gives the federal
courts to intervene for protection against racial
discrimination, suffice to render such claims
justiciable. As does your Memorandum, I would leave
our current doctrine with respect to such challenges
undisturbed. But to allow the proliferation of vote

dilution claims by mainstream political groups would
essentially be "to conclude that political groups
themselves have an independent constitutional claim to
representation." Mobile v. Bolden, 446 u.s. 55, 79
( 1980) (plurality ·op1n 1on) .
S 1nce I see no manageable
way of conferring such a right on the very political
groups that have shaped apportionment throughout our
history, I am inclined to believe that the Equal
Protection Clause does not compel treating political
gerrymandering claims as justiciable.
Sincerely,

Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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Re:

No. 84-1244-Davis v. Bandemer

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice White
cc:

The Conference
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January 16, 1986

No. 84-1244
Davis v. Bandemer

Dear Byron,
Although at Conference I rested on
a

different

memorandum

ground,

most

I

persuasive,

find
and

your
if

it

becomes a Court opinion please join me.
I may be adding a comment or two of my
own.

Si~

Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 17, 1986

Re:

84-1244 - Davis v. Bandemer

Dear Byron:
Although I agree with a good deal of what ycu
have written in your memorandum, I shall wait for
Lewis' writing.
In general I agree with your view that claims of
this kind are justiciable and that they should have
to surmount a fairly substantial threshold. As you
may surmise, however, I am inclined to think that the
standards that I discussed in my separate writing in
Karcher v. Daggett, may be more manageable than the
~effects• approach that your memorandum seems to
endorse.

Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 27, 1986

Re:

I

No. 84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer

Dear Byron,
As I told both you and Sandra earlier, after reading
your respective circulations, I agree with Sandra's idea
that claims of political gerrymandering, at least when
brought on behalf of a major political party, are not
justiciable.
Sincerely,

~

Justice White
cc:

The Conference

January 29, 1986

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

84-1244

Davis v. Bandemer

In the New Jersey r~apportionment case, Karcher v.
Daggett {1983), we agreed that an understanding of the issues would be facilitated by reproducing in color the maps
of the new districts.
We have a similar problem in Bandemere. Without the
reproduction of the maps in color it is quite difficult to
understand this case. I do not recall whether this is a
decision for the Chief Justice, the Conference or whether if a majority of you agree - the r~port~r can b~ req,Jcsted
to make the necessarv arrangements.

LFP, JR.
LFP/vde
cc - Reporters Office
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April 1, 1986
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Anne

Re:

No. 84-1244, Davis v. Bandemer

I just wanted to let you know that, in addition to working
on your

two dissents,

I

am preparing our

White's opinion in this case.
your

position,

scription,
In short,

response

to Justice

The more I re-read his response to

the more puzzled

I

become by his erroneous de-

not only of your opinion, but also of the case law.
I

think that we will have a powerful response, and I

will have some draft language

(based on the draft footnotes you

gave to me) for your review soon.

April 7, 1986

84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer

Dear Byron:
The printer has l.ent me the two
will accompany my opinion.

colore~

maps that

1 t h ink that Roland an1 qilma have don~ a superb
job in reproducing these maps that wer.e a Part of the record
belm~.
They are generally alonq the li~es or the maPs aoto
the Karcher opinion.
pend e.£.
Rol .::\n(1 11opes 'V'e can return ther:;e prowptly.
are no other copies.

Sincerely,

Justice White
lfp/ss
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April 14, 1986

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 84-1244, Davis v. Bandemer

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice White
cc: The Conference

April 16, 1986
PERSONAL

84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer
Dear Chief:
ln a letter vou recently wrote me about another
case, you expressed the view that it probably was the most
important case before you as a iudge since you went on the
bench in 1955.
By comparison, in terms of the effect on our system
of government, 1 think upon reflection you will agree that
this Indiana redistricting case is similarly important. 1
have shared your view that the "one person, one vote" rule
(it is neither a principle nor a standard} is simply a manipulable formula that does no credit to this Court. The
total rigidity with which four Justices are now willing to
apply this rule eliminates all judicial discretion.

1 invite you again to spend ten minutes looking at
the original exhibit maps here in my Chambers. The undisputed record shows that these voting districts were redrawn
by mapmakers using computers, and hurriedly adopted by party
line vote on the last day of the legislative session. Concededly, their only objective was to entrench the party in
power. Under Byron's opinion all that will be necessary in
many states - to establish monopoly control by a party for
perhaps ten years - is for hired personnel (with the relevant data and computers) to draw the kind of district lines
shown on the maps in this case.
Byron's opinion rejects, not as erroneous but as
irrelevant, all of the findings of fact made by the threejudge District Court. Despite his findinq of justiciability, Byron's opinion effectively eliminates any justiciable
issue. As will be clearer when you see the maps, and reread
the findings of the District Court, one cannot conceive of a
more egregious gerrymandering than this case presents.
ln order to agree that there is no justiciable
issue, one would have to overrule Baker v. Carr, Reynolds v.
Sims, and a half-dozen or more cases in which this Court has
assumed jurisdiction and decided claims respecting redistricting and reapportionment.
When I mentioned our precedents to Bill Rehnquist, he agreed that this line of cases

2.

should be overruled but recognized the votes aren't here to
do that. If 1 had been on the Court when Carr and Sims were
decided, 1 probably would have agreed with the dissentS of
Harlan and Frankfurter on federalism grounds. In view of my
respect for stare decisis, and for the integrity of this
Court as an institution, I would not vote now to overrule
them.
Yet, while proclaiming justiciability, there are
four votes to affirm this Indiana case simply on the basis
of "one person, one vote". All of the other relevant factors identified particularly in Reynolds v. Sims, and though
found by the District Court to have been ignored by the Indiana legislature, are now said to be irrelevant.
The "one person, one vote" rule, when thus reduced
to a mathematical and computerized exercise, has become no
rule at all in any judicial sense. A few skilled teenagers,
with the requisite data and a computer, will be able to accomplish a whollv partisan redistricting while complying
perfectly with "one person, one vote." The legislature is
then free to adopt the plan on party lines without even a
public hearing.
ln sum, your vote now - even if you ioin only the
judgment to reverse - wi.ll establish a precedent under which
redistricting is reduced to a simple mechanical procedure to
be mani~ulated by the politician~ who happen to be in control. This Court's decision would foreclose all effective
judicial review. In a word, the considerations of public
interest so clearly identified in Reynolds v. Sims will be
ignored. And in my view, this Court will have abdicated its
responsibility.
While 1 hope you will join my opinion, an option
that you might consider is simply to vote to affirm - either
on the basis of the findinqs of the District Court, or without any amplification of your vote.
Let me know if you still wish to see the maps, and
1 will have them all set for you.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

May 6, 1986

Personal

84-1244

Davie v. Bandemer

Dear Chi.ef:
As you indi.cated an intention to reread my opinion in
this case, 1 enclose - for your convenience - a copy of the
4th Draft in which 1 replied to Byron.
You will note t~~t none of the District Courts extensive findings of fact was found by Byron to be clearly erroneous. Also, in Part v (p. 24, 25) of mv opinion, I make
clear that although federal courts have a duty under the
Equal Protection Clause to review cases of extreme gerrymandering, a heavy burden of proof rests on those who chal enqe
any redistricting Plan.
The colored insert maps that will accompany my opinion
are not yet available.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
LFP/vde

June 4, 1986
PERSONAL
84-1244 Davis v. BandPmer

Dear Chief:
At long last, samples of the Indiana maps, that
will be appended to my dissent, are available. 1 enclose a
copy as it will be folded into the u.s. Reports. The Indiana Senate districts are on one side and the House districts
on the other.
You will be particularly interested in the qerrymandering of the heavily populated areas around Indianapolis. This is true of both the House and Senate races.
Also, there are numerous other examples. Take a
look at House districts 11, 12, 13 and 14 in northwest Indiana; at districts 5, 7 and 8 in northern lndianar and at 71
and 72 in the southeast.
It is obvious that contrary to Reynolds v. Sims and
its progeny, the Indiana legislature ignored all factors
relevant to the validity of redistricting except "one person, one vote" as the DC found. Byron's opinion does not
question the detailed factual findings of the DC.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
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JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 9, 1986

Re:

84-1244

Davis v. Bandemer

Dear Lewis,
I have finally finished my dissent in this
case. After our conversation I reread both your
opinion and Byron's.
I concluded it was best to put
off for another occasion any attempt to indicate I
favor one approach over the other, given the decision
that political gerrymandering cases are justiciable.
My opinion simply deals with the issue of
justiciability. My inclination is to favor the
approach that sweeps in fewer cases for application of
judicial review on the merits.
We are not often on opposite sides of a
case, and perhaps I am swayed by my own experience as
a legislator.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Map enclosed
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 10, 1986

Re:

84-1244 - Davis v. Bandemer

Dear Sandra:
Please
judgment.

join me in your opinion concurring in the
Sincerely,

()J1Y

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

·'
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June 27, 1986
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Anne

Re:

No. 84-1244, Davis v. Bandemer

The following

is a footnote along the lines suggested by

Justice Stevens:

Insert on page 12, new note 12:

Indeed,

in view of the Court's disposition in this case, further

litigation will be necessary to establish what standard properly
should be used to evaluate a redistricting plan claimed to be an
unconstitutional

partisan

proposed

plurality has

Justices,

by

the

political

gerrymander.

been explicitly

The

rejected

standard
by two

and three Justices have expressed their view that the

plurality's

standard

will

"prove

unmanageable

and

arbitrary."

Ante, at 12 (O'CONNOR, J., joined by BURGER, C.J., and REHNQUIST,
J., concurring in the judgment).

·.

lfp/ss 06/27/86

Davis v. Bandemer

DB SALLY-POW
Suggested new note 12, p. 12:
In light of the several opinions filed today,
there is no "Court" for a standard that properly should be
applied in determining whether a challenged redistricting
plan is an unconstitutional political gerrymander.

The

standard proposed by the plurality is explicitly rejected
by two Justices, and three Justices also have expressed
the view that the plurality's standard will "prove
unmanageable and arbitrary" ante, at 12 {O'Connor, J.,
joined by Burger, CJ., and Rehnquist, J., concurring in
the judgment) •

.•

June 27, 1986

84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer

Dear John:
ln view of your perceptive suggestion, what do you
think of a note along the following lines?

Suggested new note 12, p. 12 (call number to follow last
word in text):
As is evident from the several opinions filed
today, there is no "Court 8 for a standard that properly
should be applied in determining whether a challenged redistricting plan is an unconstitutional political gerrymander.
The standard proposed by the plurality is explicitly rejected by two Justices, and three Justices also have expressed
the view that the plura~ity's standard will 8 prove unmanageable and arbitrary" ante, at 12 (O'Connor, J., ioined by
Burger, CJ., and Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
lfp/ss

84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer (Anne)
BRW for the Court 10/14/85
1st draft 1/13/86
2nd draft 3/17/86
3rd draft 6/16/86
4th draft 6/20/86
Joined by WJB 1/16/86
TM 1/16/86
HAB 4/[4/86
LFP concurring in Part II of BRW's Opinion and dissenting
1st draft 2/25/86
2nd draft 2/27/86
3rd draft 3/5/86
4th draft 4/8/86
5th draft 6/20/86
6th draft 6/24/86
Joined by JPS 2/26/86
SOC concurring in the judgment
1st draft 6/10/86
2nd draft 6/10/86
3rd draft 6/25/86
Joined WHR 6/10/86
CJ 6/24/86
CJ concurring in the judgment
1st draft 6/24/86

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1244

SUSAN J. DAVIS, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.
IRWIN C. BANDEMER ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
[June 30, 1986]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in the judgment.
Today the Court holds that claims of political gerrymandering lodged by members of one of the political parties that
make up our two-party system are justiciable under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nothing in our precedents compels us to take this step, and
there is every reason not to do so. I would hold that the partisan gerrymandering claims of major political parties raise a
nonjusticiable political question that the judiciary should
leave to the legislative branch as the Framers of the Constitution unquestionably intended. Accordingly, I would
reverse the District Court's judgment on the grounds that
appellees' claim is nonjusticiable.
There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong
and stable two-party system in this country has contributed
enormously to sound and effective government. The preservation and health of our political institutions, state and
federal, depends to no small extent on the continued vitality
of our two-party system, which permits both stability and
measured change. The opportunity to control the drawing
of electoral boundaries through the legislative process of
apportionment is a critical and traditional part of politics in
the United States, and one that plays no small role in fostering active participation in the political parties at every level.

I

84-1244-CONCUR
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Thus, the legislative business of apportionment is fundamentally a political affair, and challenges to the manner in
which an apportionment has been carried out-by the very
parties that are responsible for this process-present a political question in the truest sense of the term.
To turn these matters over to the federal judiciary is to inject the courts into the most heated partisan issues. It is
predictable that the courts will respond by moving away from
( the nebulous standard a plurality of the Court fashions today
and toward some form of rough proportional representation
for all political groups. The consequences of this shift will be
as immense as they are unfortunate. I do not believe, and
the Court offers not a shred of evidence to suggest, that the
Framers of the Constitution intended the judicial power to
encompass the making of such fundamental choices about
how this Nation is to be governed. Nor do I believe that the
proportional representation towards which the Court's expansion of equal protection doctrine will lead is consistent
with our history, our traditions, or our political institutions.
The Court pays little heed to these considerations, which
should inform any sensible jurisprudence of Article III and of
the Equal Protection Claus.e. The Court's reflexive application of precedent ignores the maxim that "[p]articularly in
dealing with claims under broad provisions of the Constitution, which derive content by an interpretative process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that generalizations,
based on and qualified by the concrete situations that gave
rise to them, must not be applied out of context in disregard
of variant controlling facts." Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U. S. 339, 343-344 (1960). In cases such as this one, which
may profoundly affect the governance of this Nation, it is not
enough to cite precedent: we should examine it for possible
limits, and if they are lacking, for possible flaws.
I

Appellees are Indiana Democrats who claim that Indiana's
1981 state apportionment discriminates against Democrats

84-1244-CONCUR
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on a statewide basis by diluting their votes, thereby depriving them of "their proportionate share of political influence."
Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 299 (1962) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). The Court, relying principally on Baker v.
Carr, supra, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964),
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735 (1973), and the line of
racial gerrymandering cases including Rogers v. Lodge, 458
U. S. 613 (1982), and White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973),
holds that appellees' "purely political equal protection claim,"
ante, at - - , does not present a political question and is
therefore justiciable. Specifically, the Court holds that the
fact that a vote dilution claim "is submitted by a political
group, rather than a racial group, does not distinguish it in
terms of justiciability." Ante, at--.
A plurality of the Court·recognizes, however, that "[i]nviting attack on minor departures from some supposed norm
would too much embroil the judiciary in second-guessing
what has consistently been referred to as a political task for
the legislature, a task that should not be monitored too
closely unless the express or tacit goal is to effect its removal
from legislative halls." Ante, at - - . Accordingly, although the plurality's analysis is generally modeled on the
racial gerrymandering cases, the plurality would require a
somewhat different threshold showing that the apportionment has discriminatory effects: "unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a
manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of
voters' influence on the political process as a whole." Ante,
at--.
The step taken today is a momentous one, which if followed
in the future can only lead to political instability and judicial
malaise. If members of the major political parties are protected by the Equal Protection Clause from dilution of their
voting strength, then members of every identifiable group
that possesses distinctive interests and tends to vote on the
basis of those interests should be able to bring similar claims.
Federal courts will have no alternative but to attempt to

84-1244-CONCUR
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recreate the complex process of legislative apportionment in
the context of adversary litigation in order to reconcile the
competing claims of political, religious, ethnic, racial, occupational, and socioeconomic groups. Even if there were some
way of limiting such claims to organized political parties, the
. fact remains that the losing party or the losing group of legislators in every reapportionment will now be invited to fight
the battle anew in federal court. Apportionment is so important to legislators and political parties that the burden of
proof the plurality places on political gerrymandering plaintiffs is unlikely. to deter the routine lodging of such complaints. Notwithstanding the plurality's threshold requirement of discriminatory effects, the Court's holding that
political gerrymandering claims are justiciable has opened
the door to pervasive and unwarranted judicial superintendance of the legislative task of apportionment. There is
simply no clear stopping point to prevent the gradual evolution of a requirement of roughly proportional representation
for every cohesive political group.
In my view, this enterprise is flawed from its inception.
The Equal Protection Clause does not supply judicially manageable standards for resolving purely political gerrymandering claims, and no group right to an equal share of political
power was ever intended by the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court rests its case on precedent, but the
cases on which the Court relies do not require that we take
this next and most far-reaching step into the "political
thicket." Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, 556 (1946)
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
Baker v. Carr reaffirmed that a law suit will be held to involve a political question where there is "a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it," or
where "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion" is
apparent. 369 U. S., at 217. The Court first found a workable constitutional standard for applying the Equal Protec-

84-1244--CONCUR
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tion Clause to state legislative districting in Reynolds v.
Sims, supra. But until today the Court has not extended
the principles of Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims to test
a legislative districting plan on grounds of partisan political
gerrymandering. Indeed, one year after Reynolds v. Sims,
the Court was unanimous in summarily affirming a judgment
determining that a political gerrymandering challenge was
nonjusticiable; as Justice Harlan pointed out, the Court's action constituted a rejection of "contentions that ... partisan
'gerrymandering' may be subject to federal constitutional attack under the Fourteenth Amendment." WMCA, Inc. v.
Lomenzo, 382 U. S. 4, 6 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
The question raised again today, 21 years later, is whether
a court can apply the familiar "[j]udicial standards under the
Equal Protection Clause," Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 226,
without being forced to make a nonjudicial policy determination or to resort to a standard that is not judicially manageable. In order to answer that question, it is necessary to
interpret the Equal Protection Clause. As Justice Harlan
pointed out in his dissent in Baker v. Carr, "[t]he suggestion
... that courts lack standards by which to decide such cases
as this, is relevant not only to the question of 'justiciability,'
but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, to the determination whether any cognizable constitutional claim has been asserted in this case." I d., at 337 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Baker v. Carr itself involved just such an initial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause: the Court in effect ruled
that an arbitrary and capricious discrimination against individual voters with respect to the weight of their votes would
state a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection Clause.
See id., at 226; id., at 338-339 (Harlan, J., dissenting). That
threshold determination about the reach and meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause was the basis for the Court's holding
that the complaint of the Tennessee voters was justiciable.
Even this "arbitrary and capricious" standard threatened to
prove unmanageable, but the difficulty was pretermitted

84-1244-CONCUR
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when a relatively simple and judicially manageable requirement of population equality among districts was adopted the
following Term in Reynolds v. Sims. See Bickel, The
Supreme Court and Reapportionment, in Reapportionment
in the 1970's 57, 64 (N. Polsby ed. 1971) .
. Baker v. Carr does not require that we hold that the right
asserted in this case is similarly within the intendment of the
Equal Protection Clause and determinable under the standards developed to enforcethat Clause. The right asserted in
Baker v. Carr was an individual right to a vote whose weight
was not arbitrarily subjected to "debasement," 369 U. S., at
194. The rights asserted in this case are group rights to an
equal share of political power and representation, and the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard discussed in Baker v.
Carr cannot serve as the basis f9r recognizing such rights.
Indeed, the Court today does not rely on such a standard.
Instead, the Court justifies the extension of vote dilution
claims to mainstream political groups with the pronouncement that "Reynolds surely indicates the justiciability of
claims going to the adequacy of representation in state legislatures." Ante, at--. But Reynolds makes plain that the
one person, one vote principle safeguards the individual's
right to vote, not the interests of political groups: "To the
extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that
much less a citizen. The fact that an individual lives here or
there is not a legitimate reason for overweighting or diluting
the efficacy of his vote." 377 U. S., at 567. For that reason, "an individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial
fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in
other parts of the State." !d., at 568. Thus, the right guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause as interpreted in
Reynolds. is "the right of each voter to 'have his vote
weighted equally with those of all other citizens.'" Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 78 (1980) (plurality opinion).

84-1244-CONCUR
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In the case of mainstream political groups, the Court has
not accepted the argument that an "asserted entitlement to
group representation," Bolden, supra, at 77, can be traced to
the one person-one vote principle:
"It is, of course, true that the right of a person to vote on
an equal basis with other voters draws much of its significance from the political associations that its exercise
reflects, but it is an altogether different matter to conclude that political groups themselves have an independent constitutional claim to representation. And the
Court's decisions hold squarely that they do not." !d. at
78-79 (citing United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430
U. S. 144 (1977); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973);
and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971)).
Where representation is apportioned substantially on a population basis, it is "obvious that nobody's vote has been
'diluted' in the sense in which that word was used in the
Reynolds case." Bolden, supra, at 78. Thus, the individual's right to vote does not imply that political groups have a
right to be free from discriminatory impairment of their
group voting strength. Treating the vote dilution claims of
political groups as cognizable would effectively collapse the
"fundamental distinction between state action that inhibits an
individual's right to vote and state action that affects the political strength of various groups that compete for leadership
in a democratically governed community." Bolden, supra,
at 83 (STEVENS, J., concurring in the judgment).
Nor do this Court's racial gerrymandering cases require
the recognition of any such group right outside the context of
racial discrimination. As Justice Frankfurter observed:
"The cases involving Negro disfranchisement are no
exception to the principle of avoiding federal judicial
intervention into matters of state government in the absence of an explicit and clear constitutional imperative.
For here the controlling command of Supreme Law is
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plain and unequivocal. An end of discrimination against
the Negro was the compelling motive of the Civil War
Amendments. The Fifteenth expresses this in terms,
and it is no less true of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36,
67-72; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303,
306-307; Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 541." Baker
v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 285-286 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
·
In my view, where a racial minority group is characterized
by "the traditional indicia of suspectness" and is vulnerable to
exclusion from the political process, San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 28 (1973); see also Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 375, n. 14 (1974), individual voters
who belong to that group enjoy some measure of protection
against intentional dilution of their group voting strength by
means of racial gerrymandering. As a matter of past history
and present reality, there is a direct and immediate relationship between the racial minority's group voting strength in a
particular community and the individual rights of its members to vote and to participate in the political process. In
these circumstances, the stronger nexus between individual
rights and group interests, and the greater warrant the
Equal Protection Clause gives the federal courts to intervene
for protection against racial discrimination, suffice to render
racial gerrymandering claims justiciable. Even so, the individual's right is infringed only if the racial minority group can
prove that it has "essentially been shut out of the political
process." Ante, at--.
Clearly, members of the Democratic and Republican parties cannot claim that they are a discrete and insular group
vulnerable to exclusion from the political process by some
dominant group: these political parties are the dominant
groups, and the Court has offered no reason to believe that
they are incapable of fending for themselves through the
political process. Indeed, there is good reason to think that
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political gerrymandering is a self-limiting enterprise. See
B. Cain, The Reapportionment Puzzle 151-159 (1984). In
order to gerrymander, the legislative majority must weaken
some of its safe seats, thus exposing its own incumbents to
greater risks of defeat-risks they may refuse to accept past
a certain point. !d., at 154-155. Similarly, an overambitious gerrymander can lead to disaster for the legislative
majority: because it has created more seats in which it hopes
to win relatively narrow victories, the same swing in overall
voting strength will tend to cost the legislative majority more
and more seats as the gerrymander becomes more ambitious.
!d., at 152. More generally, each major party presumably
has ample weapons at its disposal to conduct the partisan
struggle that often leads to a partisan apportionment, but
also often leads to a bipartisan one. There is no proof before
us that political gerrymandering is an evil that cannot be
checked or cured by the people or by the parties themselves.
Absent such proof, I see no basis for concluding that there
is a need, let alone a constitutional basis, for judicial
intervention.
The plurality agrees that it would be unwise to "embroil
the judiciary in what has consistently been referred to as a
political task for the legislature." Ante, at--. Moreover,
the plurality is willing to presume that elected candidates will
not ignore the interests of voters for the losing candidate,
and it correctly observes that "the power to influence the
political process is not limited to winning elections." Ante,
at - - . But these propositions support my position-that
the costs of judicial intervention will be severe and that
political gerrymandering simply does not cause intolerable
harm to the ability of major political groups to advance their
interests.
Moreover, the new group right created by today's decision
is particularly unjustifiable in the context of the claim here,
which is founded on a supposed diminution of the statewide
voting influence of a political group. None of the elections
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for the Indiana Legislature are statewide. Voters in each
district elect their representatives from that district. To
treat the loss of candidates nominated by the party of a voter's choice as a harm to the individual voter, when that voter
cannot vote for such candidates and is not represented by
them in any direct sense, clearly exceeds the limits of the
Equal Protection Clause. On the Court's reasoning, members of a political party in one State should be able to challenge a congressional districting plan adopted in any other
State, on the grounds that their party is unfairly represented
in that State's congressional delegation, thus injuring them
as members of the national party.
The Court's reliance on Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S.
735 (1973), is insufficient to overcome these objections to a
general group right to equal political representation. Although Gaffney treated a political gerrymandering claim as
justiciable, the opinion's observation that "districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences," id., at 753, and its reluctance to undertake "the
impossible task of extirpating politics from what are the
essentially political processes of the sovereign States," id., at
754, would equally support a holding that whatever harms
political gerrymandering may sometimes occasion should be
tolerated as inextricably associated with the legislative business of redistricting. In addition, since Gaffney rejected the
challenge to bipartisan gerrymandering out of hand, the
Court simply did not confront the difficulties in framing a
manageable standard for adjudicating such claims. Accordingly, Gaffney should not bar a full consideration of those
difficulties here.
Furthermore, the Court fails to explain why a bipartisan
gerrymander-which is what was approved in Gaffneyaffects individuals any differently than a partisan gerrymander, which the Court makes vulnerable to constitutional
challenge today. In Gaffney, Connecticut, as part of a bipartisan effort, had drawn up a plan intended · to "provide a
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· rough sort of proportional representation," 412 U. S., at 754,
for the two major political parties. The Court declined to invalidate this plan, which undertook "not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but to recognize it," ibid., and suggested that "judicial interest should
be at its lowest ebb when a State purports fairly to allocate
political power to the parties in accordance with their voting
strength and, within quite tolerable limits, succeeds in doing
so." Ibid. (citations omitted).
A bipartisan gerrymander employs the same technique,
and has the same effect on individual voters, as does a partisan gerrymander. In each instance, groups of individuals
are assigned to districts with an eye towards promoting the
ends of a political party and its incumbent legislators. Some
groups within each party will lose any chance to elect a representative who belongs to their party, because they have been
assigned to a district in which the opposing party holds an
overwhelming advantage. Independent voters may lose any
chance to influence the outcome of elections in their district,
if one party has a sufficiently strong majority. As the plurality acknowledges, the scheme upheld in Gaffney tended to
"deny safe district minorities any realistic chance to elect
their own representatives." Ante, at - - . If this bipartisan arrangement between two groups of self-interested legislators is constitutionally permissible, as I believe and as the
Court held in Gaffney, then-in terms of the rights of individuals-it should be equally permissible for a legislative majority to employ the same means to pursue its own interests
over the opposition of the other party.
The Court's determination to treat the claims of mainstream political parties as justiciable thus emerges as precisely the sort of "initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion" that Baker v. Carr recognized as
characteristic of political questions. 369 U. S., at 217. The
Court has in effect decided that it is constitutionally acceptable for both parties to "waste" the votes of individuals
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through a bipartisan gerrymander, so long as the parties
themselves are not deprived of their group voting strength to
an extent that will exceed the plurality's threshold requirement. This choice confers greater rights on powerful political groups than on individuals; that cannot be the meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause.
II

The standard the plurality proposes exemplifies the intractable difficulties in deriving a judicially manageable standard
from the Equal Protection Clause for adjudicating political
gerrymandering claims. The plurality rejects any standard
that would require drawing "district lines to come as near as
possible to allocating seats to the contending parties in proportion to what their anticipated statewide vote will be,"
ante, at--, and states that "unconstitutional discrimination
occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of
voters' influence on the political process as a whole." Ante,
at - - . In my view, this standard will over time either
prove unmanageable and arbitrary or else evolve towards
some loose form of proportionality. Cf. Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L.
Rev. 227, 252-256 (1985). Either outcome would be calamitous for the federal courts, for the States, and for our twoparty system.
Vote dilution analysis is far less manageable when extended to major political parties than if confined to racial
minority groups. First, an increase in the number of competing claims to equal group representation will make judicial
review of apportionment vastly more complex. Designing
an apportionment plan that does not impair or degrade the
voting strength of several groups is more difficult than designing a plan that does not have such an effect on one group
for the simple reason that, as the number of criteria the plan
must meet increases, the number of solutions that will satisfy
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those criteria will decrease. Even where it is not impossible
to reconcile the competing claims of political, racial; and
other groups, the predictable result will be greater judicial
intrusion into the apportionment process.
Second, while membership in a racial group is an immutable characteristic, voters can-and often do-move from one
party to the other or support candidates from both parties.
Consequently, the difficulty of measuring voting strength is
heightened in the case of a major political party. It is difficult enough to measure "a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole," ante, at--, when
the group is a racial minority in a particular district or community. When the group is a major political party the difficulty is greater, and the constitutional basis for intervening
far more tenuous.
Moreover, any such intervention is likely to move in the
direction of proportional representation for political parties.
This is clear by analogy to the problem that arises in racial
gerrymandering cases: "in order to decide whether an electoral system has made it harder for minority voters to elect
the candidates they prefer, a court must have an idea in mind
of how hard it 'should' be for minority voters to elect their
preferred candidates under an acceptable system." Thornburg v. Gingles,-- U.S.--,-- (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). Any such norm must make some
reference, even if only a loose one, to the relation between
the racial minority group's share of the electorate and its
share of the elected representatives. In order to implement
the plurality's standard, it will thus be necessary for courts to
adopt an analogous norm, in order to assess whether the voting strength of a political party has been "degraded" by an
apportionment, either on a state-wide basis ·or in particular
districts. Absent any such norm, the inquiry the plurality
proposes would be so standardless as to make the adjudication of political gerrymandering claims impossible.
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Implicit in the plurality's opinion today is at least some use
of simple proportionality as the standard for measuring the
normal representational entitlements of a political party.
That is why the plurality can say that "a history (actual or
projected) of disproportionate results," together with proof
of "the denial of fair representation" and of "lack of political
power," will constitute an equal protection violation. Ante,
at - - . To be sure, the plurality has qualified its use of a
standard of proportional representation in a variety of ways
so as to avoid a requirement of proportional representation.
The question is whether these qualifications are likely to be
enduring in the face of the tremendous political pressures
that courts will confront when called on to decide political
gerrymandering claims. Because the most easily measured
indicia of political power relate solely to winning and losing
elections, there is a grave risk that the plurality's various
attempts to qualify and condition the group right the Court
has created will gradually pale in importance. What is likely
to remain is a loose form of proportionality, under which
some deviations from proportionality are permissible, but
any significant, persistent deviations from proportionality
are suspect. Courts will be forced to look for some form of
"undue" disproportionality with respect to electoral success if
political gerrymandering claims are justiciable, because otherwise they will find their decisions turning on imponderables
such as whether the legislators of one party have fairly represented the voters of the other.
Of course, in one sense a requirement of proportional
representation, whether loose or absolute, is judicially manageable. If this Court were to declare that the Equal Protection Clause required proportional representation within
certain fixed tolerances, I have no doubt that district courts
would be able to apply this edict. The flaw in such a pronouncement, however, would be the use of the Equal Protection Clause as the vehicle for making a fundamental policy
choice that is contrary to the intent of its Framers and to the
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traditions of this republic. The political question doctrine as
articulated in Baker v. Carr rightly requires that we refrain
from making such policy choices in order to evade what would
otherwise be a lack of judicially manageable standards. See
369 U. S., at 217.
Unfortunately, a drift towards proportional representation
is apparent even in the plurality opinion. Although at times
the plurality seems to require that the political party be "essentially . . . shut out of the political process" before a
constitutional violation will be found, ante, at--, the plurality's explanation of the deficiencies in the District Court's
approach focuses not on access to the political process as a
whole, but entirely on statewide electoral success. Thus,
the critical inquiry appears to be into whether the complaining political party could be expected to regain control of the
state legislature in the next few elections if backed by a majority of voters. Ante, at--. As an aid in this inquiry,
courts must apparently also ask "by what percentage the
statewide . . . vote" for the complaining political party would
have to increase to control the legislature or one of its
Houses. Ibid.
Under the plurality's approach, where it is shown that
under a challenged apportionment plan one party will consistently fail to gain control of the legislature even if it wins a
majority of the votes, a court would be justified in finding the
"threshold showing" met, at which point "the legislation
would be examined for valid underpinnings." Ante, at--.
It may fairly be doubted that this last step is anything more
than a formality, except perhaps in the case of bipartisan gerrymanders that have proved unexpectedly favorable to one
party. Consequently, although the plurality criticizes JusTICE POWELL for effectively concluding "that disproportionate short-term election results alone are a sufficient effect to
support a finding of a constitutional violation," ante, at--,
the plurality itself arrives at the conclusion that foreseeable,
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disproportionate long-term election results suffice to prove a
constitutional violation.
Thus, the plurality opinion ultimately rests on a political
preference for proportionality-not an outright claim that
proportional results are required, but a conviction that the
greater the departure from proportionality, the more suspect
an apportionment plan becomes. This preference for proportionality is in serious tension with essential features of
state legislative elections. Districting itself represents a
middle ground between winner-take-all statewide elections
and proportional representation for political parties. If
there is a constitutional preference for proportionality, the
legitimacy of districting itself is called into question: the
voting strength of less evenly distributed groups will invariably be diminished by districting as compared to at-large proportional systems for electing representatives. Moreover,
one implication of the districting system is that voters cast
votes for candidates in their districts, not for a statewide
slate of legislative candidates put forward by the parties.
Consequently, efforts to determine party voting strength
presuppose a norm that does not exist-statewide elections
for representatives along party lines.
The plurality's theory is also internally inconsistent. The
plurality recognizes that, given a normal dispersion of party
strength and winner-take-all district-based elections, it is
likely that even a narrow statewide preference for one party
will give that party a disproportionately large majority in the
legislature. Ante, at--. The plurality is prepared to tolerate this effect, because not to do so would spell the end of
district-based elections, or require reverse gerrymandering
to ensure greater proportionality for the minority party.
But this means that the plurality would extend greater protection to a party that can command a majority of the statewide vote than to a party that cannot: the explanation, once
again, is that the plurality has made a political judgment-in
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this instance, that district-based elections must be taken as a
given.
Because a statewide majority for a party's candidates will
frequently result only if the "winning" party attracts independent voters and voters from the other party, under the
plurality's approach a great deal will turn on whether the
support of these voters is included as part of the party's voting strength. The plurality would reserve this question,
but, however it is ultimately answered, anomalies will result.
To measure a party's voting strength by including voters who
only occasionally vote for that party's candidates is arbitrary;
to ignore the role these voters play will be to further discriminate against parties that do not command a permanent
majority of the electorate in a given State.
I would avoid the difficulties generated by the plurality's
efforts to confine the effects of a generalized group right to
equal representation by not recognizing such a right in the
first instance. To allow district courts to strike down apportionment plans on the basis of their prognostications as to the
outcome of future elections or future apportionments invites
":findings" on matters as to which neither judges nor anyone
else can have any confidence. Once it is conceded that "a
group's electoral power is not unconstitutionally diminished
by the simple fact of an apportionment scheme that makes
winning elections more difficult," ante, at - - , the virtual
impossibility of reliably predicting how difficult it will be to
win an election in 2, or 4, or 10 years should, in my view,
weigh in favor of holding such challenges nonjusticiable. Racial gerrymandering should remain justiciable, for the harms
it engenders run counter to the central thrust of the Fourteenth Amendment. But no such justification can be given
for judicial intervention on behalf of mainstream political
parties, and the risks such intervention poses to our political
institutions are unacceptable. "Political affiliation is the
keystone of the political trade. Race, ideally, is not."
United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg, Inc. v.

l
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Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 171 n. 1 (1977) (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring).
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SUSAN J. DAVIS, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.
IRWIN C. BANDEMER ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
[March - , 1986]

JUSTICE PowELL, concurring in Part I of the Memorandum
Opinion, and dissenting. ·
This case presents the question whether a state legislature
violates the Equal Protection Clause by adopting a redistricting plan designed solely to preserve the power of the
dominant political party, when the plan follows the doctrine
of "one person, one vote" but ignores all other neutral factors
relevant to the fairness of redistricting. 1
In answering this question, JUSTICE WHITE's memorandum opinion expresses the view, with which I agree, that a
partisan political gerrymander violates the Equal Protection
Clause only on proof of "both intentional discrimination
against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group." Ante, at 13. The memoran' This opinion uses the term "redistricting" to refer to the process by
which state legislators draw the boundaries of voting districts. The terms
"redistricting," "apportionment," and "reapportionment" frequently are
used interchangeably. Backstrom, Robins , & Eller, Issues in Gerrymandering: An Exploratory Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering Applied to
Minnesota, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1121 , 1121 , n. 1 (1978); Grofman, Criteria for
Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 77, 78,
n. 6 (1985). Technically, the words "apportionment" and "reapportionment" apply to the "allocation of a finite number of representatives among
a fixed number of pre-established areas," while "districting" and "redistricting" refer to the drawing of district lines. _Backstrom, Robins , &
Eller, supra, at 1121, n. 1; see Grofman, supra, at 78 , n. 6.
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dum opinion acknowledges that the record in this case supports a finding that the challenged redistricting plan was
adopted for the purpose of discriminating against Democratic
voters. Ante, at 14. The memorandum opinion concludes,
however, that appellees failed to establish that their voting
strength was diluted statewide despite uncontradicted proof
that certain key districts were grotesquely gerrymandered to
enhance the election prospects of Republican candidates.
This conclusion appears to rest solely on the ground that the
legislature accomplished its gerrymander consistent with
"one person, one vote," in the sense that the legislature designed voting districts of approximately equal population and
erected no direct barriers to Democratic voters' exercise of
the franchise. Since the essence of a gerrymandering claim
is that the members of a political party as a group have been
denied their right to "fair and effective representation,"
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 565 (1964), I believe that
the claim cannot be tested solely by reference to "one person,
one vote." Rather, a number of other relevant neutral factors must be considered. Because the memorandum opinion
ignores such factors and fails to enunciate standards by which
to determine whether a legislature has enacted an unconstitutional gerrymander, I dissent.
I

The facts are described in the memorandum opinion and
may be briefly restated here. In 1981, the Republican Party
controlled both houses of the Indiana General Assembly, and
its candidate held the Governor's seat. Pursuant to the requirements of the State Constitution, the General Assembly
undertook legislative redistricting based on 1980 census data.
A Conference Committee, all of whose members were Republicans, was assigned the task of drawing district maps
with the assistance of a private computer firm. The information fed into the computer primarily concerned the political complexion of the State's precincts. The redistricting
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process was conducted in secret. Democratic legislators
were not afforded any participation in designing the district
maps that were adopted. There were no hearings where
members of the public were invited to express their views.
The Republican Committee revealed the results of its computer's efforts two days before the end of the legislative session, and the Democrats hurriedly presented an alternative
plan. On the last day of the session, the Republican plan
was adopted by party line vote in both houses of the General
Assembly. The Governor signed the plan into law.
In 1982 and 1984, elections were held under the redistricting plan. Prior to the 1982 election, this lawsuit was commenced by appellees, a group of Indiana Democrats who
claimed that the plan constitutes a partisan political gerrymander designed to disenfranchise Democratic voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 Since trial was completed after the 1982 election, appellees relied in part on the disparity between votes
cast for Democratic legislative candidates in that election and
seats captured by Democrats. The case was heard by a
three-judge panel in the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The District Court, over the dissent of
z In the District Court, appellees' lawsuit was consolidated with a suit
brought by the Indiana NAACP. The plaintiffs in the NAACP suit argued that the redistricting intentionally fragmented concentrations of
black voters in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
and of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973. The District Court determined that the plan discriminated against black voters,
not because of their race, but because blacks had a demonstrated and overwhelming tendency to vote as a bloc for Democratic candidates. Indeed,
the District Court explicitly found that the "disadvantaging effect of the
plan's multi-member districts falls particularly hard and harsh upon black
voters in the state." 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1488 (SD Ind. 1984). Rather
than taking a cross-appeal challenging the District Court's rejection of
their constitutional and statutory claims, the NAACP plaintiffs have filed a
brief in this Court urging affirmance of the District Court's judgment that
the plan unconstitutionally discriminates against Democratic voters as a
group and against blacks as members of that group.
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Judge Pell, made extensive findings of fact and determined
that appellees had established an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander. 603 F. Supp. 1479 (SD Ind. 1984). The
Court today reverses the District Court, without concluding
that any of its findings was clearly erroneous.

II
A
Gerrymandering is "the deliberate and arbitrary distortion
of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal
political purposes." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526,
538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring). 3 As JUSTICE STEVENS
correctly observed, gerrymandering violates the Equal Protection Clause only when the redistricting plan serves "no
purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial,
ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a
position of strength at a particular time, or to disadvantage a
politically weak segment of the community." Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 748 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring).
The term "gerrymandering," however, is also used loosely
to describe the common practice of the party in power to redistrict to its own advantage. An intent to discriminate in
this sense may be present whenever redistricting occurs.
See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 753 (1973); Cous3
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged ed. 1961)
defines "gerrymander" as "to divide (a territorial unit) into election districts in an unnatural and unfair way with the purpose of giving one political party an electoral majority in a large number of districts while concentrating the voting strength of the opposition in as few districts as
possible." The term "gerrymander" was coined by combining the last
name of Elbridge Gerry with the word "salamander" in order to describe
the "fancied resemblance to a salamander ... of the irregularly shaped
outline of an election district in northeastern Massachusetts that had been
formed for partisan purposes in 1812 during Gerry's governorship" of that
State. Ibid. Though many of the voting districts appearing in the plans
challenged here have bizarre shapes, House District 66 perhaps most
closely resembles a salamander. See the redistricting maps appended to
this opinion.
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ins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F. 2d 830, 847 (CA7) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 893 (1972).
Moreover, since legislative bodies rarely reflect accurately
the popular voting strength of the principal political parties,
the effect of any particular redistricting may be perceived as
unfair. See id., at 752-754. Consequently, only a sensitive
and searching inquiry can distinguish gerrymandering in the
"loose" sense from gerrymandering that amounts to unconstitutional discrimination. Because it is difficult to develop
and apply standards that will identify the unconstitutional
gerrymander, courts may seek to avoid their responsibility to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause by finding that a claim of
gerrymandering is nonjusticiable. I agree with the memorandum opinion that such a course is mistaken, and that the
allegations in this case raise a justiciable issue. 4
Moreover, I am convinced that appropriate judicial standards can and should be developed. Justice Fortas' definition
of unconstitutional gerrymandering properly focuses on
whether the boundaries of the voting districts have been distorted deliberately and arbitrarily to achieve illegitimate
ends. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S., at 538. Under
this definition, the merits of a gerrymandering claim must be
determined by reference to the configurations of the districts, the observance of political subdivision lines, and other
criteria that have independent relevance to the fairness of redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 755-759
(STEVENS, J., concurring). In this case, the District Court
examined the redistricting in light of such factors and found,
among other facts, that the boundaries of a number of districts were deliberately distorted to deprive Democratic vot'As the memorandum opinion properly explains, prior decisions of this
Court make clear that an equal protection challenge to redistricting does
not constitute a nonjusticiable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U. S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735 (1973). Accordingly, I join Part I of the memorandum opinion.
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ers of an equal opportunity to participate in the State's legislative processes. The memorandum opinion makes no
reference to any of the District Court's findings of fact. It
rejects the District Court's ultimate conclusion with no explanation of the respects in which appellees' proof fell short of
establishing discriminatory effect. A brief review of the
Court's jurisprudence in the context of another kind of challenge to redistricting, a claim of malapportionment, demonstrates the pressing need for the Court to enunciate standards to guide legislators who redistrict and judges who
determine the constitutionality of the legislative effort.
B

The Equal Protection Clause guarantees citizens that their
state will govern them impartially. See Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring). In the context
of redistricting, that guarantee is of critical importance because the franchise provides most citizens their only voice in
the legislative proces·s. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at
561-562, 565-566. Since the contours of a voting district
powerfully may affect citizens' ability to exercise influence
through their vote, district lines should be determined in accordance with neutral and legitimate criteria. When deciding where those lines will fall, the state should treat its voters as standing in the same position, regardless of their
political beliefs or party affiliation. Chapman v. Meier, 420
U. S. 1, 17 (1975); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 751.
The first cases in which this Court entertained equal protection challenges to redistricting involved allegations that
state legislatures had refused to redesign States' voting districts to eliminate gross population disparities among those ·
districts. E. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, supra. The Court's decision in Reynolds v.
Sims illustrates two concepts that are vitally important in
evaluating an equal protection challenge to redistricting.
First, the Court recognized that equal protection encom-
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passes a guarantee of equal representation, requiring a State
to seek to achieve through redistricting "fair and effective
representation for all citizens." Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U. S., at 565-566; see Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, at 748.
The concept of "representation" necessarily applies to
groups: groups of voters elect representatives, individual
voters do not. Gross population disparities violate the mandate of equal representation by denying voters residing in
heavily populated districts, as a group, the opportunity to
elect the number of representatives to which their voting
strength otherwise would entitle them. While population
disparities do dilute the weight of individual votes, their discriminatory effect is felt only when those individual votes are
combined. Thus, the fact that individual voters in heavily
populated districts are free to cast their ballot has no bearing
on a claim of malapportionment.
·
Second, at the same time that it announced the principle of
"one person, one vote" to compel States to eliminate gross
disparities among district populations, the Court plainly recognized that redistricting should be based on a number of
neutral criteria, of which districts of equal population was
only one. Reynolds v. Sims identified several of the factors
that should guide a legislature engaged in redistricting. For
example, the Court observed that districts should be compact
and cover contiguous territory, precisely because the alternative, "[i]ndiscriminate districting," would be "an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering." 377 U. S., at 578-579.
Similarly, a State properly could choose to give "independent
representation" to established political subdivisions. Adherence to community boundaries, the Court reasoned, would
both "deter the possibilities of gerrymandering," and allow
communities to have a voice in the legislature that directly
controls their local interests. !d., at 580-581. See also
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 325-326 (1973). Thus,
Reynolds v. Sims contemplated that "one person, one vote"
would be only one among several neutral factors that serve
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the constitutional mandate of fair and effective representation. See Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, at 748-749. It was
not itself to be the only goal of redistricting. 5
A standard that judges the constitutionality of a districting
plan solely by reference to the doctrine of "one person, one
vote" may cause two detrimental results. 6 First, as a perceived way to avoid litigation, legislative bodies may place
undue emphasis on mathematical exactitude, subordinating
or ignoring entirely other criteria that bear directly on the
fairness of redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S.,
at 753 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 774 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 749. Second,
as this case illustrates, and as Reynolds v. Sims anticipated,
exclusive or primary reliance on "one person, one vote" can
betray the constitutional promise of fair and effective representation by enabling a legislature to engage intentionally
in clearly discriminatory gerrymandering.
See Wells
5
The doctrine of "one person, one vote" originally was regarded as a
means to prevent discriminatory gerrymandering since "opportunities for
- gerrymandering are greatest when there is freedom to construct unequally
populated districts." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 .U. S. 526, 534, n. 4
(1969). Advances in computer technology achieved since the doctrine was
announced have drastically reduced its deterrent value by permitting political cartographers to draw districts of equal population that intentionally
discriminate against cognizable groups of voters. See Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U. S. 725, 752, n. 10 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring). For "one person, one vote" to serve its intended purpose of implementing the constitutional mandate of fair and effective representation, therefore, consideration also must be given to other neutral factors.
6
In decisions concerning congressional redistricting, the Court has focused its attention almost exclusively on whether a challenged plan satisfies "one person, one vote." See Karcher v. Daggett, supra; White v.
Weiser, 412 U. S. 783 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, supra. In cases involving state legislative redistricting, such as the case before us today, the
Court has refused to limit a legislature to the single goal of precise population equality. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 745; Mahan v. Howell,
410 u. s. 315, 322-325 (1973).
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v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542, 551 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).

c

In light of the foregoing principles, I believe that the
memorandum opinion is seriously flawed in several respects.
First, apparently to avoid the forceful evidence that some
district lines indisputably were designed to and did discriminate against Democrats, the memorandum opinion describes
appellees' claim as alleging that "Democratic voters over the
State as a whole, not Democratic voters in particular districts, have been subjected to unconstitutional discrimination." Ante, at 13. Assuming that this characterization of
appellees' claim is accurate, it in no way undermines appellees' showing of statewide discriminatory effect through
proof of "individual districting" that "exemplif[ies] this discrimination." Ibid. If Democratic voters in a number of
critical districts are the focus of unconstitutional discrimination, as the District Court found, the effect of that discrimination will be felt over the State as a whole.
The memorandum opinion also erroneously characterizes
the harm members of the losing party suffer as a group when
they are deprived, through deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries, of the opportunity to elect representatives of their choosing. See ante, at 17-18. 7 It may
7
The memorandum opinion correctly concludes that a redistricting plan
is not unconstitutional merely because the plan makes it more difficult for a
group of voters to elect the candidate of its choice or merely because the
plan does not provide proportional representation. Ante, at 17-18. But
the memorandum opinion leaps from that conclusion to the assumption that
"[a]n individual or group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is
usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and
to have as much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in
the district." Ante, at 18. Thus, the memorandum apparently concludes
that effects on election results are of little import, as long as the losers
have some access to their representatives. Though effects on election results do not suffice to establish an unconstitutional gerrymander, they cer-
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be, as the memorandum suggests, that representatives will
not "entirely ignore the interests" of opposition voters.
Ante, at 18. But it defies political reality to suppose that
members of a losing party have as much political influence
over state government as do members of the victorious
party. Even the most conscientious state legislators do not
disregard opportunities to reward persons or groups who
were active supporters in their election campaigns. Similarly, no one doubts that partisan considerations play a major
role in the passage of legislation and the appointment of state
officers. Not surprisingly, therefore, the District Court expressly found that "[c]ontrol of the General Assembly is crucial" to members of the major political parties in Indiana.
603 F. Supp., at 1483. 8 In light of those findings, I cannot
accept the memorandum opinion's apparent conclusion that
loss of this "crucial" position is constitutionally insignificant
as long as the losers are not "entirely ignored" by the
winners.
The memorandum opinion relies almost exclusively on the
"one person, one vote" standard to reject appellees' convincing proof that the redistricting plan had a seriously discriminatory effect on their voting strength in particular districts.
The memorandum opinion properly describes the claim in this
tainly are relevant to such a claim, and they may suffice to show that the
claimants have been injured by the redistricting they challenge.
8
The District Court found that: "Control of the General Assembly is
crucial to a political party for a number of reasons. The majority party
elects the Speaker of the House, a person who wields considerable power in
the assigning of bills to committees, the conduct of the actual legislative
sessions, and is empowered, under legislative rules, to prevent bills from
reaching the floor for debate or vote. Similarly, the majority party elects
floor leaders in both houses who control the flow of legislation, the assignment of members to committees, and the appointment of committee chairmen. All of these powers are important to the achievement of a party's
legislative goals. There is little doubt that the minority party plays a less
substantial role in the drafting and enactment of legislation." 603 F.
Supp. , at 1483.
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case as a denial of fair and effective "representation," ante, at
12, but it does not provide any explanation of how complying
with "one person, one vote" deters or identifies a gerrymander that unconstitutionally discriminates against a cognizable
group of voters. While that standard affords some protection to the voting rights of individuals, "it protects groups
only indirectly at best," Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 752
(STEVENS, J., concurring), even when the group's identity is
determined solely by reference to the fact that its members
reside in a particular voting district. "One person, one vote"
alone does not protect the voting rights of a group made up of
persons affiliated with a particular political party who seek to
achieve representation through their combined voting
strength. Thus, the facts that each Democratic voter was
permitted to cast his one vote and that the districts were of
equal population are irrelevant to a claim that district lines
were drawn for the purpose and with the effect of debasing
the strength of votes cast by Democrats as a group.
The final and most basic flaw in the memorandum opinion
is its failure to enunciate any standard that affords guidance
to legislatures and courts. Legislators and judges are left to
wonder whether compliance with "one person, one vote" completely insulates a partisan gerrymander from constitutional
scrutiny, or whether a more substantial but as yet undefined
standard applies. The failure to articulate clear doctrine in
this area places the Court in the curious position of inviting
further litigation even as it appears to signal the "constitutional green light" 9 to would-be gerrymanderers.

III
In Karcher v. Daggett, JUSTICE STEVENS, echoing the decision in Reynolds v. Sims, described factors that I believe
properly should guide both legislators who redistrict and
judges who test redistricting plans against constitutional
"Edwards, The Gerrymander and "One Man, One Vote ," 46
N. Y. U. L. Rev. 879, 880 (1971).
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challenges. 462 U. S., at 753-761. The most important of
these factors are the shapes of voting districts and adherence
to established political subdivision boundaries. '0 Other relevant considerations include the nature of the legislative procedures by which the apportionment law was adopted and
legislative history reflecting contemporaneous legislative
goals. To make out a case of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, the plaintiff should be required to offer proof
concerning these factors, which bear directly on the fairness
of a redistricting plan, as well as evidence concerning population disparities and statistics tending to show vote dilution.
No one factor should be dispositive.
In this case, appellees offered convincing proof of the ease
with which mapmakers, consistent with the "one person, one
vote" standard, may design a districting plan that purposefully discriminates against political opponents as well as racial minorities. Computer technology now enables gerrymanderers to achieve their purpose while adhering perfectly
to the requirement that districts be of equal population. Relying on the factors correctly described by JUSTICE STEVENS
in Karcher v. Daggett, the District Court carefully reviewed
appellees' evidence and found that the redistricting law was
intended to and did discriminate against Democrats as a
group . . We have held that a district court's ultimate determination that a redistricting plan was "being maintained for
discriminatory purposes," as well as its "subsidiary findings
of fact," may not be set aside by a reviewing court unless
they are clearly erroneous. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613,
622-623 (1982); see, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755,
769-770 (1973). Not only does the memorandum opinion ignore this established principle, it fails even to acknowledge
'"In some cases, proof of grotesque district shapes may, without more,
provide convincing proof of unconstitutional gerrymandering. For example, see the redistricting maps appended to the Court's opinions in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 346 U. S. 339, 348 (1960), and in Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U. S., at 744.
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the findings expressly made by the Indiana District Court.
The memorandum also disregards the various factors discussed by the District Court as adequate indicia of unconstitutional gerrymandering.
A

A court should look first to the legislative process by which
the challenged plan was adopted. Here, the District Court
found that the procedures used in redistricting Indiana were
carefully designed to exclude Democrats from participating
in the legislative process. In February 1981, both houses of
the General Assembly passed reapportionment bills with no
substantive content and referred them to the other chamber
where conflicting amendments were made. The purpose of
this process was to send "vehicle bills" to a Conference Committee whose task was to apportion representation. Four
conferees and four advisors served on the Committee. The
conferees, all Republicans, were responsible for designing
the voting districts and were entitled to vote on the result of
their own efforts. The advisors, Democrats, were excluded
from the mapmaking process· and were given no committee
vote. 603 F. Supp., at 1483.
The legislative process consisted of nothing more than the
majority party's private application of computer technology
to mapmaking. The Republican State Committee engaged
the services of a computer firm to aid the conferees in their
task. I d., at 1483-1484. According to the Conference Committee chairman, the only data used in the computer program
were precinct population, race of precinct citizens, precinct
political complexion, and .statewide party voting trends. Access to the mapmaking process was strictly limited. No
member of the Democratic party and no member of the public
was provided with any of the information used in or generated by the computer program. When questioned about the
lack of minority party participation in the redistricting process, the chairman of the Conference Committee stated that
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the Democrats would "have the privilege to offer a minority
map. But I will advise you in advance that it will not be accepted." Id., at 1484.
Republicans promised to hold public hearings on redistricting. No hearing was held dur1ng the mapmaking process,
the only time during which voters' views could be expected to
influence their legislators. Ibid. Two days before the end
of the General Assembly's regular session, during the first
and only public hearing on reapportionment, the Conference
Committee revealed for the first time the result of its mapmaking effort. This timing gave the Democrats but 40 hours
in which to review the districting of more than 4,000 precincts. Ibid. On the last day of the session, April30, 1981,
the Conference Committee report was introduced for a vote
and was adopted by party line vote in both houses of the General Assembly. 11 Ibid.
B

Next, the District Court found that the maps "conspicuously ignore[d] traditional political subdivisions, with no concern for any adherence to principles of community interest."
Id~, at 1493.
The court carefully described how the mapmakers carved up counties, cities, and even townships in
their effort to draw lines beneficial to the majority party.
Many districts meander through several counties, picking up
a number of townships from each. 12 The District Court explained why this failure to honor county boundaries could be
expected to have a detrimental impact on citizens' exercise of
their vote. In Indiana, the county government is the seat of
local affairs. I d., at 1494. The redistricting dissects coun11
Presumably as a result of the haste with which the redistricting law
was pushed through the General Assembly, parts of the state were "wholly
omitted in the 1981legislation." 603 F. Supp., at 1484. In the 1982legislative session, therefore, amendments were passed to assign the omitted
areas to voting districts. Ibid.
12
E. g., House Districts 20, 22, 25, 28, 42, 45, 46, 55, 57, 62, 66, 70, 73,
74; Senate Districts 7, 24, 37, 39, 45, 47.
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ties into strange shapes lacking in common interests, on one
occasion even placing the seat of one county in a voting district composed of townships from other counties. I d., at
1487; see House Districts 45, 46. Under these conditions,
the District Court expressly found that "the potential for
voter disillusion and nonparticipation is great," as voters are
forced to focus their political activities in artificial electoral
units. 603 F. Supp., at 1494. Intelligent voters, regardless
of party affiliation, resent this sort of political manipulation of
the electorate for no public purpose.
Deposition testimony of the Chairman of the Conference
Committee revealed that the mapmakers gave no consideration to the interests of communities. In the Chairman's
view, the concept of honoring community interests meant
only that mapmakers should refuse to divide a small, suburban community. The shapes of the voting districts and the
manner in which the districts divide established communities, from the county to the township level, illustrate that
community interests were ignored by appellants. As the
District Court observed, for example, "it is difficult to conceive the interests shared by blacks in Washington Township .
and white suburbanites in Hamilton and Boone Counties, or
the shared interest of Allen and Noble County farmers with
residents of downtown Fort Wayne." /d., at 1487.

c
In addition to the foregoing findings that apply to both the
House and Senate plans, the District Court also noted the
substantial evidence that appellants were motivated solely by
partisan considerations. /d., at 1484. There is no evidence
that the public interest in a fair electoral process was given
any consideration by appellants. Indeed, as noted above,
the mapmakers' partisan goals were made explicitly clear by
contemporaneous statements of Republican leaders who
openly acknowledged that their goal was to disadvantage
Democratic voters. As one Republican House member con-
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cisely put it, "The name of the game is to keep us in power."
NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 232 (Indianapolis Star, Mar. 22,
1981). When the plan was completed, Republican leaders
announced that the House map was designed to yield 56
"safe" Republican seats and 30 Democratic seats, with the remainder being "tossups." NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 242
(Post-Tribune, April 29, 1981, p. 1). Republicans expected
that their Senate map would regularly produce 30 Republican
seats and 8 to 10 Democratic seats so that Republicans would
maintain their grip on the Senate even if Democrats won the
remaining seats. NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 241 (Post-Tribune, April 29, 1981, p. 1). In short, the record unequivocally demonstrates that in 1981 the Republican-dominated
General Assembly deliberately sought to design a redistricting plan under which members of the Democratic party
would be deprived of a fair opportunity to win control of the
General Assembly at least until 1991, the date of the next
redistricting.
IV
A

I turn now to the District Court's findings with respect
particularly to the gerrymandering of the House Districts.
The court found that the plan contained voting districts
whose irrational shapes called for justification. E. g., House
Districts 20, 22, 25, 45, 56, 48, 62, 66, 70, 73. The findings
concerning the district configurations reflect the panel's familiarity with Indiana geography and the particular characteristics of the State's political subdivisions. As the District
Court noted, the voter confusion generated by irrat~onal district boundaries is exacerbated in this case by the fact that
the lines in the House Plan were drawn independently of
those in the Senate Plan. 603 F. Supp., at 1484-1485.
When the Senate voting districts are overlaid on the House
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districts, the potential for voter confusion becomes readily
apparent as lines and districts intersect in a crazy-quilt. 13
The District Court carefully considered the multimember
districts contained in the House plan and found that they
were intentionally employed to minimize Democratic voting
power. This Court has expressly recognized that "[a] districting plan may create multimember districts perfectly acceptable under equal population standards, but invidiously
discriminatory because they are employed 'to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of
the voting population."' Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S.,
at 751 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439
(1965)). 14 In this case, invidious purpose may be inferred
from the mapmakers' selection of areas to be divided into
multimember districts. These districts appear in some areas
where they had been used previously and not in others, in
some urban areas and not in others, and in some areas where
their use required combining rural townships with urban
areas from another county. 15 The only discernible pattern is
3

Since the Indiana House of Representatives has 100 members, and the
senate has 50, the mapmakers readily could have designed a "nested" plan,
that is, a plan that included "two House districts within one Senate district." 603 F. Supp., at 1484. By permitting voters readily to identify
their voting districts and corresponding representatives, a nested plan can
be expected to foster voter participation. See Grofman, supra, at 88, 92.
Instead, as the District Court observed, the mapmakers drew House districts that were "not at all relevant to the Senate districts." 603 F. Supp.,
at 1484.
"In the context of racial gerrymandering claims, the Court has refused
to adopt a per se rule barring the use of multimember districts. White v.
Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765 (1973). But the Court has repeatedly recognized that the characteristics of multimember districts, namely their tendency to submerge the voting strength of the minority by allowing the majority to capture all of the district's assigned seats, make them a ready
means for legislative discrimination against racial groups or political opponents. E. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616 (1982).
16
The multimember districts are House Districts 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15,
'
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the appearance of these districts in areas where their winnertake-all aspects can best be employed to debase Democratic
voting strength. The District Court determined that the
multimember districts diluted Democratic voting strength by
"stacking" Democrats into districts "where their majority
would be overwhelming" and by fragmenting populations of
Democratic voters among other districts where their voting
strength would be reduced. 603 F. Supp. , at 1488-1489,
1494. For example, the mapmakers split Fort Wayne, a city
with a demonstrated tendency to vote for Democratic candidates, in half and associated each segment with areas from
outlying counties whose residents had a pattern of voting for
Republican candidates. Id., at 1488, 1494; see House Districts 19, 20. Similarly, the redistricting of Marion County
presents a clear example of dilution of Democrats' voting
strength through the use of multimember districts. 16
Though population figures entitled the county to elect exactly
14 House members, the mapmakers decided to tack on por19, 20, 31, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 75.
"The District Court found that the multimember districts employed in
Marion County were "particularly suspect with respect to compactness."
603 F . Supp., at 1487. Of all the districts in the challenged plan, the court
determined that House District 48 "presents the most grievous example of
the political cartographer's handiwork in this case." Ibid. That district
"forms the letter 'C' around the central city of Indianapolis" and "includes
portions of the urban southwestside of the city, the airport and suburban
area around Ben Davis High School on the west side, and the Meridian
Hills area at the northern part of the county." Ibid. The court expressly
determined that, even though House District 48 satisfies "one person, one
vote," there was "simply no conceivable justification for this kind of district." Ibid. Of course, the District Court also noted the discriminatory
purpose served by the Marion-County House Districts, including District
48: "the powerful Marion County delegation forced neighboring counties to
cede turf to permit a preservation of the multi-member districts which had
consistently returned Republicans to the Statehouse." /d., at 1487, n. 1.
Moreover, as appellees' statistical showing of vote dilution plainly demonstrates, these gerrymandered districts had a discriminatory impact on the
votes of Democrats as a group.
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tions of 2 neighboring counties in order artificially to create a
population base entitled to elect 15 representatives. Then,
they carved that artificial geographical unit into five threemember districts whose irregular shapes were designed to
fence Democrats into one heavily Democratic district and
then scatter pockets of Democratic strength among the other
four districts. ld., at 1487, 1489; see House Districts 48, 49,
50, 51, 52.
Appellees further demonstrated through a statistical showing that the House Plan debased the effectiveness of their
votes. In 1982, all 100 House seats were up for election.
Democratic candidates received about 51.9 percent of the
vote, and Republican candidates received about 48.1 percent.
Forty-three Democratic representatives were elected; 57 Republicans were elected. 17 Appellees offered startling statistics with respect to House results in Marion and Allen Counties, two areas in which multimember districts were used.
In these counties, Democratic candidates earned 46.3 percent
of the vote, but won only 3 of 21 House seats. As the District Court observed, "such a disparity speaks for itself."
ld., at 1489. 18
B
Since half of the Senate membership is up for election
every two years, the only election results under the challenged plan available at trial related to 25 of the 50 Senate
17

In the 1984 election, Democratic candidates earned approximately 44
percent of the vote, and Republicans earned approximately 56 percent.
Thirty-nine Democrats were elected to the House, and 61 Republicans
were elected. The figures for the 1984 elections cited in this opinion were
provided by the Elections Research Center, Washington, D. C. A Supplemental Statement filed by appellants in the District Court following
trial also quoted some of the 1984 election results, including the fact that in
1984 the Democratic candidate for Governor won 48% of the vote.
18
The 1984 House election in the Marion and Allen County House Districts reflected a similar disparity, when Republicans again captured 18 of
· the 21 House seats and the Democrats 3 despite the fact that Democratic
candidates earned approximately 38 percent of the vote in these counties.
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seats. Those results showed that, of the seats up for election in 1982, Democrats were elected to 13 seats and Republicans to 12. Democratic candidates earned about 53.1 percent of the vote, and Republicans received about 46.9
percent. At trial, it was appellees' contention that most of
the Senate seats won by Democrats in 1982 were "safe" Democratic seats so that their party's success at the polls in that
year was fully consistent with the statewide Republican gerrymander. This contention is borne out by the results of the
1984 Senate election. In that election, Democratic candidates received 42.3 percent of the vote, and Republicans 57.7
percent. Yet, of the 25 Senate positions up for election, only
7 were captured by Democrats.

c
The District Court found, and I agree, that appellants
failed to justify the discriminatory impact of the plan by
showing that the plan had a rational basis in permissible neutral criteria. Appellants' primary justification was that the
plan comports with the principle of "one person, one vote."
Their plan did adhere to that objective, with population deviations between House districts of 1. 05 percent and between
Senate districts of 1.15 percent. But reliance on "one person, one vote" does not sufficiently explain or justify the
harm the plan inflicts on Democratic voters as a group. The
court below expressly found that the irregular district shapes
could not be justified on the basis of population distribution.
603 F. Supp., at 1494. Nor does "one person, one vote" explain the mapmakers' failure to honor established political or
community boundaries. It does not excuse the irrational use
of multimember districts, with their devastating impact on
- the voting strength of Democrats. The only other justification offered by appellants, for which the District Court found
some support as a contemporaneous goal, was that the mapmakers sought to maintain "the black representation in the
General Assembly that existed prior to the new districting
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plan." But the court further determined that the impact of
the redistricting fell most harshly on black voters who predominantly are Democrats. !d., at 1488, 1489-1490. None
of these critical findings was found by the Court today to be
clearly erroneous.

v

In conclusion, I want to make clear the limits of the standard that I believe the Equal Protection Clause imposes on
legislators engaged in redistricting. Traditionally, the
determination of electoral districts within a State has been a
matter left to the legislative branch of the state government.
Apart from the doctine of separation of powers and the federal system prescribed by the Constitution, federal judges
are ill-equipped generally to review legislative decisions respecting redistricting. As the memorandum opinion makes
clear, however, this Court's precedents hold that a colorable
claim of discriminatory gerrymandering presents a justiciable controversy under the Equal Protection Clause. Federal courts in exercising their duty to adjudicate such claims
should impose a heavy burden of proof on those who allege
that a redistricting plan violates the Constitution. In light
of Baker v. Carr, Reynolds v. Sims, and their progeny, including such comparatively recent decisions as Gaffney v.
Cummings, this case presents a paradigm example of unconstitutional discrimination against the members of a political
party that happened to be out of power. The well-grounded
findings of the District Court to this effect ha.ve not been, and
I believe cannot be, held clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins,
concurring in Part I of the Memorandum Opinion, and
dissenting.
This case presents the question whether a state legislature
violates the Equal Protection Clause by adopting a redistricting plan designed solely to preserve the power of the
dominant political party, when the plan follows the doctrine
of "one person, one vote" but ignores all other neutral factors
relevant to the fairness of redistricting. 1
In answering this question, JUSTICE WHITE's memorandum opinion expresses the view, with which I agree, that a
partisan political gerrymander violates the Equal Protection
Clause only on proof of "both intentional discrimination
against an identifiable political group and an actual discrimi' This opinion uses the term "redistricting" to refer to the process by
which state legislators draw the boundaries of voting districts. The terms
"redistricting," "apportionment," and "reapportionment" frequently are
used interchangeably. Backstrom, Robins, & Eller, Issues in Gerrymandering: An Exploratory Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering Applied to
Minnesota, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1121, 1121, n. 1 (1978); Grofman, CJ"iteria for
Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 77, 78,
n. 6 (1985). Technically, the words "apportionment" and "reapportionment" apply to the "allocation of a finite number of representatives among
a fixed number of pre-established areas," while "districting" and "redistricting" refer to the drawing of district lines. Backstrom, Robins, &
Eller, supra, at 1121, n. 1; see Grofman, supra, at 78, n. 6.
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natory effect on that group." Ante, at 13. The memorandum opinion acknowledges that the record in this case supports a finding that the challenged redistricting plan was
adopted for the purpose of discriminating against Democratic
voters. Ante, at 14. The memorandum opinion concludes,
however, that appellees failed to establish that their voting
strength was diluted statewide despite uncontradicted proof
that certain key districts were grotesquely gerrymandered to
enhance the election prospects of Republican candidates.
This conclusion appears to rest solely on the ground that the
legislature accomplished its gerrymander consistent with
"one person, one vote," in the sense that the legislature designed voting districts of approximately equal population and
erected no direct barriers to Democratic voters' exercise of
the franchise. Since the essence of a gerrymandering claim
is that the members of a political party as a group have been
denied their right to "fair and effective representation,"
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 565 (1964), I believe that
the claim cannot be tested solely by reference to "one person,
one vote." Rather, a number of other relevant neutral factors must be considered. Because the memorandum opinion
ignores such factors and fails to enunciate standards by which
to determine whether a legislature has enacted an unconstitutional gerrymander, I dissent.
I

The facts are described in the memorandum opinion and
may be briefly restated here. In 1981, the Republican Party
controlled both houses of the Indiana General Assembly, and
its candidate held the Governor's seat. Pursuant to the requirements of the State Constitution, the General Assembly
undertook legislative redistricting based on 1980 census data.
A Conference Committee, all of whose members were Republicans, was assigned the task of drawing district maps
with the assistance of a private computer firm. The information fed into the computer primarily concerned the po-
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litical complexion of the State's precincts. The redistricting
process was conducted in secret. Democratic legislators
were not afforded any participation in designing the district
maps that were adopted. There were no hearings where
members of the public were invited to express their views.
The Republican Committee revealed the results of its computer's efforts two days before the end of the legislative session, and the Democrats hurriedly presented an alternative
plan. On the last day of the session, the Republican plan
was adopted by party line vote in both houses of the General
Assembly. The Governor signed the plan into law.
In 1982 and 1984, elections were held under the redistricting plan. Prior to the 1982 election, this lawsuit was commenced by appellees, a group of Indiana Democrats who
claimed that the plan constitutes a partisan political gerrymander designed to disenfranchise Democratic voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 Since trial was completed after the 1982 election, appellees relied in part on the disparity between votes
cast for Democratic legislative candidates in that election and
seats captured by Democrats. The case was heard by a
three-judge panel in the District Court for the Southern DisIn the District Court, appellees' lawsuit was consolidated with a suit
brought by the Indiana NAACP. The plaintiffs in the NAACP suit argued that the redistricting intentionally fragmented concentrations of
black voters in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
and of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973. The District Court determined that the plan discriminated against black voters,
not because of their race, but because blacks had a demonstrated and overwhelming tendency to vote as a bloc for Democratic candidates. Indeed,
the District Court explicitly found that the "disadvantaging effect of the
plan's multi-member districts falls particularly hard and harsh upon black
voters in the state." 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1488 (SD Ind. 1984). Rather
than taking a cross-appeal challenging the District Court's rejection of
their constitutional and statutory claims, the NAACP plaintiffs have filed a
brief in this Court urging affirmance of the District Court's judgment that
the plan unconstitutionally discriminates against Democratic voters as a
group and against blacks as members of that group.
2
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trict of Indiana. The District Court, over the dissent of
Judge Pell, made extensive findings of fact and determined
that appellees had established an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander. 603 F. Supp. 1479 (SD Ind. 1984). The
Court today reverses the District Court, without concluding
that any of its findings was clearly erroneous.

II
A
Gerrymandering is "the deliberate and arbitrary distortion
of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal
political purposes." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526,
538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring). 3 As JUSTICE STEVENS
correctly observed, gerrymandering violates the Equal Protection Clause only when the redistricting plan serves "no
purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial,
ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a
position of strength at a particular time, or to disadvantage a
politically weak segment of the community." Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 748 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring).
The term "gerrymandering," however, is also used loosely
to describe the common practice of the party in power to redistrict to its own advantage. An intent to discriminate in
this sense may be present whenever redistricting occurs.
3
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged ed. 1961)
defines "gerrymander" as "to divide (a territorial unit) into election districts in an unnatural and unfair way with the purpose of giving one political party an electoral majority in a large number of districts while concentrating the voting strength of the opposition in as few districts as
possible." The term "gerrymander" was coined by combining the last
name of Elbridge Gerry with the word "salamander" in order to describe
the "fancied resemblance to a salamander . . .. of the irregularly shaped
outline of an election district in northeastern Massachusetts that had been
formed for partisan purposes in 1812 during Gerry's governorship" of that
State. Ibid. Though many of the voting districts appearing in the plans
challenged here have bizarre shapes, House District 66 perhaps most
closely resembles a salamander. See the redistricting maps appended to
this opinion.
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See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 753 (1973); Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F. 2d 830, 847 (CA7) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 893 (1972).
Moreover, since legislative bodies rarely reflect accurately
the popular voting strength of the principal political parties,
the effect of any particular redistricting may be perceived as
unfair. See id., at 752-754. Consequently, only a sensitive
and searching inquiry can distinguish gerrymandering in the
"loose" sense from gerrymandering that amounts to unconstitutional discrimination. Because it is difficult to develop
and apply standards that will identify the unconstitutional
gerrymander, courts may seek to avoid their responsibility to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause by finding that a claim of
gerrymandering is nonjusticiable. I agree with the memorandum opinion that such a course is mistaken, and that the
allegations in this case raise a justiciable issue. 4
Moreover, I am convinced that appropriate judicial stand-·
ards can and should be developed. Justice Fortas' definition
of unconstitutional gerrymandering properly focuses on
whether the boundaries of the voting districts have been distorted deliberately and arbitrarily to achieve illegitimate
ends. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S., at 538. Under
this definition, the merits of a gerrymandering claim must be
determined by reference to the configurations of the districts, the observance of political subdivision lines, and other
criteria that have independent relevance to the fairness of redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 755-759
(STEVENS, J., concurring). In this case, the District Court
examined the redistricting in light of such factors and found,
among other facts, that the boundaries of a number of dis'As the memorandum opinion properly explains, prior decisions of this
Court make clear that an equal protection challenge to redistricting does
not constitute a nonjusticiable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U. S. 186 (1962); R eynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735 (1973). Accordingly, I join Part I of the memorandum opinion.
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tricts were deliberately distorted to deprive Democratic voters of an equal opportunity to participate in the State's legislative processes. The memorandum opinion makes no
reference to any of the District Court's findings of fact. It
rejects the District Court's ultimate conclusion with no explanation of the respects in which appellees' proof fell short of
establishing discriminatory effect. A brief review of the
Court's jurisprudence in the context of another kind of challenge to redistricting, a claim of malapportionment, demonstrates the pressing need for the Court to enunciate standards to guide legislators who redistrict and judges who
determine the constitutionality of the legislative effort.
B

The Equal Protection Clause guarantees citizens that their
state will govern them impartially. See Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring). In the context
of redistricting, that guarantee is of critical importance because the franchise provides most citizens their only voice in
the legislative process. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at
561-562, 565-566. Since the contours of a voting district
powerfully may affect citizens' ability to exercise influence
through their vote, district lines should be determined in accordance with neutral and legitimate criteria. When deciding where those lines will fall, the state should treat its voters as standing in the same position, regardless of their
political beliefs or party affiliation. Chapman v. Meier, 420
U. S. 1, 17 (1975); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 751.
The first cases in which this Court entertained equal protection challenges to redistricting involved allegations that
state legislatures had refused to redesign States' voting districts to eliminate gross population disparities among those
districts. E. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, supra. The Court's decision in Reynolds v.
Sims illustrates two concepts that are vitally important in
evaluating an equal protection challenge to redistricting.
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First, the Court recognized that equal protection encompasses a guarantee of equal representation, requiring a State
to seek to achieve through redistricting "fair and effective
representation for all citizens." Reynolds v. Sims , 377
U. S., at 565-566; see Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, at 748.
The concept of "representation" necessarily applies to
groups: groups of voters elect representatives, individual
voters do not. Gross population disparities violate the mandate of equal representation by denying voters residing in
heavily populated districts, as a group, the opportunity to
elect the number of representatives to which their voting
strength otherwise would entitle them. While population
disparities do dilute the weight of individual votes, their discriminatory effect is felt only when those individual votes are
combined. Thus, the fact that individual voters in heavily
populated districts are free to cast their ballot has no bearing
on a claim of malapportionment. ·
Second, at the same time that it announced the principle of
"one person, one vote" to compel States to eliminate gross
disparities among district populations, the Court plainly recognized that redistricting should be based on a number of
neutral criteria, of which districts of equal population was
only one. Reynolds v. Sims identified several of the factors
that should guide a legislature engaged in redistricting. For
example, the Court observed that districts should be compact
and cover contiguous territory, precisely because the alternative, "[i]ndiscriminate districting," would be "an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering." 377 U. S., at 578-579.
Similarly, a State properly could choose to give "independent
representation" to established political subdivisions. Adherence to community boundaries, the Court reasoned, would
both "deter the possibilities of gerrymandering," and allow
communities to have a voice in the legislature that directly
controls their local interests. I d., at 580-581. See also
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 325-326 (1973). Thus,
Reynolds v. Sims contemplated that "one person, one vote"
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would be only one among several neutral factors that serve
the constitutional mandate of fair and effective representation. See Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, at 748-749. It was
not itself to be the only goal of redistricting. 5
A standard that judges the constitutionality of a districting
plan solely by reference to the doctrine of "one person, one
vote" may cause two detrimental results. 6 First, as a perceived way to avoid litigation, legislative bodies may place
undue emphasis on mathematical exactitude, subordinating
or ignoring entirely other criteria that bear directly on the
fairness of redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S.,
at 753 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 774 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 749. Second,
as this case illustrates, and as Reynolds v. Sims anticipated,
exclusive or primary reliance on "one person, one vote" can
betray the constitutional promise of fair and effective representation by enabling a legislature to engage intentionally
in clearly discriminatory gerrymandering.
See Wells
5
The doctrine of "one person, one vote" originally was regarded as a
means to prevent discriminatory gerrymandering since "opportunities for
gerrymandering are greatest when there is freedom to construct unequally
populated districts." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526, 534, n. 4
(1969). Advances in computer technology achieved since the doctrine was
announced have drastically reduced its deterrent value by permitting political cartographers to draw districts of equal population that intentionally
discriminate against cognizable groups of voters. See Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U. S. 725, 752, n. 10 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring). For "one person, one vote" to serve its intended purpose of implementing the constitutional mandate of fair and effective representation, therefore, consideration also must be given to other neutral factors.
6
In decisions concerning congressional redistricting, the Court has focused its attention almost exclusively on whether a challenged plan satisfies "one person, one vote." See Karcher v. Daggett, supra; White v.
Weiser, 412 U. S. 783 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, supra. In cases involving state legislative redistricting, such as the case before us today, the
Court has refused to limit a legislature to the single goal of precise population equality. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 745; Mahan v. Howell,
410 u. s. 315, 322-325 (1973).
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v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542, 551 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).

c

In light of the foregoing principles, I believe that the
memorandum opinion is seriously flawed in several respects.
First, apparently to avoid the forceful evidence that some
district lines indisputably were designed to and did discriminate against Democrats, the memorandum opinion describes
appellees' claim as alleging that "Democratic voters over the
State as a whole, not Democratic voters in particular districts, have been subjected to unconstitutional discrimination." Ante, at 13. Assuming that this characterization of
appellees' claim is accurate, it in no way undermines appellees' showing of statewide discriminatory effect through
proof of "individual districting" that "exemplif[ies] this discrimination." Ibid. If Democratic voters in a number of
critical districts are the focus of unconstitutional discrimination, as the District Court found, the effect of that discrimination will be felt over the State as a whole.
The memorandum opinion also erroneously characterizes
the harm members of the losing party suffer as a group when
they are deprived, through deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries, of the opportunity to elect representatives of their choosing. See ante, at 17-18. 7 It may
7
The memorandum opinion correctly concludes that a redistricting plan
is not unconstitutional merely because the plan makes it more difficult for a
group of voters to elect the candidate of its choice. or merely because the
plan does not provide proportional representation. Ante, at 17-18. But
the memorandum opinion leaps from that conclusion to the assumption that
"[a]n individual or group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is
usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and
to have as much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in
the district." Ante, at 18. Thus, the memorandum apparently concludes
that effects on election results are of little import, as long as the losers
have some access to their representatives. Though effects on election results do not suffice to establish an unconstitutional gerrymander, they cer-
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be, as the memorandum suggests, that representatives will
not "entirely ignore the interests" of opposition voters.
Ante, at 18. But it defies political reality to suppose that
members of a losing party have as much political influence
over state government as do members of the victorious
party. Even the most conscientious state legislators do not
disregard opportunities to reward persons or groups who
were active supporters in their election campaigns. Similarly, no one doubts that partisan considerations play a major
role in the passage of legislation and the appointment of state
officers. Not surprisingly, therefore, the District Court expressly found that "[ c]ontrol of the General Assembly is crucial" to members of the major political parties in Indiana.
603 F. Supp., at 1483. 8 In light of those findings, I cannot
accept the memorandum opinion's apparent conclusion that
loss of this "crucial" position is constitutionally insignificant
as long as the losers are not "entirely ignored" by the
winners.
The memorandum opinion relies almost exclusively on the
"one person, one vote" standard to reject appellees' convincing proof that the redistricting plan had a seriously discriminatory effect on their voting strength in particular districts.
The memorandum opinion properly describes the claim in this
tainly are relevant to such a claim, and they may suffice to show that the
claimants have been injured by the redistricting they challenge.
8
The District Court found that: "Control of the General Assembly is
crucial to a political party for a number of reasons. The majority party
elects the Speaker of the House, a person who wields considerable power in
the assigning of bills to committees, the conduct of the actual legislative
sessions, and is empowered, under legislative rules, to prevent bills from
reaching the floor for debate or vote. Similarly, the majority party elects
floor leaders in both houses who control the flow of legislation, the assignment of members to committees, and the appointment of committee chairmen. All of these powers are important to the achievement of a party's
legislative goals. There is little doubt that the minority party plays a less
substantial role in the drafting and enactment of legislation." 603 F.
Supp., at 1483.
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case as a denial of fair and effective "representation," ante, at
12, but it does not provide any explanation of how complying
with "one person, one vote" deters or identifies a gerrymander that unconstitutionally discriminates against a cognizable
group of voters. While that standard affords some protection to the voting rights of individuals, "it protects groups
only indirectly at best," Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 752
(STEVENS, J., concurring), even when the group's identity is
determined solely by reference to the fact that its members
reside in a particular voting district. "One person, one vote"
alone does not protect the voting rights of a group made up of
persons affiliated with a particular political party who seek to
achieve representation through their combined voting
strength. Thus, the facts that each Democratic voter was
permitted to cast his one vote and that the districts were of
equal population are irrelevant to a claim that district lines
were drawn for the purpose and with the effect of debasing
the strength of votes cast by Democrats as a group.
The final and most basic flaw in the memorandum opinion
is its failure to enunciate any standard that affords guidance
to legislatures and courts. Legislators and judges are left to
wonder whether compliance with "one person, one vote" completely insulates a partisan gerrymander from constitutional
scrutiny, or whether a more substantial but as yet undefined
standard applies. The failure to articulate clear doctrine in
this area places the Court in the curious position of inviting
further litigation even as it appears to signal the "constitutional green light" 9 to would-be gerrymanderers.

III
In Karcher v. Daggett, JUSTICE STEVENS, echoing the decision in Reynolds v. Sims, described factors that I believe
properly should guide both legislators who redistrict and
judges who test redistricting plans against constitutional
9
Edwards, The Gerrymander and
N. Y. U. L. Rev. 879, 880 (1971).

"One Man,

One Vote," 46
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challenges. 462 U. S., at 753-761. The most important of
these factors are the shapes of voting districts and adherence
to established political subdivision boundaries. 10 Other relevant considerations include the nature of the legislative procedures by which the apportionment law was adopted and
legislative history reflecting contemporaneous legislative
goals. To make out a case of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, the plaintiff should be required to offer proof
concerning these factors, which bear directly on the fairness
of a redistricting plan, as well as evidence concerning population disparities and statistics tending to show vote dilution.
No one factor should be dispositive.
In this case, appellees offered convincing proof of the ease
with which mapmakers, consistent with the "one person, one
vote" standard, may design a districting plan that purposefully discriminates against political opponents as well as racial minorities. Computer technology now enables gerrymanderers to achieve their purpose while adhering perfectly
to the requirement that districts be of equal population. Relying on the factors correctly described by JUSTICE STEVENS
in Karcher v. Daggett, the District Court carefully reviewed
appellees' evidence and found that the redistricting law was
intended to and did discriminate against Democrats as a
group. We have held that a district court's ultimate determination that a redistricting plan was "being maintained for
discriminatory purposes," as well as its "subsidiary findings
of fact," may not be set aside by a reviewing court unless
they are clearly erroneous. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613,
622-623 (1982); see, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755,
769-770 (1973). Not only does the memorandum opinion ignore this established principle, it fails even to acknowledge
10
In some cases, proof of grotesque district shapes may, without more,
provide convincing proof of unconstitutional gerrymandering. For example, see the redistricting maps appended to the Court's opinions in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 346 U. S. 339, 348 (1960), and in Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U. S., at 744.
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the findings expressly made by the Indiana District Court.
The memorandum also disregards the various factors discussed by the District Court as adequate indicia of unconstitutional gerrymandering.

A
A court should look first to the legislative process by which
the challenged plan was adopted. Here, the District Court
found that the procedures used in redistricting Indiana were
carefully designed to exclude Democrats from participating
in the legislative process. In February 1981, both houses of
the General Assembly passed reapportionment bills with no
substantive content and referred them to the other chamber
where conflicting amendments were made. The purpose of
this process was to send "vehicle bills" to a Conference Committee whose task was to apportion representation. Four
conferees and four advisors served on the Committee. The
conferees, all Republicans, were responsible for designing
the voting districts and were entitled to vote on the result of
their own efforts. The advisors, Democrats, were excluded
from the mapmaking process and were given no committee
vote. 603 F. Supp., at 1483.
The legislative process consisted of nothing more than the
majority party's private application of computer technology
to mapmaking. The Republican State Committee engaged
the services of a computer firm to aid the conferees in their
task. !d., at 1483-1484. According to the Conference Committee chairman, the only data used in the computer program
were precinct population, race of precinct citizens, precinct
political complexion, and statewide party voting trends. Access to the mapmaking process was strictly limited. No
member of the Democratic party and no member of the public
was provided with any of the information used in or generated by the computer program. When questioned about the
lack of minority party participation in the redistricting process, the chairman of the Conference Committee stated that
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the Democrats would "have the privilege to offer a minority
map. But I will advise you in advance that it will not be accepted." Id., at 1484.
Republicans promised to hold public hearings on redistricting. No hearing was held during the mapmaking process,
the only time during which voters' views could be expected to
influence their legislators. Ibid. Two days before the end
of the General Assembly's regular session, during the first
and only public hearing on reapportionment, the Conference
Committee revealed for the first time the result of its mapmaking effort. This timing gave the Democrats but 40 hours
in which to review the districting of more than 4,000 precincts. Ibid. On the last day of the session, April30, 1981,
the Conference Committee report was introduced for a vote
and was adopted by party line vote in both houses of the General Assembly. 11 Ibid.
B
Next, the District Court found that the maps "conspicuously ignore[d] traditional political subdivisions, with no concern for any adherence to principles of community interest."
I d., at 1493. The court carefully described how the mapmakers carved up counties, cities, and even townships in
their effort to draw lines beneficial to the majority party.
Many districts meander through several counties, picking up
a number of townships from each. 12 The District Court explained why this failure to honor county boundaries could be
expected to have a detrimental impact on citizens' exercise of
their vote.· In Indiana, the county government is the seat of
local affairs. I d., at 1494. The redistricting dissects coun11
Presumably as a result of the haste with which the redistricting law
was pushed through the General Assembly, parts of the state were "wholly
omitted in the 1981legislation." 603 F. Supp., at 1484. In the 1982 legislative session, therefore, amendments were passed to assign the omitted
areas to voting districts. Ibid .
2
' E . g., House Districts 20, 22, 25, 28, 42, 45, 46, 55, 57, 62, 66, 70, 73,
74; Senate Districts 7, 24, 37, 39, 45, 47.

84-1244-CONCUR/DISSENT
DAVIS v. BANDEMER

15

ties into strange shapes lacking in comm<;m interests, on one
occasion even placing the seat of one county in a voting district composed of townships from other counties. I d., at
1487; see House Districts 45, 46. Under these conditions,
the District Court expressly found that "the potential for
voter disillusion and non participation is great," as voters are
forced to focus their political activities in artificial electoral
units. 603 F. Supp., at 1494. Intelligent voters, regardless
of party affiliation, resent this sort of political manipulation of
the electorate for no public purpose.
Deposition testimony of the Chairman of the Conference
Committee revealed that the mapmakers gave no consideration to the interests of communities. In the Chairman's
view, the concept of honoring community interests meant
only that mapmakers should refuse to divide a small, suburban community. The shapes of the voting districts and the
manner in which the districts divide established communities, from the county to the township level, illustrate that
community interests were ignored by appellants. As the
District Court observed, for example, "it is difficult to con- ·
ceive the interests shared by blacks in Washington Township
and white suburbanites in Hamilton and Boone Counties, or
the shared interest of Allen and Noble County farmers with
residents of downtown Fort Wayne." I d., at 1487.

c
In addition to the foregoing findings that apply to both the
House and Senate plans, the District Court also noted the
substantial evidence that appellants were motivated solely by
partisan considerations. I d., at 1484. There is no evidence
that the public interest in a fair electoral process was given
any consideration by appellants. Indeed, as noted above,
the mapmakers' partisan goals were made explicitly clear by
contemporaneous statements of Republican leaders who
openly acknowledged that their goal was to disadvantage
Democratic voters. As one Republican House member con-
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cisely put it, "The name of the game is to keep us in power."
NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 232 (Indianapolis Star, Mar. 22,
1981). When the plan was completed, Republican leaders
announced that the House map was designed to yield 56
"safe" Republican seats and 30 Democratic seats, with theremainder being "tossups." NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 242
(Post-Tribune, April 29, 1981, p. 1). Republicans expected
that their Senate map would regularly produce 30 Republican
seats and 8 to 10 Democratic seats so that Republicans would
maintain their grip on the Senate even if Democrats won the
remaining seats. NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 241 (Post-Tribune, April 29, 1981, p. 1). In short, the record unequivocally demonstrates that in 1981 the Republican-dominated
General Assembly deliberately sought to design a redistricting plan under which members of the Democratic party
would be deprived of a fair opportunity to win control of the
General Assembly at least until 1991, the date of the next
redistricting.
IV
A
I turn now to the District Court's findings with respect
particularly to the gerrymandering of the House Districts.
The court found that the plan contained voting districts
whose irrational shapes called for justification. E . g. , House
Districts 20, 22, 25, 45, 56, 48, 62, 66, 70, 73. The findings
concerning the district configurations reflect the panel's familiarity with Indiana geography and the particular characteristics of the State's political subdivisions. As the District
Court noted, the voter confusion generated by irrational district boundaries is exacerbated in this case by the fact that
the lines in the House Plan were drawn independently of
those in the Senate Plan. 603 F. Supp., at 1484-1485.
When the Senate voting districts are overlaid on the House
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districts, the .potential for voter confusion becomes readily
apparent as lines and districts intersect in a crazy-quilt. 13
The District Court carefully considered the multimember
districts contained in the House plan and found that they
were intentionally employed to minimize Democratic voting
power. This Court has expressly recognized that "[a] districting plan may create multimember districts perfectly acceptable under equal population standards, but invidiously
discriminatory because they are employed 'to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of
the voting population."' Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S.,
at 751 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439
(1965)). 14 In this case, invidious purpose may be inferred
from the mapmakers' selection of areas to be divided into
multimember districts. These districts appear in some areas
where they had been used previously and not in others, in
some urban areas and not in others, and in some areas where
their use required combining rural townships with urban
areas from another county. 15 The only discernible pattern is
Since the Indiana House of Representatives has 100 members, and the
Senate has 50, the mapmakers readily could have designed a "nested" plan,
that is, a plan that included "two House districts within one Senate district." 603 F. Supp., at 1484. By permitting voters readily to identify
their voting districts and corresponding representatives, a nested plan can
be expected to foster voter participation. See Grofman, supra, at 88, 92.
Instead, as the District Court observed, the mapmakers drew House districts that were "not at all relevant to the Senate districts." 603 F. Supp.,
at 1484.
"In the context of racial gerrymandering claims, the Court has refused
to adopt a per se rule barring the use of multimember districts. White v.
Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765 (1973). But the Court has repeatedly recognized that the characteristics of multimember districts, namely their tendency to submerge the voting strength of the minority by allowing the majority to capture all of the district's assigned seats, make them a ready
means for legislative discrimination against racial groups or political opponents. E. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613,_616 (1982).
15
The multimember districts are House Districts 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15,
'

3
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the appearance of these districts in areas where their winnertake-all aspects can best be employed to debase Democratic
voting strength. The District Court determined that the
multimember districts diluted Democratic voting strength by
"stacking" Democrats into districts "where their majority
would be overwhelming" and by fragmenting populations of
Democratic voters among other districts where their voting
strength would be reduced. 603 F. Supp., at 1488-1489,
1494. For example, the mapmakers split Fort Wayne, a city
with a demonstrated tendency to vote for Democratic candidates, in half and associated each segment with areas from
outlying counties whose residents had a pattern of voting for
Republican candidates. Id., at 1488, 1494; see House Districts 19, 20. Similarly, the redistricting of Marion County
presents a clear example of dilution of Democrats' voting
strength through the use of multimember districts. 16
Though population figures entitled the county to elect exactly
14 House members, the mapmakers decided to tack on por19, 20, 31, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 75.
•• The District Court found that the multimember districts employed in
Marion County were "particularly suspect with respect to compactness."
603 F. Supp., at 1487. Of all the districts in the challenged plan, the court
determined that House District 48 "presents the most grievous example of
the political cartographer's handiwork in this case." Ibid. That district
"forms the letter 'C' around the central city of Indianapolis" and "includes
portions of the urban southwestside of the city, the airport and suburban
area around Ben Davis High School on the west side, and the Meridian
Hills area at the northern part of the county." Ibid. The court expressly
determined that, even though House District 48 satisfies "one person, one
vote," there was "simply no conceivable justification for this kind of district." Ibid. Of course, the District Court also noted the discriminatory
purpose served by the Marion County House Districts, including District
48: "the powerful Marion County delegation forced neighboring counties to
cede turf to permit a preservation of the multi-member districts which had
consistently returned Republicans to the Statehouse." Id., at 1487, n. 1.
Moreover, as appellees' statistical showing of vote dilution plainly demonstrates, these gerrymandered districts had a discriminatory impact on the
votes of Democrats as a group.
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tions of 2 neighboring counties in order artificially to create a
population base entitled to elect 15 representatives. Then,
they carved that artificial geographical unit into five threemember districts whose irregular shapes were designed to
fence Democrats into one heavily Democratic district and
then scatter pockets of Democratic strength among the other
four districts. !d., at 1487, 1489; see House Districts 48, 49,
50, 51, 52.
Appellees further demonstrated through a statistical showing that the House Plan debased the effectiveness of their
votes. In 1982, all 100 House seats were up for election.
Democratic candidates received about 51.9 percent of the
vote, and Republican candidates received about 48.1 percent.
Forty-three Democratic representatives were elected; 57 Republicans were elected. 17 Appellees offered startling statistics with respect to House results in Marion and Allen Counties, two areas in which multimember districts were used.
In these counties, Democratic candidates earned 46.3 percent
of the yote, but won only 3 of 21 House seats. As the District Court observed, "such a disparity speaks for itself."
ld., at 1489. 18
B
Since half of the Senate membership is up for election
every two years, the only election results under the challenged plan available at trial related to 25 of the 50 Senate
17
In the 1984 election, Democratic candidates earned approximately 44
percent of the vote, and Republicans earned approximately 56 percent.
Thirty-nine Democrats were elected to the House, and 61 Republicans
were elected. The figures for the 1984 elections cited in this opinion were
provided by the Elections Research Center, Washington, D. C. A Supplemental Statement filed by appellants in the District Court following
trial also quoted some of the 1984 election results, including the fact that in
1984 the Democratic candidate for Governor won 48% of the vote.
18
The 1984 House election in the Marion and Allen County House Districts reflected a similar disparity, when Republicans again captured 18 of
the 21 House seats and the Democrats 3 despite the fact that Democratic
candidates earned approximately 38 percent of the vote in these counties.
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seats. Those results showed that, of the seats up for election in 1982, Democrats were elected to 13 seats and Republicans to 12. Democratic candidates earned about 53.1 percent of the vote, and Republicans received about 46.9
percent. At trial, it was appellees' contention that most of
the Senate seats won by Democrats in 1982 were "safe" Democratic seats so that their party's success at the polls in that
year was fully consistent with the statewide Republican gerrymander. This contention is borne out by the results of the
1984 Senate election. In that election, Democratic candidates received 42.3 percent of the vote, and Republicans 57.7
percent. Yet, of the 25 Senate positions up for election, only
7 were captured by Democrats.

c
The District Court found, and I agree, that appellants
failed to justify the discriminatory impact of the plan by
showing that the plan had a rational basis in permissible neutral criteria. Appellants' primary justification was that the
plan comports with the principle of "one person, one vote."
Their plan did adhere to that objective, with population deviations between House districts of 1.05 percent and between
Senate districts of 1.15 percent. But reliance on "one person, one vote" does not sufficiently explain or justify the
harm the plan inflicts on Democratic voters as a group. The
court below expressly found that the irregular district shapes
could not be justified on the basis of population distribution.
603 F. Supp., at 1494. Nor does "one person, one vote" explain the mapmakers' failure to honor established political or
community boundaries. It does not excuse the irrational use
of multimember districts, with their devastating impact on
the voting strength of Democrats. The only other justification offered by appellants, for which the District Court found
some support as a contemporaneous goal, was that the mapmakers sought to maintain "the black representation in the
General Assembly that existed prior to the new districting
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plan." But the court further determined that the impact of
the redistricting fell most harshly on black voters who predominantly are Democrats. ld., at 1488, 1489-1490. None
of these critical findings was found by the Court today to be
clearly erroneous.

v

In conclusion, I want to make clear the limits of the standard that I believe the Equal Protection Clause imposes on
legislators engaged in redistricting. Traditionally, the
determination of electoral districts within a State has been a
matter left to the legislative branch of the state government.
Apart from the doctine of separation of powers and the federal system prescribed by the Constitution, federal judges
are ill-equipped generally to review legislative decisions respecting redistricting. As the memorandum opinion makes
clear, however, this Court's precedents hold that a colorable
claim of discriminatory gerrymandering presents a justiciable controversy under the Equal Protection Clause. Federal courts in exercising their duty to adjudicate such claims
should impose a heavy burden of proof on those who allege
that a redistricting plan violates the Constitution. In light
of Baker v. Carr, Reynolds v. Sims, and their progeny, including such comparatively recent decisions as Gaffney v.
Cummings, this case presents a paradigm example of unconstitutional discrimination against the members of a political
party that happened to be out of power. The well-grounded
findings of the District Court to this effect have not been, and
I believe cannot be, held clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
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SUSAN J. DAVIS, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.
IRWIN C. BANDEMER ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
[March - , 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins,
concurring in Part I of the Memorandum Opinion, and
dissenting.
This case presents the question whether a state legislature
violates the Equal Protection Clause by adopting a redistricting plan designed solely to preserve the power of the
dominant political party, when the plan follows the doctrine
of "one person, one vote" but ignores all other neutral factors
relevant to the fairness of redistricting. 1
In answering this question, JUSTICE WHITE's memorandum opinion expresses the view, with which I agree, that a
partisan political gerrymander violates the Equal Protection
Clause only on proof of "both intentional discrimination
against an identifiable political group and an actual discrimi1
This opinion uses the term "redistricting" to refer to the process by
which state legislators draw the boundaries of voting districts. The terms
"redistricting," "apportionment," and "reapportionment" frequently are
used interchangeably. Backstrom, Robins, & Eller, Issues in Gerrymandering: An Exploratory Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering Applied to
Minnesota, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1121, 1121, n. 1 (1978); Grofman, Criteria for
Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 77, 78,
n. 6 (1985). Technically, the words "apportionment" and "reapportionment" apply to the "allocation of a finite number of representatives among
a fixed number of pre-established areas," while "districting" and "redistricting" refer to the drawing of district lines. Backstrom, Robins , &
Eller, supra, at 1121, n. 1; see Grofman, supra, at 78, n. 6.
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natory effect on that group." Ante, at 13. The memoran- 1
dum opinion acknowledges that the record in this case supports a finding that the challenged redistricting plan was
adopted for the purpose of discriminating against Democratic
voters. Ante, at 14. The memorandum opinion concludes,
however, that appellees failed to establish that their voting
strength was diluted statewide despite uncontradicted proof
that certain key districts were grotesquely gerrymandered to
enhance the election prospects of Republican candidates.
This conclusion appears to rest solely on the ground that the
legislature accomplished its gerrymander consistent with
"one person, one vote," in the sense that the legislature designed voting districts of approximately equal population and
erected no direct barriers to Democratic voters' exercise of
the franchise. Since the essence of a gerrymandering claim
is that the members of a political party as a group have been
denied their right to "fair and effective representation,"
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 565 (1964), I believe that
the claim cannot be tested solely by reference to "one person,
one vote." Rather, a number of other relevant neutral factors must be considered. Because the memorandum opinion
ignores such factors and fails to enunciate standards by which
to determine whether a legislature has enacted an unconstitutional gerrymander, I dissent.
I

The facts .are described in the memorandum opinion and
may be briefly restated here. In 1981, the Republican Party
controlled both houses of the Indiana General Assembly, and
its candidate held the Governor's seat. Pursuant to the requirements of the State Constitution, the General Assembly
undertook legislative redistricting based on 1980 census data.
A Conference Committee, all of whose members were Republicans, was assigned the task of drawing district maps
with the assistance of a private computer firm. The information fed into the computer primarily concerned the po-
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litical complexion of the State's precincts. The redistricting
process was conducted in secret. Democratic legislators
were not afforded any participation in designing the district
maps that were adopted. There were no hearings where
members of the public were invited to express their views.
The Republican Committee revealed its proposed redistricting plan two days before the end of the legislative session,
and the Democrats hurriedly presented an alternative plan.
On the last day of the session, the Republican plan was
adopted by party line vote in both houses of the General Assembly. The Governor signed the plan into law.
In 1982 and 1984, elections were held under the new redistricting plan. Prior to the 1982 election, this lawsuit was
commenced by appellees, a group of Indiana Democrats who
claimed that the plan constitutes a partisan political gerrymander designed to disenfranchise Democratic voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 Since trial was completed after the 1982 election, appellees relied in part on the disparity between votes
cast for Democratic legislative candidates in that election and
seats captured by Democrats. The case was heard by a
three-judge panel in the District Court for the Southern Dis2
In the District Court, appellees' lawsuit was consolidated with a suit
brought by the Indiana NAACP. The plaintiffs in the NAACP suit argued that the redistricting intentionally fragmented concentrations of
black voters in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
and of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973. The District Court determined that the plan discriminated against black voters,
not because of their race, but because blacks had a demonstrated and overwhelming tendency to vote as a bloc for Democratic candidates. Indeed,
the District Court explicitly found that the "disadvantaging effect of the
plan's multi-member districts falls particularly hard and harsh upon black
voters in the state." 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1488 (SD Ind. 1984). Rather
than taking a cross-appeal challenging the District Court's rejection of
their constitutional and statutory claims, the NAACP plaintiffs have filed a
brief in this Court urging affirmance of the District Court's judgment that
the plan unconstitutionally discriminates against Democratic voters as a
group and against blacks as members of that group.
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trict of Indiana. The District Court, over the dissent of
Judge Pell, made extensive findings of fact and determined
that appellees had established an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander. 603 F. Supp. 1479 (SD Ind. 1984). The
Court today reverses the District Court, without concluding
that any of its findings was clearly erroneous.
II
A
Gerrymandering is "the deliberate and arbitrary distortion
of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal
political purposes." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526,
538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring). 3 As JUSTICE STEVENS
correctly observed, gerrymandering violates the Equal Protection Clause only when the redistricting plan serves "no
purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial,
ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a
position of strength at a particular time, or to disadvantage a
politically weak segment of the community." Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 748 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring).
The term "gerrymandering," however, is also used loosely
to describe the common practice of the party in power to redistrict to its own advantage. An intent to discriminate in
this sense may be present whenever redistricting occurs.
3
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged ed. 1961)
defines "gerrymander" as "to divide (a territorial unit) into election districts in an unnatural and unfair way with the purpose of giving one political party an electoral majority in a large number of districts while concentrating the voting strength of the opposition in as few districts as
possible." The term "gerrymander" was coined by combining the last
name of Elbridge Gerry with the word "salamander" in order to describe
the "fancied resemblance to a salamander . . . of the irregularly shaped
outline of an election district in northeastern Massachusetts that had been
formed for partisan purposes in 1812 during Gerry's governorship" of that
State. Ibid. Though many of the voting districts appearing in the plans
challenged here have bizarre shapes, House District 66 perhaps most
closely resembles a salamander. See the redistricting maps appended to
this opinion.
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See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 753 (1973); Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F. 2d 830, 847 (CA7) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 893 (1972).
Moreover, since legislative bodies rarely reflect accurately
the popular voting strength of the principal political parties,
the effect of any particular redistricting may be perceived as
unfair. See id., at 752-754. Consequently, only a sensitive
and searching inquiry can distinguish gerrymandering in the
"loose" sense from gerrymandering that amounts to unconstitutional discrimination. Because it is difficult to develop
and apply standards that will identify the unconstitutional
gerrymander, courts may seek to avoid their responsibility to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause by finding that a claim of
gerrymandering is nonjusticiable. I agree with the memorandum opinion that such a course is mistaken, and that the
allegations in this case raise a justiciable issue. 4
Moreover, I am convinced that appropriate judicial standards can and should be developed. Justice Fortas' definition
of unconstitutional gerrymandering properly focuses on
whether the boundaries of the voting districts have been distorted deliberately and arbitrarily to achieve illegitimate
ends. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S., at 538. Under
this definition, the merits of a gerrymandering claim must be
determined by reference to the configurations of the districts, the observance of political subdivision lines, and other
criteria that have independent relevance to the fairness of redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 755-759
(STEVENS, J., concurring). In this case, the District Court
examined the redistricting in light of such factors and found,
among other facts, that the boundaries of a number of dis' As the memorandum opinion properly explains, prior decisions of this
Court make clear that an equal protection challenge to redistricting does
not present a nonjusticiable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U. S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735 (1973). Accordingly, I join Part I of the memorandum opinion.
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tricts were deliberately distorted to deprive Democratic voters of an equal opportunity to participate in the State's legislative processes. The memorandum opinion makes no
reference to any of the District Court's findings of fact. It
rejects the District Court's ultimate conclusion with no explanation of the respects in which appellees' proof fell short of
establishing discriminatory effect. A brief review of the
Court's jurisprudence in the context of another kind of challenge to redistricting, a claim of malapportionment, demonstrates the pressing need for the Court to enunciate standards to guide legislators who redistrict and judges who
determine the constitutionality of the legislative effort.
B

The Equal Protection Clause guarantees citizens that their
state will govern them impartially. See Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring). In the context
of redistricting, that guarantee is of critical importance because the franchise provides most citizens their only voice in
the legislative process. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at
561-562, 565-566. Since the contours of a voting district
powerfully may affect citizens' abhity to exercise fnfluence
through their vote, district lines should be determined in accordance with neutral and legitimate criteria. When deciding where those lines will fall, the state should treat its voters as standing in the same position, regardless of their
political beliefs or party affiliation. Chapman v. Meier, 420
U. S. 1, 17 (1975); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 751.
The first cases in which this Court entertained equal protection challenges to redistricting involved allegations that
state legislatures had refused to redesign States' voting districts to eliminate gross population disparities among those
districts. E. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, supra. The Court's decision in Reynolds v.
Sims illustrates two concepts that are vitally important in
evaluating an equal protection challenge to redistricting.

84-1244-CONCUR/DISSENT
DAVIS v. BANDEMER

7

First, the Court recognized that equal protection encompasses a guarantee of equal representation, requiring a State
to seek to achieve through redistricting "fair and effective
representation for all citizens." Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U. S., at 565-566; see Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, at 748. /
The concept of "representation" necessarily applies/o"
~ ~oups of voters elect representatives"
a
v~t. Gross population disparities violate the mandate of equal representation by denying voters residing in
heavily populated districts ~he opportunity to
elect the number of rep~sentatives to which ~ voting
strength otherwise would entitle them. WftiM population
disparities do~lute the weight of individual vote~ , ~ discriminatory ef fect is felt only when those individuaf\ otes are
combined. 'Pfttts., The fact that individual voters m :Rea¥ily
~epuJ.at.e.d-distl::iets are free to cast their ballot has no bearing
on a claim of malapportionment.
Second, at the same time that it announced the principle of
"one person, one vote" to compel States to eliminate gross
disparities among district populations, the Court plainly recognized that redistricting should be based on a number of
neutral criteria, of which districts of equal population was
only one. Reynolds v. Sims identified several of the factors
that should guide a legislature engaged in redistricting. For
example, the Court observed that districts should be compact
and cover contiguous territory, precisely because the alternative, "[i]ndiscriminate districting," would be "an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering." 377 U. S., at 578-579.
Similarly, a State properly could choose to give "independent
representation" to established political subdivisions. Adherence to community boundaries, the Court reasoned, would
both "deter the possibilities of gerrymandering," and allow
communities to have a voice in the legislature that directly
controls their local interests. I d., at 580-581. See also
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 325-326 (1973). Thus,
Reynolds v. Sims contemplated that "one person, one vote"
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would be only one among several neutral factors that serve
the constitutional mandate of fair and effective representation. See Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, at 748-749. It was
not itself to be the only goal of redistricting. 5
A standard that judges the constitutionality of a districting
plan solely by reference to the doctrine of "one person, one
vote" may cause two detrimental results. 6 First, as a perceived way to avoid litigation, legislative bodies may place
undue emphasis on mathematical exactitude, subordinating
or ignoring entirely other criteria that bear directly on the
fairness of redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S.,
at 753 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 774 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 749. Second,
as this case illustrates, and as Reynolds v. Sims anticipated,
exclusive or primary reliance on "one person, one vote" can
betray the constitutional promise of fair and effective representation by enabling a legislature to engage intentionally
in clearly discriminatory gerrymandering.
See Wells
• The doctrine of "one person, one vote" originally was regarded as a
means to prevent discriminatory gerrymandering since "opportunities for
gerrymandering are greatest when there is freedom to construct unequally
populated districts." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526, 534, n. 4
(1969). Advances in computer technology achieved since the doctrine was
announced have drastically reduced its deterrent value by permitting political cartographers to draw districts of equal population that intentionally
discriminate against cognizable groups of voters. See Karcher v. Daggett ,
462 U. S. 725, 752, n. 10 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring). For "one person, one vote" to serve its intended purpose of implementing the constitutional mandate of fair and effective representation, therefore, consideration also must be given to other neutral factors.
• In decisions concerning congressional redistricting, the Court has focused its attention almost exclusively on whether a challenged plan satisfies "one person, one vote. " See Karcher v. Daggett , supra; White v.
Weiser, 412 U. S. 783 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, supra. In cases involving state legislative redistricting, such as the case before us today, the
Court has refused to limit a legislature to the single goal of precise population equality. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 745; Mahan v. Howell ,
410 u. s. 315, 322-325 (1973).
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v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542, 551 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).

c

In light of the foregoing principles, I believe that the
memorandum opinion is seriously flawed in several respects.
First, apparently to avoid the forceful evidence that some
district lines indisputably were designed to and did discriminate against Democrats, the memorandum opinion describes
appellees' claim as alleging that "Democratic voters over the
State as a whole, not Democratic voters in particular districts, have been subjected to unconstitutional discrimination." Ante, at 13. Assuming that this characterization of
appellees' claim is accurate, it in no way undermines appellees' showing of statewide discriminatory effect through
proof of "individual districting" that "exemplif[ies] this discrimination." Ibid. If Democratic voters in a number of
critical districts are the focus of unconstitutional discrimination, as the District Court found, the effect of that discrimination will be felt over the State as a whole.
The memorandum opinion also erroneously characterizes
the harm members of the losing party suffer as a group when
they are deprived, through deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries, of the opportunity to elect representatives of their choosing. See ante, at 17-18. 7 It may
7
The memorandum opinion correctly concludes that a redistricting plan
is not unconstitutional merely because the plan makes it more difficult for a
group of voters to elect the candidate of its choice or merely because the
plan does not provide proportional representation. Ante, at 17-18. But
the memorandum opinion leaps from that conclusion to the assumption that
"[a]n individual or group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is
usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and
to have as much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in
the district." Ante, at 18. Thus, the memorandum apparently concludes
that effects on election results are of little import, as long as the losers
have some access to their representatives. Though effects on election results do not suffice to establish an unconstitutional gerrymander, they cer-
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be, as the memorandum suggests, that representatives will
not "entirely ignore the interests" of opposition voters.
Ante, at 18. But it defies political reality to suppose that
members of a losing party have as much political influence
over state government as do members of the victorious
party. Even the most conscientious state legislators do not
disregard opportunities to reward persons or groups who
were active supporters in their election campaigns. Similarly, no one doubts that partisan considerations play a major
role in the passage of legislation and the appointment of state
officers. Not surprisingly, therefore, the District Court expressly found that "[c]ontrol of the General Assembly is crucial" to members of the major political parties in Indiana.
603 F. Supp., at 1483. 8 In light of those findings, I cannot
accept the memorandum opinion's apparent conclusion that
loss of this "crucial" position is constitutionally insignificant
as long as the losers are not "entirely ignored" by the
winners.
The memorandum opinion relies almost exclusively on the
"one person, one vote" standard to reject appellees' convincing proof that the redistricting plan had a seriously discriminatory effect on their voting strength in particular districts.
The memorandum properly describes the claim in this case as
tainly are relevant to such a claim, and they may suffice to show that the
claimants have been injured by the redistricting they challenge.
8
The District Court found that: "Control of the General Assembly is
crucial to a political party for a number of reasons. The majority party
elects the Speaker of the House, a person who wields considerable power in
the assigning of bills to committees, the conduct of the actual legislative
sessions, and is empowered, under legislative rules, to prevent bills from
reaching the floor for debate or vote. Similarly, the majority party elects
floor leaders in both houses who control the flow of legislation, the assignment of members to committees, and the appointment of committee chairmen. All of these powers are important to the achievement of a party's
legislative goals. There is little doubt that the minority party plays a less
substantial role in the drafting and enactment of legislation." 603 F.
Supp., at 1483.
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a denial of fair and effective "representation," ante , at 12, but
it does not provide any explanation of how complying with
"one person, one vote" deters or identifies a gerrymander
that unconstitutionally discriminates against a cognizable
group of voters. While that standard affords some protection to the voting rights of individuals, "it protects groups
only indirectly at best," Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 752
(STEVENS, J., concurring), even when the group's identity is
determined solely by reference to the fact that its members
reside in a particular voting district. "One person, one vote"
alone does not protect the voting rights of a group made up of
persons affiliated with a particular political party who seek to
achieve representation through their combined voting
strength. Thus, the facts that each Democratic voter was
permitted to cast his or her one vote and that the districts
were of equal population are irrelevant to a claim that district
lines were drawn for the purpose and with the effect of substantially debasing the strength of votes cast by Democrats
as a group.
The final and most basic flaw in the memorandum opinion
is its failure to enunciate any standard that affords guidance
to legislatures and courts. Legislators and judges are left to
wonder whether compliance with "one person, one vote" completely insulates a partisan gerrymander from constitutional
scrutiny, or whether a fairer but as yet undefined standard
applies. The failure to articulate clear doctrine in this area
places the Court in the curious position of inviting further litigation even as it appears to signal the "constitutional green
light" 9 to would-be gerrymanderers.

III
In Karcher v. Daggett, JUSTICE STEVENS, echoing the decision in Reynolds v. Sims, described factors that I believe
properly should guide both legislators who redistrict and
Edwards, The Gerrymander and "One Man,
N. Y. U. L. Rev. 879, 880 (1971).
9

One Vote," 46
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judges who test redistricting plans against constitutional
challenges. 462 U. S., at 753-761. The most important of
these factors are the shapes of voting districts and adherence
to established political subdivision boundaries. 10 Other relevant considerations include the nature of the legislative procedures by which the apportionment law was adopted and
legislative history reflecting contemporaneous legislative
goals. To make out a case of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, the plaintiff should be required to offer proof
concerning these factors, which bear directly on the fairness
of a redistricting plan, as well as evidence concerning population disparities and statistics tending to show vote dilution.
No one factor should be dispositive.
In this case, appellees offered convincing proof of the ease
with which mapmakers, consistent with the "one person, one
vote" standard, may design a districting plan that purposefully discriminates against political opponents as well as racial minorities. Computer technology now enables gerry. manderers to achieve the1r purpose while adhering perfectly
to the requirement that districts be of equal population. Relying on the factors correctly described by JusTICE STEVENS
in Karcher v. Daggett, the District Court carefully reviewed
appellees' evidence and found that the redistricting law was
intended to and did unconstitutionally discriminate against
Democrats as a group. We have held that a district court's
ultimate determination that a redistricting plan was "being
maintained for discriminatory purposes," as well as its "subsidiary findings of fact," may not be set aside by a reviewing
court unless they are clearly erroneous. Rogers v. Lodge,
458 U. S. 613, 622-623 (1982); see, e. g., White v. Regester,
412 U. S. 755, 769-770 (1973). Not only does the memoran10

In some cases, proof of grotesque district shapes may, without more,
provide convincing proof of unconstitutional gerrymandering. For example, see the redistricting maps appended to the Court's opinions in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 346 U. S. 339, 348 (1960), and in Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U. S., at 744.
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dum opinion ignore this established principle, it fails even to
acknowledge the findings expressly made by the Indiana District Court. The memorandum also disregards the various
factors discussed by the District Court as adequate indicia of
unconstitutional gerrymandering.

A
A court should look first to the legislative process by which
the challenged plan was adopted. Here, the District Court
found that the procedures used in redistricting Indiana were
carefully designed to exclude Democrats from participating
in the legislative process. In February 1981, both houses of
the General Assembly passed reapportionment bills with no
substantive content and referred them to the other chamber
where conflicting amendments were made. The purpose of
this process was to send "vehicle bills" to a Conference Committee whose task was to apportion representation. Four
conferees and four advisors served on the Committee. The
conferees, all Republicans, were responsible for designing
the voting districts and were entitled to vote on the result of
their own efforts. The advisors, Democrats, were excluded
from the mapmaking process and were given no committee
vote. 603 F. Supp., at 1483.
The legislative process consisted of nothing more than the
majority party's private application of computer technology
to mapmaking. The Republican State Committee engaged
the services of a computer firm to aid the conferees in their
task. !d. , at 1483-1484. According to the Conference Committee chairman, the only data used in the computer program
were precinct population, race of precinct citizens, precinct
political complexion, and statewide party voting trends. Access to the mapmaking process was strictly limited. No
member of the Democratic party and no member of the public
was provided with any of the information used in or generated by the computer program. When questioned about the
lack of minority party participation in the redistricting proc-
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ess, the chairman of the Conference Committee stated that
the Democrats would "have the privilege to offer a minority
map. But I will advise you in advance that it will not be accepted." Id., at 1484.
Republicans promised to hold public hearings on redistricting. No hearing was held during the mapmaking process,
the only time during which voters' views could be expected to
influence their legislators. Ibid. Two days before the end
of the General Assembly's regular session, during the first
and only public hearing on reapportionment, the Conference
Committee revealed for the first time the result of its mapmaking effort. This timing gave the Democrats but 40 hours
in which to review the districting of more than 4,000 precincts. Ibid. On the last day of the session, April30, 1981,
the Conference Committee report was introduced for a vote
and was adopted by party line vote in both houses of the General Assembly. 11 Ibid.
B
Next, the District Court found that the maps "conspicuously ignore[d] traditional political subdivisions, with no concern for any adherence to principles of community interest."
Id., at 1493. The court carefully described how the mapmakers carved up counties, cities, and even townships in
their effort to draw lines beneficial to the majority party.
Many districts meander through several counties, picking up .
a number of townships from each. 12 The District Court explained why this failure to honor county boundaries could be
expected to have a detrimental impact on citizens' exercise of
"Presumably as a result of the haste with which the redistricting law
was pushed through the General Assembly, parts of the state were "wholly
omitted in the 1981legislation." 603 F . Supp., at 1484. In the 1982 legislative session, therefore, amendments were passed to assign the omitted
areas to voting districts. Ibid.
12
E. g. , House Districts 20, 22, 25, 28, 42, 45, 46, 55, 57, 62, 66, 70, 73,
74; Senate Districts 7, 24, 37, 39, 45, 47. See the redistricting maps appended to this opinion.
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their vote. In Indiana, the county government is the seat of
local affairs. I d., at 1494. The redistricting dissects counties into strange shapes lacking in common interests, on one
occasion even placing the seat of one county in a voting district composed of townships from other counties. I d., at
1487; see House Districts 45, 46. Under these conditions,
the District Court expressly found that "the potential for
voter disillusion and nonparticipation is great," as voters are
forced to focus their political activities in artificial electoral
units. 603 F. Supp., at 1494. Intelligent voters, regardless
of party affiliation, resent this sort of political manipulation of
the electorate for no public purpose.
Deposition testimony of the Chairman of the Conference
Committee revealed that the mapmakers gave no consideration to the interests of communities. In the Chairman's
view, the concept of honoring community interests meant
only that mapmakers should refuse to divide a small, suburban community. The shapes of the voting districts and the
manner in which the districts divide established communities, from the county to the township level, illustrate that
community interests were ignored by appellants. As the
District Court observed, for example, "it is difficult to conceive the interests shared by blacks in Washington Township
and white suburbanites in Hamilton and Boone Counties, or
the shared interest of Allen and Noble County farmers with
residents of downtown Fort Wayne." I d., at 1487.

c
In addition to the foregoing findings that apply to both the
House and Senate plans, the District Court also noted the
substantial evidence that appellants were motivated solely by
partisan considerations. I d., at 1484. There is no evidence
that the public interest in a fair electoral process was given
any consideration by appellants. Indeed, as noted above,
the mapmakers' partisan goals were made explicitly clear by
contemporaneous statements of Republican leaders who
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openly acknowledged that their goal was to disadvantage
Democratic voters. As one Republican House member concisely put it, "The name of the game is to keep us in power."
NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 232 (Indianapolis Star, Mar. 22,
1981 section 2, page 3). When the plan was completed, Republican leaders announced that the House map was designed
to yield 56 "safe" Republican seats and 30 Democratic seats,
with the remainder being "tossups." NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 242 (Post-Tribune, April 29, 1981, p. 1). Republicans
expected that their Senate map would regularly produce 30
Republican seats and 8 to 10 Democratic seats so that Republicans would maintain their grip on the Senate even if Democrats won the remaining seats. NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit
241 (Post-Tribune, April 29, 1981, p. 1). In short, the
record unequivocally demonstrates that in 1981 the Republican-dominated General Assembly deliberately sought to design a redistricting plan under which members of the Democratic party would be deprived of a fair opportunity to win
control of the General Assembly at least until 1991, the date
of the next redistricting.
IV
A
I turn now to the District Court's findings with respect
particularly to the gerrymanderi~g of the House Districts.
The court found that the plan contained voting districts
whose irrational shapes called for justification. E. g., House
Districts 20, 22, 25, 45, 56, 48, 62, 66, 70, 73. The findings
concerning the district configurations reflect the panel's familiarity with Indiana geography and the particular characteristics of the State's political subdivisions. As the District
Court noted, the voter confusion generated by irrational district boundaries i~d in this case by the fact that
the lines in the House Plan were drawn independently of
those in the Senate Plan. 603 F. Supp., at 1484-1485.
When the Senate voting districts are overlaid on the House
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districts, the potential for voter confusion · becomes readily
apparent as lines and districts intersect in a crazy-quilt. 13
The District Court carefully considered the multimember
districts contained in the House plan and found that they
were intentionally employed to minimize Democratic voting
power. This Court has expressly recognized that "[a] districting plan may create multimember districts perfectly acceptable under equal population standards, but invidiously
discriminatory because they are employed 'to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of
the voting population."' Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S.,
at 751 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439
(1965)). 14 In this case, invidious purpose may be inferred
from the mapmakers' selection of areas to be divided into
multimember districts. These districts appear in some areas
where they had been used previously and not in others, in
some urban areas and not in others, and in some areas where
their use required combining rural townships with urban
areas from another county. 15 The only discernible pattern is
Since the Indiana House of Representatives has 100 members, and the
Senate has 50, the mapmakers readily could have designed a "nested" plan,
that is, a plan that included "two House districts within one Senate district." 603 F. Supp., at 1484. By permitting voters readily to identify
their voting districts and corresponding representatives, a nested plan can
be expected to foster voter participation. See Grofman, supra, at 88, 92.
Instead, as the District Court observed, the mapmakers drew House districts that were "not at all relevant to the Senate districts." 603 F. Supp. ,
at 1484.
14
In the context of racial gerrymandering claims, the Court has refused
to adopt a per se rule barring the use of multimember districts. White v.
Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765 (1973). But the Court has repeatedly recognized that the characteristics of multimember districts, namely their tendency to submerge the voting strength of the minority by allowing the majority to capture all of the district's assigned seats, make them a ready
means for legislative discrimination against racial groups or political opponents. E . g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616 (1982).
'"The multimember districts are House Districts 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15,
19, 20, 31, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 75.
13
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the appearance of these districts in areas where their winnertake-all aspects can best be employed to debase Democratic
voting strength. The District Court determined that the
multimember districts diluted Democratic voting strength by
"stacking" Democrats into districts "where their majority
would be overwhelming" and by fragmenting populations of
Democratic voters among other districts where their voting
strength would be reduced. 603 F. Supp., at 1488-1489,
1494. For example, the mapmakers split Fort Wayne, a city
with a demonstrated tendency to vote for Democratic candidates, and associated each of the halves with areas from outlying counties whose residents had a pattern of voting for Republican candidates. Id., at 1488, 1494; see House Districts
19, 20.
Similarly, the redistricting of Marion County
presents a clear example of dilution of Democrats' voting
strength through the use of multimember districts. 16
Though population figures entitled the county to elect exactly
14 House members, the mapmakers decided to tack on portions of 2 neighboring counties in order artificially to create a
The District Court found that the multimember districts employed in
Marion County were "particularly suspect with respect to compactness."
603 F. Supp., at 1487. Of all the districts in the challenged plan, the court
determined that House District 48 "presents the most grievous example of
the political cartographer's handiwork in this case." Ibid. That district
"forms the letter 'C' around the central city of Indianapolis" and "includes
portions of the urban southwestside of the city, the airport and suburban
area around Ben Davis High School on the west side, and the Meridian
Hills area at the northern part of the county." Ibid. The court expressly
determined that, even though House District 48 satisfies "one person, one
vote," there was "simply no conceivable justification for this kind of district." Ibid. Of course, the District Court also noted the discriminatory
purpose served by the Marion County House Districts, including District
48: "the powerful Marion County delegation forced neighboring counties to
cede turf to permit a preservation of the multi-member districts which had
consistently returned Republicans to the Statehouse." !d., at 1487, n. 1.
Moreover, as appellees' statistical showing of vote dilution plainly demonstrates, these gerrymandered districts had a discriminatory impact on the
votes of Democrats as a group.
16
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population base entitled to elect 15 representatives. Then,
they carved that artificial geographical unit into five threemember districts whose irregular shapes were designed to
fence Democrats into one heavily Democratic district and
scatter pockets of Democratic strength among the other four
districts. ld., at 1487, 1489; see House Districts 48, 49, 50,
51, 52.

Appellees further demonstrated through a statistical showing that the House Plan debased the effectiveness of their
votes. In 1982, all 100 House seats were up for election.
Democratic candidates received about 51.9 percent of the
vote, and Republican candidates received about 48.1 percent.
Forty-three Democratic representatives were elected; 57 Republicans were elected. 17 Appellees offered startling statistics with respect to House results in Marion and Allen Counties, two areas in which multimember districts were used.
In these counties, Democratic candidates earned 46.3 percent
of the vote, but won only 3 of 21 House seats. As the District Court observed, "such a disp3;rity speaks for itself."
I d., at 1489. 18
B

Since half of the Senate membership is up for election
every two years, the only election results under the challenged plan available at trial related to 25 of the 50 Senate
seats. Those results showed that, of the seats up for elecIn the 1984 election, Democratic candidates earned approximately 44
percent of the vote, and Republicans earned approximately 56 percent.
Thirty-nine Democrats were elected to the House, and 61 Republicans
were elected. The figures for the 1984 elections cited in this opinion were
provided by the Elections Research Center, Washington, D. C. A Supplemental Statement filed by appellants in the District Court following
trial also quoted some of the 1984 election results, including the fact that in
1984 the Democratic candidate for Governor won 48% of the vote.
8
' The 1984 House election in the Marion and Allen County House Districts reflected a similar disparity, when Republicans again captured 18 of
the 21 House seats and the Democrats 3 despite the fact that Democratic
candidates earned approximately 38 percent of the vote in these counties.
17
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tion in 1982, Democrats were elected to 13 seats and Republicans to 12. Democratic candidates earned about 53.1 percent of the vote, and Republicans received about 46.9
percent. At trial, it was appellees' contention that most of
the Senate seats won by Democrats in 1982 were "safe" Democratic seats so that their party's success at the polls in that
year was fully consistent with the statewide Republican gerrymander. This contention is borne out by the results of the
1984 Senate election. In that election, Democratic candidates received 42.3 percent of the vote, and Republicans 57.7
percent. Yet, of the 25 Senate positions up for election, only
7 were captured by Democrats.

c
The District Court found, and I agree, that appellants
failed to justify the discriminatory impact of the plan by
showing that the plan had a rational basis in permissible neutral criteria. Appellants' primary justification was that the
plan comports with the principle of "one person, one vote."
Their plan did adhere to that objective, with population deviations between House districts of 1.05 percent and between
Senate districts of 1.15 percent. But reliance on "one person, one vote" does not sufficiently explain or justify the discrimination the plan inflicted on Democratic voters as a
group. The court below expressly found that the irregular
district shapes could not be justified on the basis of population distribution. 603 F. Supp., at 1494. Nor does adherence to "one person, one vote" excuse the mapmakers' failure
to honor established political or community boundaries. It
does not excuse the irrational use of multimember districts,
with their devastating impact on the voting strength of Democrats. The only other justification offered by appellants,
for which the District Court found some support as a contemporaneous goal, was that the mapmakers sought to maintain
"the black representation in the General Assembly that existed prior to the new districting plan." But the court fur-
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ther determined that the impact of the redistricting fell most
harshly on black voters who predominantly are Democrats.
I d., at 1488, 1489-1490. None of these critical findings was
found by the Court today to be clearly erroneous.

v
In conclusion, I want to make clear the limits of the standard that I believe the Equal Protection Clause imposes on
legislators engaged in redistricting. Traditionally, the
determination of electoral districts within a State has been a
matter left to the legislative branch of the state government.
Apart from the doctine of separation of powers and the federal system prescribed by the Constitution, federal judges
are ill-equipped generally to review legislative decisions respecting redistricting. As the memorandum opinion makes
clear, however, this Court's precedents hold that a color::tble
claim of discriminatory gerrymandering presents a justiciable controversy under the Equal Protection Clause. Federal courts in exercising their duty to adjudicate such claims
should impose a heavy burden of proof on those who allege
that a redistricting plan violates the Constitution. In light
of Baker v. Carr, Reynolds v. Sims, and their progeny, including such comparatively recent decisions as Gaffney v.
Cummings, this case presents a paradigm example of unconstitutional discrimination against the members of a political
party that happened to be out of power. The well-grounded
findings of the District Court to this effect have not been, and
I believe cannot be, held clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1244

SUSAN J. DAVIS, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.
IRWIN C. BANDEMER ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
[April - , 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins,
concurring in Part I of the Court's opinion, and dissenting.
This case presents the question whether a state legislature
violates the Equal Protection Clause by adopting a redistricting plan designed solely to preserve the power of the
dominant political party, when the plan follows the doctrine
of "one person, one vote" but ignores all other neutral factors
relevant to the fairness of redistricting. 1
In answering this question, the Court expresses the view,
with which I agree, that a partisan political gerrymander violates the Equal Protection Clause only on proof of "both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group
and an actual discriminatory effect on that group." Ante, at
13. The Court acknowledges that the record in this case
This opinion uses the term "redistricting" to refer to the process by
which state legislators draw the boundaries of voting districts. The terms
"redistricting," "apportionment," and "reapportionment" frequently are
used interchangeably. Backstrom, Robins, & Eller, Issues in Gerrymandering: An Exploratory Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering Applied to
Minnesota, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1121, 1121, n. 1 (1978); Grofman, Criteria for
Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 77, 78,
n. 6 (1985). Technically, the words "apportionment" and "reapportionment" apply to the "allocation of a finite number of representatives among
a fixed number of pre-established areas," while "districting" and "redistricting" refer to the drawing of district lines. Backstrom, Robins, &
Eller, supra, at 1121, n. 1; see Grofman, supra, at 78, n. 6.
1
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supports a finding that the challenged redistricting plan was
adopted for the purpose of discriminating against Democratic
voters. Ante, at 14. The Court concludes, however, that
appellees failed to establish that their voting strength was
diluted statewide despite uncontradicted proof that certain
key districts were grotesquely gerrymandered to enhance
the election prospects of Republican candidates. This conclusion appears to rest solely on the ground that the legislature accomplished its gerrymander consistent with "one person, one vote," in the sense that the legislature designed
voting districts of approximately equal population and
erected no direct barriers to Democratic voters' exercise of
the franchise. Since the essence of a gerrymandering claim
is that the members of a political party as a group have been
denied their right to "fair and effective representation,"
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 565 (1964), I believe that
the claim cannot be tested solely by reference to "one person,
one vote." Rather, a number of other relevant neutral factors must be considered. Because the Court ignores such
factors and fails to enunciate standards by which to determine whether a legislature has enacted an unconstitutional
gerrymander, I dissent.
I

The facts are described in the Court's opinion and may be
briefly restated here. In 1981, the Republican Party controlled both houses of the Indiana General Assembly, and its
candidate held the Governor's seat. Pursuant to the requirements of the State Constitution, the General Assembly
undertook legislative redistricting based on 1980 census data.
A Conference Committee, all of whose members were Republicans, was assigned the task of drawing district maps
with the assistance of a private computer firm. The information fed into the computer primarily concerned the political complexion of the State's precincts. The redistricting
process was conducted in secret. Democratic legislators
were not afforded any participation in designing the district
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maps that were adopted. There were no hearings where
members of the public were invited to express their views.
The Republican Committee revealed its proposed redistricting plan two days before the end of the legislative session,
and the Democrats hurriedly presented an alternative plan.
On the last day of the session, the Republican plan was
adopted by party line vote in both houses of the General Assembly. The Governor signed the plan into law.
In 1982 and 1984, elections were held under the new redistricting plan. Prior to the 1982 election, this lawsuit was
commenced by appellees, a group of Indiana Democrats who
claimed that the plan constitutes a partisan political gerrymander designed to disenfranchise Democratic voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 Since trial was completed after the 1982 election, appellees relied in part on the disparity between votes
cast for Democratic legislative candidates in that election and
seats captured by Democrats. The case was heard by a
three-judge panel in the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The District Court, over the dissent of
Judge Pell, made extensive findings of fact and determined
that appellees had established an unconstitutional partisan
2
In the District Court, appellees' lawsuit was consolidated with a suit
brought by the Indiana NAACP. The plaintiffs in the NAACP suit
argued that the redistricting intentionally fragmented concentrations of
black voters in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
and of §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,42 U.S. C.§ 1973. The District Court determined that the plan discriminated against black voters,
not because of their race, but because blacks had a demonstrated and overwhelming tendency to vote as a bloc for Democratic candidates. Indeed,
the District Court explicitly found that the "disadvantaging effect of the
plan's multi-member districts falls particularly hard and harsh upon black
voters in the state." 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1488 (SD Ind. 1984). Rather
than taking a cross-appeal challenging the District Court's. rejection of
their constitutional and statutory claims, the NAACP plaintiffs have filed a
brief in this Court urging affirmance of the District Court's judgment that
the plan unconstitutionally discriminates against Democratic voters as a
group and against blacks as members of that group.
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gerrymander. 603 F. Supp. 1479 (SD Ind. 1984). The
Court today reverses the District Court, without concluding
that any of its findings was clearly erroneous.

II

A
Gerrymandering is "the deliberate and arbitrary distortion
of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal
political purposes." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526,
538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring). 3 As JUSTICE STEVENS
correctly observed, gerrymandering violates the Equal Protection Clause only when the redistricting plan serves "no
purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial,
ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a
position of strength at a particular time, or to disadvantage a
politically weak segment of the community." Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 748 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring).
The term "gerrymandering," however, is also used loosely
to describe the common practice of the party in power to redistrict to its own advantage. An intent to discriminate in
this sense may be present whenever redistricting occurs.
See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 753 (1973); Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F. 2d 830, 847 (CA7) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 893 (1972).
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged ed. 1961)
defines "gerrymander" as "to divide (a territorial unit) into election districts in an unnatural and unfair way with the purpose of giving one political party an electoral majority in a large number of districts while
concentrating the voting strength of the opposition in as few districts as
possible." The term "gerrymander" was coined by combining the last
name of Elbridge Gerry with the word "salamander" in order to describe
the "fancied resemblance to a salamander ... of the irregularly shaped
outline of an election district in northeastern Massachusetts that had been
formed for partisan purposes in 1812 during Gerry's governorship" of that
State. Ibid. Though many of the voting districts appearing in the plans
challenged here have bizarre shapes, House District 66 perhaps most
closely resembles a salamander. See the redistricting maps appended to
this opinion.
3
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Moreover, since legislative bodies rarely reflect accurately
the popular voting strength of the principal political parties,
the effect of any particular redistricting may be perceived as
unfair. See id., at 752-754. Consequently, only a sensitive
and searching inquiry can distinguish gerrymandering in the
"loose" sense from gerrymandering that amounts to unconstitutional discrimination. Because it is difficult to develop
and apply standards that will identify the unconstitutional
gerrymander, courts may seek to avoid their responsibility to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause by finding that a claim of
gerrymandering is nonjusticiable. I agree with the Court
that such a course is mistaken, and that the allegations in this
case raise a justiciable issue. 4
Moreover, I am convinced that appropriate judicial standards can and should be developed. Justice Fortas' definition
of unconstitutional gerrymandering properly focuses on
whether the boundaries of the voting districts have been
distorted deliberately and arbitrarily to achieve illegitimate
ends. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S., at 538. Under
this definition, the merits of a gerrymandering claim must be
determined by reference to the configurations of the districts, the observance of political subdivision lines, and other
criteria that have independent relevance to the fairness of redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 755-759
(STEVENS, J., concurring). In this case, the District Court
examined the redistricting in light of such factors and found,
among other facts , that the boundaries of a number of districts were deliberately distorted to deprive Democratic voters of an equal opportunity to participate in the State's legislative processes. The Court makes no reference to any of
the District Court's findings of fact. It rejects the District
• As the Court properly explains, our prior decisions make clear that an
equal protection challenge to redistricting does not present a nonjusticiable
political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962); R eynolds v.
Sims, 377 U. S. ~3 (1964); Gaffney v. Cummings , 412 U. S. 735 (1973).
Accordingly, I join Part I of the Court's opinion.
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Court's ultimate conclusion with no explanation of the respects in which appellees' proof fell short of establishing discriminatory effect. A brief review of the Court's jurisprudence in the context of another kind of challenge to
redistricting, a claim of malapportionment, demonstrates the
pressing need for the Court to enunciate standards to guide
legislators who redistrict and judges who determine the constitutionality of the legislative effort.
B

The Equal Protection Clause guarantees citizens that their
state will govern them impartially. See Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring). In the context
of redistricting, that guarantee is of critical importance because the franchise provides most citizens their only voice in
the legislative process. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at
561-562, 565-566. Since the contours of a voting district
powerfully may affect citizens' ability to exercise influence
through their vote, district lines should be determined in accordance with neutral and legitimate criteria. When deciding where those lines will fall, the state should treat its voters as standing in the same position, regardless of their
political beliefs or party affiliation. Chapman v. Meier, 420
U. S. 1, 17 (1975); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 751.
The first cases in which this Court entertained equal protection challenges to redistricting involved allegations that
state legislatures had refused to redesign States' voting districts to eliminate gross population disparities among those
districts. E. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, supra. The Court's decision in Reynolds v.
Sims illustrates two concepts that are vitally important in
evaluating an equal protection challenge to redistricting.
First, the Court recognized that equal protection encompasses a guarantee of equal representation, requiring a State
to seek to achieve through redistricting "fair and effective
representation for all citizens." Reynolds v. Sims, 377
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U. S., at 565-566; see Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, at 748.
The concept of "representation" necessarily applies to
groups: groups of voters elect representatives, individual
voters do not. Gross population disparities violate the mandate of equal representation by denying voters residing in
heavily populated districts, as a group, the opportunity to
elect the number of representatives to which their voting
strength otherwise would entitle them. While population
disparities do dilute the weight of individual votes, their discriminatory effect is felt only when those individual votes are
combined. Thus, the fact that individual voters in heavily
populated districts are free to cast their ballot has no bearing
on a claim of malapportionment.
Second, at the same time that it announced the principle of
"one person, one vote" to compel States to eliminate gross
disparities among district populations, the Court plainly recognized that redistricting should be based on a number of
neutral criteria, of which districts of equal population was
only one. Reynolds v. Sims identified several of the factors
that should guide a legislature engaged in redistricting. For
example, the Court observed that districts should be compact
and cover contiguous territory, precisely because the alternative, "[i]ndiscriminate districting," would be "an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering." 377 U. S., at 578-579.
Similarly, a State properly could choose to give "independent
representation" to established political subdivisions. Adherence to community boundaries, the Court reasoned, would
both "deter the possibilities of gerrymandering," and allow
communities to have a voice in the legislature that directly
controls their local interests. I d., at 580-581. See also
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 325-326 (1973). Thus,
Reynolds v. Sims contemplated that "one person, one vote"
would be only one among several neutral factors that serve
the constitutional mandate of fair and effective representa-
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tion. See Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, at 748-749. It was
not itself to be the only goal of redistricting. 5
A standard that judges the constitutionality of a districting
plan solely by reference to the doctrine of "one person, one
vote" may cause two detrimental results. 6 First, as a perceived way to avoid litigation, legislative bodies may place
undue emphasis on mathematical exactitude, subordinating
or ignoring entirely other criteria that bear directly on the
fairness of redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S.,
at 753 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 774 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 749. Second,
as this case illustrates, and as Reynolds v. Sims anticipated,
exclusive or primary reliance on "one person, one vote" can
betray the constitutional promise of fair and effective representation by enabling a legislature to engage intentionally
See Wells
in clearly discriminatory gerrymandering.
v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542, 551 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
The doctrine of "one person, one vote" originally was regarded as a
means to prevent discriminatory gerrymandering since "opportunities for
gerrymandering are greatest when there is freedom to construct unequally
populated districts." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526, 534, n. 4
(1969). Advances in computer technology achieved since the doctrine was
announced have drastically reduced its deterrent value by permitting political cartographers to draw districts of equal population that intentionally
discriminate against cognizable groups of voters. See Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U. S. 725, 752, n. 10 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring). For "one
person, one vote" to serve its intended purpose of implementing the constitutional mandate of fair and effective representation, therefore,
consideration also must be given to other neutral factors.
6
In decisions concerning congressional redistricting, the Court has
focused its attention almost exclusively on whether a challenged plan satisfies "one person, one vote." See Karcher v. Daggett, supra; White v.
Weiser, 412 U. S. 783 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, supra. In cases
involving state legislative redistricting, such as the case before us today,
the Court has refused to limit a legislature to the single goal of precise
population equality. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 745; Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 322-325 (1973).
5
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c
In light of the foregoing principles, I believe that the
Court's opinion is seriously flawed in several respects.
First, apparently to avoid the forceful evidence that some
district lines indisputably were designed to and did discriminate against Democrats, the Court describes appellees' claim
as alleging that "Democratic voters over the State as a
whole, not Democratic voters in particular districts, have
been subjected to unconstitutional discrimination." Ante, at
13. This characterization is not inconsistent with appellees'
proof, and the District Court's finding, of statewide discriminatory effect resulting from "individual districting" that
"exemplif[ies] this discrimination." Ibid. If Democratic
voters in a number of critical districts are the focus of unconstitutional discrimination, as the District Court found, the
effect of that discrimination will be felt over the State as a
whole.
The Court also erroneously characterizes the harm members of the losing party suffer as a group when they are deprived, through deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district
boundaries, of the opportunity to elect representatives of
their choosing. See ante, at 17-18. 7 It may be, as the
The Court correctly concludes that a redistricting plan is not unconstitutional merely because the plan makes it more difficult for a group of
voters to elect the candidate of its choice or merely because the plan does
not provide proportional representation. Ante, at 17-18. While the
"Equal Protection Clause confers a substantive right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters," Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U. S. 55, 77 (1979) (plurality opinion), the Constitution does not guarantee
proportional representation or protect any group from defeat at the polls,
id., at 77-80; see White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). But
the Court leaps from that conclusion to the assumption that "[a]n individual
or group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is usually deemed
to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to have as
much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district." Ante, at 18. Thus, the Court apparently concludes that effects on
election results are of little import, as long as the losers have some access
to their representatives. Though effects on election results do not suffice
to establish an unconstitutional gerrymander, they certainly are relevant
7
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Court suggests, that representatives will not "entirely ignore
the interests" of opposition voters. Ante, at 18. But it defies political reality to suppose that members of a losing party
have as much political influence over state government as do
members of the victorious party. Even the most conscientious state legislators do not disregard opportunities to reward persons or groups who were active supporters in their
election campaigns. Similarly, no one doubts that partisan
considerations play a major role in the passage of legislation
and the appointment of state officers. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the District Court expressly found that "[c]ontrol
of the General Assembly is crucial" to members of the major
political parties in Indiana. 603 F. Supp., at 1483. 8 In light
of those findings, I cannot accept the Court's apparent conclusion that loss of this "crucial" position is constitutionally
insignificant as long as the losers are not "entirely ignored"
by the winners.
The Court relies almost exclusively on the "one person, one
vote" standard to reject appellees' convincing proof that the
redistricting plan had a seriously discriminatory effect on
their voting strength in particular districts. The Court
properly describes the claim in this case as a denial of fair and
effective "representation," ante, at 12, but it does not provide any explanation of how complying with "one person, one
to such a claim, and they may suffice to show that the claimants have been
injured by the redistricting they challenge.
8
The District Court found that: "Control of the General Assembly is
crucial to a political party for a number of reasons. The majority party
elects the Speaker of the House, a person who wields considerable power in
the assigning of bills to committees, the conduct of the actual legislative
sessions, and is empowered, under legislative rules, to prevent bills from
reaching the floor for debate or vote. Similarly, the majority party elects
floor leaders in both houses who control the flow of legislation, the assignment of members to committees, and the appointment of committee chairmen. All of these powers are important to the achievement of a party's
legislative goals. There is little doubt that the minority party plays a less
substantial role in the drafting and enactment of legislation." 603 F.
Supp., at 1483.
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vote" deters or identifies a gerrymander that unconstitutionally discriminates against a cognizable group of voters.
While that standard affords some protection to the voting
rights of individuals, "it protects groups only indirectly at
best," Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. 8., at 752 (STEVENS, J.,
concurring), even when the group's identity is determined
solely by reference to the fact that its members reside in a
particular voting district. "One person, one vote" alone does
not protect the voting rights of a group made up of persons
affiliated with a particular political party who seek to achieve
representation through their combined voting strength.
Thus, the facts that the legislature permitted each Democratic voter to cast his or her one vote, erected no direct barriers to Democratic voters' exercise of the franchise, and
drew districts of equal population, are irrelevant to a claim
that district lines were drawn for the purpose and with the
effect of substantially debasing the strength of votes cast by
Democrats as a group. 9
The final and most basic flaw in the Court's opinion is its
failure to enunciate any standard that affords guidance to legislatures and courts. 10 Legislators and judges are left to
9
As was said in the context of a constitutional challenge by black voters
to an at-large voting scheme, "[t]he absence of official obstacles to registration, voting and running for office heretofore has never been deemed to insulate an electoral system" from constitutional attack. Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U. S., at 102 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
•• The Court describes its standard as requiring a "threshold" showing
that the "electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently
degrade a voter's or group of voters' influence in the political process as a
whole." Ante, at 18; see ante, at 19, 20, n. 12. Plaintiffs apparently can
meet the Court's "threshold" only after a number of elections have been
held under the challenged plan. Ante, at 21, 22, 25. At one point, the
Court acknowledges that this formulation is "somewhat different" from any
standard we have previously used to test an electoral plan against an equal
protection challenge, ante, at 19, and also takes pains to say that its opinion
here does not suggest any "alteration of the standards developed" for evaluating racial challenges, ante, at 19, n. 11; see ante, at 20, n. 12. Curiously, the Court then goes on to claim that its standard is consistent with
that used when a racial group challenges an electoral scheme, ante, at 26,
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wonder whether compliance with "one person, one vote" completely insulates a partisan gerrymander from constitutional
scrutiny, or whether a fairer but as yet undefined standard
applies. The failure to articulate clear doctrine in this area
places the Court in the curious position of inviting further
litigation even as it appears to signal the "constitutional
green light" 11 to would-be gerrymanderers.
and with our "equal protection cases generally," ante, at 27. This claim is
simply incorrect.
Our cases have construed the Equal Protection Clause to require proof of
intentional discrimination, placing the burden on plaintiffs to trace the "'invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory . . . to a
racially discriminatory purpose.'" Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616
(1982), quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 240 (1976). In none
of those cases was the Court willing to assume discriminatory intent,
as the Court suggests today is the proper course. Ante, at 27. While the
Court correctly observes that our prior decisions have held that disproportionate election results alone do not violate the Constitution, the
Court erroneously suggests that those holdings flowed solely from the
"perception that the power to influence the political process is not limited
to winning elections.'' Ante, at 18. The Court wholly ignores the basic
problem underlying all of those prior decisions, namely, that the plaintiffs
came into court with no direct proof of discriminatory intent. In those
cases, the Court concluded that proof of discriminatory effect, including
disproportionate election results, if serious enough, could give rise to an
inference of purposeful discrimination. See Rogers v. Lodge, supra, at
618; see also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 94-95, 101-103 (WHITE, J.,
dissenting). I cannot agree, as the Court suggests, that a standard requiring proof of "heightened effect," where invidious intent has been established directly, has support in any of our cases, or that an equal protection
violation can be established "only where a history (actual or projected) of
disproportionate results appears.'' Ante, at 25. If a racial minority established that the legislature adopted a redistricting law for no purpose
other than to disadvantage that group, the Court's new standard apparently would require plaintiffs to wait for the results of several elections,
creating a history of discriminatory effect, before they could challenge the
law in court.
11
Edwards, The Gerrymander and "One Man, One Vote," 46
N. Y. U. L. Rev. 879, 880 (1971).
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III
In Karcher v. Daggett, JUSTICE STEVENS, echoing the decision in Reynolds v. Sims, described factors that I believe
properly should guide both legislators who redistrict and
judges who test redistricting plans against constitutional
challenges. 462 U. S., at 753-761. The most important of
these factors are the shapes of voting districts and adherence
to established political subdivision boundaries. 12 Other relevant considerations include the nature of the legislative
procedures by which the apportionment law was adopted
and legislative history reflecting contemporaneous legislative
goals. To make out a case of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, the plaintiff should be required to offer proof
concerning these factors, which bear directly on the fairness
of a redistricting plan, as well as evidence concerning population disparities and statistics tending to show vote dilution.
No one factor should be dispositive. 13
12
In some cases, proof of grotesque district shapes may, without more,
provide convincing proof of unconstitutional gerrymandering. In addition
to the maps appended to this opinion, see the redistricting maps appended
to the Court's opinions in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 346 U. S. 339, 348 (1960),
and in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 744.
13
Groups may consistently fail to elect representatives under a perfectly
neutral election scheme. Thus, a test that turns only on election results,
as the Court's standard apparently does, likely would identify an unconstitutional gerrymander where none existed. The test that I would adopt
requires consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the plan, including factors initially identified in Reynolds v. Sims, to determine if a
constitutional violation has occurred. Since democracy can work well and
fairly only when citizens have an opportunity to become familiar with their
voting districts, where they must focus their political activities, district
boundaries must have some rationality. Confusion inevitably follows, as
clearly will be the case in Indiana, when a citizen finds himself or herself
forced to associate with several artificial communities, depending on which
office is on the ballot. Thus, irrational lines themselves affect the ability
of all voters to exercise their political influence, with disproportionate election results illustrating the effect of a plan that was deliberately designed
to serve no purpose other than to minimize the voting strength of a disfavored group.
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In this case, appellees offered convincing proof of the ease
with which mapmakers, consistent with the "one person, one
vote" standard, may design a districting plan that purposefully discriminates against political opponents as well as
racial minorities. Computer technology now enables gerrymanderers to achieve their purpose while adhering perfectly
to the requirement that districts be· of equal population. Relying on the factors correctly described by JusTICE STEVENS
in Karcher v. Daggett, the District Court carefully reviewed
appellees' evidence and found that the redistricting law was
intended to and did unconstitutionally discriminate against
Democrats as a group. We have held that a district court's
ultimate determination that a redistricting plan was "being
maintained for discriminatory purposes," as well as its "subsidiary findings of fact," may not be set aside by a reviewing
court unless they are clearly erroneous. Rogers v. Lodge,
458 U. S. 613, 622-623 (1982); see, e. g., White v. Regester,
412 U. S. 755, 769-770 (1973). The Court ignores these
precedents. 14 The Court also disregards the various factors
discussed by the District Court as adequate indicia of unconstitutional gerrymandering.

A
A court should look first to the legislative process by which
the challenged plan was adopted. Here, the District Court
found that the procedures used in redistricting Indiana were
carefully designed to exclude Democrats from participating
in the legislative process. In February 1981, both houses of
"The Court, making new law, ignores the "clearly erroneous" standard
of Rule 52(a), by saying that it has not rejected any of the District Court's
findings of fact, but has "merely . . . disregarded those that were irrelevant in this case and held insufficient those that inadequately supported
the District Court's ultimate legal conclusions." Ante, at 27, n. 17. In a
gerrymandering case the facts as to how, where, and why the legislature
drew the district boundaries are at the heart of the equal protection
violation. The Court makes no effort to explain its flat assertions that the
District Court's careful findings were "irrelevant" or "insufficient."
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the General Assembly passed reapportionment bills with no
substantive content and referred them to the other chamber
where conflicting amendments were made. The purpose of
this process was to send "vehicle bills" to a Conference Committee whose task was to apportion representation. Four
conferees and four advisors served on the Committee. The
conferees, all Republicans, were responsible for designing
the voting districts and were entitled to vote on the result of
their own efforts. The advisors, Democrats, were excluded
from the mapmaking process and were given no committee
vote. 603 F. Supp., at 1483.
The legislative process consisted of nothing more than the
majority party's private application of computer technology
to mapmaking. The Republican State Committee engaged
the services of a computer firm to aid the conferees in their
task. I d., at 1483-1484. According to the Conference Committee chairman, the only data used in the computer program
were precinct population, race of precinct citizens, precinct
political complexion, and statewide party voting trends. Access to the mapmaking process was strictly limited. No
member of the Democratic party and no member of the public
was provided with any of the information used in or generated by the computer program. When questioned about the
lack of minority party participation in the redistricting process, the chairman of the Conference Committee stated that
the Democrats would "have the privilege to offer a minority
map. But I will advise you in advance that it will not be
accepted." !d., at 1484.
Republicans promised to hold public hearings on redistricting. No hearing was held during the mapmaking process,
the only time during which voters' views could be expected to
influence their legislators. Ibid. Two days before the end
of the General Assembly's regular session, during the first
and only public hearing on reapportionment, the Conference
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Committee revealed for the first time the result of its mapmaking effort. This timing gave the Democrats but 40 hours
in which to review the districting of more than 4,000 precincts. Ibid. On the last day of the session, April30, 1981,
the Conference Committee report was introduced for a vote
and was adopted by party line vote in both houses of the
General Assembly. 15 Ibid.
B
Next, the District Court found that the maps "conspicuously ignore[d] traditional political subdivisions, with no concern for any adherence to principles of community interest."
I d., at 1493. The court carefully described how the mapmakers carved up counties, cities, and even townships in
their effort to draw lines beneficial to the majority party.
Many districts meander through several counties, picking up
a number of townships from each. 16 The District Court explained why this failure to honor county boundaries could be
expected to have a detrimental impact on citizens' exercise of
their vote. In Indiana, the county government is the seat of
local affairs. I d., at 1494. The redistricting dissects counties into strange shapes lacking in common interests, on one
occasion even placing the seat of one county in a voting district composed of townships from other counties. I d., at
1487; see House Districts 45, 46. Under these conditions,
the District Court expressly found that "the potential for
voter disillusion and nonparticipation is great," as voters are
forced to focus their political activities in artificial electoral
units. 603 F. Supp., at 1494. Intelligent voters, regardless
! G Presumably as a result of the haste with which the redistricting law
was pushed through the General Assembly , parts of the state were "wholly
omitted in the 1981legislation." 603 F . Supp. , at 1484. In the 1982 legislative session, therefore, amendments were passed to assign the omitted
areas to voting districts. Ibid.
16
E . g. , House Districts 20, 22, 25, 28, 42, 45, 46, 55, 57, 62, 66, 70, 73,
74; Senate Districts 7, 24, 37, 39, 45, 47. See the redistricting maps
appended to this opinion.
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of party affiliation, resent this sort of political manipulation of
the electorate for no public purpose.
Deposition testimony of the Chairman of the Conference
Committee revealed that the mapmakers gave no consideration to the interests of communities. In the Chairman's
view, the concept of honoring community interests meant
only that mapmakers should refuse to divide a small, suburban community. The shapes of the voting districts and the
manner in which the districts divide established communities, from the county to the township level, illustrate that
community interests were ignored by appellants. As the
District Court observed, for example, "it is difficult to conceive the interests shared by blacks in Washington Township
and white suburbanites in Hamilton and Boone Counties, or
the shared interest of Allen and Noble County farmers with
residents of downtown Fort Wayne." !d., at 1487.

c
In addition to the foregoing findings that apply to both the
House and Senate plans, the District Court also noted the
substantial evidence that appellants were motivated solely by
partisan considerations. I d., at 1484. There is no evidence
that the public interest in a fair electoral process was given
any consideration by appellants. Indeed, as noted above,
the mapmakers' partisan goals were made explicitly clear by
contemporaneous statements of Republican leaders who
openly acknowledged that their goal was to disadvantage
Democratic voters. As one Republican House member concisely put it, "The name of the game is to keep us in power." 17
NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 232 (Indianapolis Star, Mar. 22,
17

Evidence of partisan sparring during the redistricting process, of
course, is not sufficient to establish an equal protection violation or to show
that the legislature pursued no legitimate objectives in adopting the plan.
But such evidence is probative of contemporaneous legislative goals, adding support to the objective facts showing that the legislature adopted the
plan for the sole purpose of disadvantaging members of the political party
that happened to be out of power.
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1981, § 2, page 3). When the plan was completed, Republican leaders announced that the House map was designed to
yield 56 "safe" Republican seats and 30 Democratic seats,
with the remainder being "tossups." NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 242 (Post-Tribune, April 29, 1981, p. 1). Republicans
expected that their Senate map would regularly produce 30
Republican seats and 8 to 10 Democratic seats so that Republicans would maintain their grip on the Senate even if Democrats won the remaining seats. NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit
241 (Post-Tribune, April 29, 1981, p. 1). In short, the
record unequivocally demonstrates that in 1981 the Republican-dominated General Assembly deliberately sought to
design a redistricting plan under which members of the Democratic party would be deprived of a fair opportunity to win
control of the General Assembly at least until 1991, the date
of the next redistricting.
IV
A
I turn now to the District Court's findings with respect
particularly to the gerrymandering of the House Districts.
The court found that the plan contained voting districts
whose irrational shapes called for justification. E. g., House
Districts 20, 22, 25, 45, 56, 48, 62, 66, 70, 73. The findings
concerning the district configurations reflect the panel's familiarity with Indiana geography and the particular characteristics of the State's political subdivisions. As the District
Court noted, the voter confusion generated by irrational district boundaries is exacerbated in this case by the fact that
the lines in the House Plan were drawn independently of
those in the Senate Plan. 603 F. Supp., at 1484-1485.
When the Senate voting districts are overlaid on the House
districts, the potential for voter confusion becomes readily
apparent as lines and districts intersect in a crazy-quilt. 18
18

Since the Indiana House of Representatives has 100 members, and the
Senate has 50, the mapmakers readily could have designed a "nested" plan,
that is, a plan that included "two House districts within one Senate district." 603 F. Supp. , at 1484. By permitting voters readily to identify
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The District Court carefully considered the multimember
districts contained in the House plan and found that they
were intentionally employed to minimize Democratic voting
power. This Court has expressly recognized that "(a] districting plan may create multimember districts perfectly acceptable under equal population standards, but invidiously
discriminatory because they are employed 'to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of
the voting population."' Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S.,
at 751 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439
(1965)). 19 In this case, invidious purpose may be inferred
from the mapmakers' selection of areas to be divided into
multimember districts. These districts appear in some areas
where they had been used previously and not in others, in
some urban areas and not in others, and in some areas where
their use required combining rural townships with urban
areas from another county. 20 The only discernible pattern is
the appearance of these districts in areas where their winnertake-all aspects can best be employed to debase Democratic
voting strength. The District Court determined that the
multimember districts diluted Democratic voting strength by
their voting districts and corresponding representatives, a nested plan can
be expected to foster voter participation. See Grofman, supra, at 88, 92.
Instead, as the District Court observed, the mapmakers drew House districts that were "not at all relevant to the Senate districts." 603 F. Supp.,
at 1484.
19
In the context of racial gerrymandering claims, the Court has refused
to adopt a per se rule barring the use of multimember districts. White v.
Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765 (1973). But the Court has repeatedly recognized that the characteristics of multimember districts, namely their
tendency to submerge the voting strength of the minority by allowing the
majority to capture all of the district's assigned seats, make them a ready
means for legislative discrimination against racial groups or political
opponents. E . g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616 (1982).
20
The multimember districts are House Districts 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15,
19, 20, 31, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 75.
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"stacking" Democrats into districts "where their majority
would be overwhelming" and by fragmenting populations of
Democratic voters among other districts where their voting
strength would be reduced. 603 F. Supp., at 1488-1489,
1494. For example, the mapmakers split Fort Wayne, a city
with a demonstrated tendency to vote for Democratic candidates, and associated each of the halves with areas from outlying counties whose residents had a pattern of voting for Republican candidates. I d., at 1488, 1494; see House Districts
19, 20.
Similarly, the redistricting of Marion County
presents a clear example of dilution of Democrats' voting
strength through the use of multimember districts. Though
population figures entitled the county to elect exactly 14
House members, the mapmakers decided to tack on portions
of 2 neighboring counties in order artificially to create a population base entitled to elect 15 representatives. Then, they
carved that artificial geographical unit into five threemember districts whose irregular shapes were designed to
fence Democrats into one heavily Democratic district and
scatter pockets of Democratic strength among the other four
districts. Id., at 1487, 1489; see House Districts 48, 49, 50,
51, 52. 21
21

The District Court found that the multimember districts employed in
Marion County were "particularly suspect with respect to compactness."
603 F. Supp., at 1487. Of all the districts in the challenged plan, the court
determined that House District 48 "presents the most grievous example of
the political cartographer's handiwork in this case." Ibid . That district
"forms the letter 'C' around the central city of Indianapolis" and "includes
portions of the urban southwestside of the city, the airport and suburban
area around Ben Davis High School on the west side, and the Meridian
Hills area at the northern part of the county." Ibid. The court expressly
determined that, even though House District 48 satisfies "one person, one
vote," there was "simply no conceivable justification for this kind of district." Ibid.
The following map, taken from an exhibit provided by the parties, shows
this grotesque gerrymandering. The legislature first proceeded to disregard Marion County's boundary lines, which essentially form a square, and
then carved the area it created into oddly shaped multimember districts.
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Appellees further demonstrated through a statistical showing that the House Plan debased the effectiveness of their
votes. In 1982, all 100 House seats were up for election.
Democratic candidates received about 51.9 percent of the
vote, and Republican candidates received about 48.1 percent.
Forty-three Democratic representatives were elected; 57
Republicans were elected. 22 Appellees offered startling
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The District Court also noted the discriminatory purpose served by the
Marion County House Districts, including District 48: "the powerful
Marion County delegation forced neighboring counties to cede turf to
permit a preservation of the multi-member districts which had consistently
returned Republicans to the Statehouse." !d., at 1487, n. 1. Moreover,
as appellees' statistical showing of vote dilution plainly demonstrates ,
these gerrymandered districts had a discriminatory impact on the votes of
Democrats as a group.
22
In the 1984 election, Democratic candidates earned approximately 44
percent of the vote, and Republicans earned approximately 56 percent.
Thirty-nine Democrats were elected to the House, and 61 Republicans
were elected. The figures for the 1984 elections cited in this opinion were
provided by the Elections Research Center, Washington, D. C. A Supplemental Statement filed by appellants in the District Court following
trial also quoted some of the 1984 election results, including the fact that in
1984 the Democratic candidate for Governor won 48% of the vote.
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statistics with respect to House results in Marion and Allen
Counties, two areas in which multimember districts were
used. In these counties, Democratic candidates earned 46.3
percent of the vote, but won only 3 of 21 House seats. As
the District Court observed, "such a disparity speaks for itself." !d., at 1489. 23
B

Since half of the Senate membership is up for election
every two years, the only election results under the challenged plan available at trial related to 25 of the 50 Senate
seats. Those results showed that, of the seats up for election in 1982, Democrats were elected to 13 seats and Republicans to 12. Democratic candidates earned about 53.1 percent of the vote, and Republicans received about 46.9
percent. At trial, it was appellees' contention that most of
the Senate seats won by Democrats in 1982 were "safe" Democratic seats so that their party's success at the polls in
that year was fully consistent with the statewide Republican
gerrymander. This contention is borne out by the results of
the 1984 Senate election. In that election, Democratic candidates received 42.3 percent of the vote, and Republicans 57.7
percent. Yet, of the 25 Senate positions up for election, only
7 were captured by Democrats. 24
23
The 1984 House election in the Marion and Allen County House Districts reflected a similar disparity, when Republicans again captured 18 of
the 21 House seats and the Democrats 3 despite the fact that Democratic
candidates earned approximately 38 percent of the vote in these counties.
24
The District Court's discussion of district shapes focused primarily on
the House Plan. As the following map of the Senate districts in the Marion County area illustrates, the Senate Plan also contains districts with unusual shapes. Although the population of Marion County, whose boundary lines form a square, was entitled to elect exactly seven Senators, 603
F . Supp. , at 1487, n. 1, the mapmakers ignored both that population figure
and the county boundaries, and created eight wholly irrational voting districts. As one Democratic voter remarked when the Senate Plan was unveiled, "People who live near the [district line separating Senate districts
33 and 34] are going to need an Indian guide and a compass to figure out

23

84-1244-CONCUR/DISSENT
DAVIS v. BANDEMER

c
The District Court found, and I agree, that appellants
failed to justify the discriminatory impact of the plan by
showing that the plan had a rational basis in permissible neutral criteria. Appellants' primary justification was that the
plan comports with the principle of "one person, one vote."
Their plan did adhere to that objective, with population deviations between House districts of 1. 05 percent and between
which district they're in." NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 252 (Indianapolis
Star, May 10, 1981, § 2, page 3).
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Senate districts of 1.15 percent. But reliance on "one person, one vote" does not sufficiently explain or justify the
discrimination the plan inflicted on Democratic voters as a
group. The District Court expressly found that the irregular district shapes could not be justified on the basis of population distribution. 603 F. Supp., at 1494. Nor does adherence to "one person, one vote" excuse the mapmakers' failure
to honor established political or community boundaries. It
does not excuse the irrational use of multimember districts,
with their devastating impact on the voting strength of
Democrats. The only other justification offered by appellants, for which the District Court found some support as a
contemporaneous goal, was that the mapmakers sought to
maintain "the black representation in the General Assembly
that existed prior to the new districting plan." But the court
further determined that the impact of the redistricting fell
most harshly on black voters who predominantly are Democrats. I d., at 1488, 1489-1490. None of these critical findings was found by the Court today to be clearly erroneous.

v
In conclusion, I want to make clear the limits of the standard that I believe the Equal Protection Clause imposes
on legislators engaged in redistricting. Traditionally, the
determination of electoral districts within a State has been a
matter left to the legislative branch of the state government.
Apart from the doctrine of separation of powers and the federal system prescribed by the Constitution, federal judges
are ill-equipped generally to review legislative decisions
respecting redistricting. As the Court's opinion makes
clear, however, our precedents hold that a colorable claim of
discriminatory gerrymandering presents a justiciable controversy under the Equal Protection Clause. Federal courts in
exercising their duty to adjudicate such claims should impose
a heavy burden of proof on those who allege that a redistricting plan violates the Constitution. In light of Baker v. Carr,
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Reynolds v. Sims, and their progeny, including such comparatively recent decisions as Gaffney v. Cummings, this case
presents a paradigm example of unconstitutional discrimination against the members of a political party that happened to
be out of power. The well-grounded findings of the District
Court to this effect have not been, and I believe cannot be,
held clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
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IRWIN C. BANDEMER ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
[June-, 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins,
concurring in Part I of the Court's opinion, and dissenting.
This case presents the question whether a state legislature
violates the Equal Protection Clause by adopting a redistricting plan designed solely to preserve the power of the
dominant political party, when the plan follows the doctrine
of "one person, one vote" but ignores all other neutral factors
relevant to the fairness of redistricting. 1
In answering this question, the Court expresses the view,
with which I agree, that a partisan political gerrymander violates the Equal Protection Clause only on proof of "both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group
and an actual discriminatory effect on that group." Ante, at
13. The Court acknowledges that the record in this case
supports a finding that the challenged redistricting plan was
This opinion uses the tenn "redistricting" to refer to the process by
which state legislators draw the boundaries of voting districts. The tenns
"redistricting," "apportionment," and "reapportionment" frequently are
used interchangeably. Backstrom, Robins, & Eller, Issues in Gerrymandering: An Exploratory Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering Applied to
Minnesota, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1121, 1121, n. 1 (1978); Grofman, Criteria for
Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 77, 78,
n. 6 (1985). Technically, the words "apportionment" and "reapportionment" apply to the "allocation of a finite number of representatives among
a fixed number of pre-established areas," while "districting" and "redistricting" refer to the drawing of district lines. Backstrom, Robins , &
Eller, supra, at 1121 , n. 1; see Grofman, supra, at 78, n. 6.
1
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adopted for the purpose of discriminating against Democratic
voters. Ante, at 15-16. The Court concludes, however,
that appellees failed to establish that their voting strength
was diluted statewide despite uncontradicted proof that
certain key districts were grotesquely gerrymandered to enhance the election prospects of Republican candidates. This
conclusion appears to rest solely on the ground that the legislature accomplished its gerrymander consistent with "one
person, one vote," in the sense that the legislature designed
voting districts of approximately equal population and
erected no direct barriers to Democratic voters' exercise of
the franchise. Since the essence of a gerrymandering claim
is that the members of a political party as a group have been
denied their right to "fair and effective representation,"
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 565 (1964), I believe that
the claim cannot be tested solely by reference to "one person,
one vote." Rather, a number of other relevant neutral
factors must be considered. Because the Court ignores such
factors and fails to enunciate standards by which to determine whether a legislature has enacted an unconstitutional
gerrymander, I dissent.
I
The facts are described in the Court's opinion and may be
briefly restated here. In 1981, the Republican Party controlled both houses of the Indiana General Assembly, and its
candidate held the Governor's seat. Pursuant to the requirements of the State Constitution, the General Assembly
undertook legislative redistricting based on 1980 census data.
A Conference Committee, all of whose members were Republicans, was assigned the task of drawing district maps
with the assistance of a private computer firm. The information fed into the computer primarily concerned the political complexion of the State's precincts. The redistricting
process was conducted in secret. Democratic legislators
were not afforded any participation in designing the district
maps that were adopted. There were no hearings where
members of the public were invited to express their views.
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The Republican Committee revealed its proposed redistricting plan two days before the end of the legislative session,
and the Democrats hurriedly presented an alternative plan.
On the last day of the session, the Republican plan was
adopted by party line vote in both houses of the General Assembly. The Governor signed the plan into law.
In 1982 and 1984, elections were held under the new redistricting plan. Prior to the 1982 election, this lawsuit was
commenced by appellees, a group of Indiana Democrats who
claimed that the plan constitutes a partisan political gerrymander designed to disenfranchise Democratic voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 Since trial was completed after the 1982 election, appellees relied in part on the disparity between votes
cast for Democratic legislative candidates in that election and
seats captured by Democrats. The case was heard by a
three-judge panel in the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The District Court, over the dissent of
Judge Pell, made extensive findings of fact and determined
that appellees had established an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander. 603 F. Supp. 1479 (SD Ind. 1984). The
2

In the District Court, appellees' lawsuit was consolidated with a suit
brought by the Indiana NAACP. The plaintiffs in the NAACP suit
argued that the redistricting intentionally fragmented concentrations of
black voters in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
and of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973. The District Court determined that the plan discriminated against black voters,
not because of their race, but because blacks had a demonstrated and overwhelming tendency to vote as a bloc for Democratic candidates. Indeed,
the District Court explicitly found that the "disadvantaging effect of the
plan's multi-member districts falls particularly hard and harsh upon black
voters in the state." 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1488 (SD Ind. 1984). Rather
than taking a cross-appeal challenging the District Court's rejection of
their constitutional and statutory claims, the NAACP plaintiffs have filed a
brief in this Court urging affirmance of the District Court's judgment that
the plan unconstitutionally discriminates against Democratic voters as a
group and against blacks as members of that group.
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Court today reverses the District Court, without concluding
that any of its findings was clearly erroneous.

II
A
Gerrymandering is "the deliberate and arbitrary distortion
of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal
political purposes." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526,
538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring). 3 As JUSTICE STEVENS
correctly observed, gerrymandering violates the Equal Protection Clause only when the redistricting plan serves "no
purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial,
ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a
position of strength at a particular time, or to disadvantage a
politically weak segment of the community." Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 748 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring).
The term "gerrymandering," however, is also used loosely
to describe the common practice of the party in power to
choose the redistricting plan that gives it an advantage at the
polls. An intent to discriminate in this sense may be present
whenever redistricting occurs. See Gaffney v. Cummings,
412 U. S. 735, 753 (1973); Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F. 2d 830, 847 (CA7) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 409 U. S. 893 (1972). Moreover, since legislative
3
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged ed. 1961)
defines "gerrymander" as "to divide (a territorial unit) into election districts in an unnatural and unfair way with the purpose of giving one political party an electoral majority in a large number of districts while
concentrating the voting strength of the opposition in as few districts as
possible." The term "gerrymander" was coined by combining the last
name of Elbridge Gerry with the word "salamander" in order to describe
the "fancied resemblance to a salamander . . . of the irregularly shaped
outline of an election district in northeastern Massachusetts that had been
formed for partisan purposes in 1812 during Gerry's governorship" of that
State. Ibid. Though many of the voting districts appearing in the plans
challenged here have bizarre shapes, House District 66 perhaps most
closely resembles a salamander. See the redistricting maps appended to
this opinion.

84-1244-CONCUR/DISSENT
DAVIS v. BANDEMER

5

bodies rarely reflect accurately the popular voting strength
of the principal political parties, the effect of any particular
redistricting may be perceived as unfair. See id., at
752-754. Consequently, only a sensitive and searching inquiry can distinguish gerrymandering in the "loose" sense
from gerrymandering that amounts to unconstitutional discrimination. Because it is difficult to develop and apply
standards that will identify the unconstitutional gerrymander, courts may seek to avoid their responsibility to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause by finding that a claim of gerrymandering is nonjusticiable. I agree with the Court that
such a course is mistaken, and that the allegations in this case
raise a justiciable issue. 4
Moreover, I am convinced that appropriate judicial standards can and should be developed. Justice Fortas' definition
of unconstitutional gerrymandering properly focuses on
whether the boundaries of the voting districts have been
distorted deliberately and arbitrarily to achieve illegitimate
ends. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S., at 538. Under
this definition, the merits of a gerrymandering claim must be
determined by reference to the configurations of the districts, the observance of political subdivision lines, and other
criteria that have independent relevance to the fairness of redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 755-759
(STEVENS, J., concurring). In this case, the District Court
examined the redistricting in light of such factors and found,
among other facts, that the boundaries of a number of districts were deliberately distorted to deprive Democratic
voters of an equal opportunity to participate in the State's
legislative processes. The Court makes no reference to
any of these findings of fact. It rejects the District Court's
ultimate conclusion with no explanation of the respects in
'As the Court properly explains, our prior decisions make clear that an
equal protection challenge to redistricting does not present a nonjusticiable
political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735 (1973).
Accordingly, I join Part I of the Court's opinion.
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which appellees' proof fell short of establishing discriminatory effect. A brief review of the Court's jurisprudence in
the context of another kind of challenge to redistricting, a
claim of malapportionment, demonstrates the pressing need
for the Court to enunciate standards to guide legislators who
redistrict and judges who determine the constitutionality of
the legislative effort.
B
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees citizens that their
state will govern them impartially. See Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring). In the context
of redistricting, that guarantee is of critical importance because the franchise provides most citizens their only voice in
the legislative process. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at
561-562, 565-566. Since the contours of a voting district
powerfully may affect citizens' ability to exercise influence
through their vote, district lines should be determined in accordance with neutral and legitimate criteria. When deciding where those lines will fall, the state should treat its voters as standing in the same position, regardless of their
political beliefs or party affiliation. Chapman v. Meier, 420
U. S. 1, 17 (1975); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 751.
The first cases in which this Court entertained equal protection challenges to redistricting involved allegations that
state legislatures had refused to redesign States' voting districts to eliminate gross population disparities among those
districts. E. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, supra. The Court's decision in Reynolds v.
Sims illustrates two concepts that are vitally important in
evaluating an equal protection challenge to redistricting.
First, the Court recognized that equal protection encompasses a guarantee of equal representation, requiring a State
to seek to achieve through redistricting "fair and effective
representation for all citizens." Reynolds v. Sims, 377
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U. S., at 565-566; see Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, at 748.
The concept of "representation" necessarily applies to
groups: groups of voters elect representatives, individual
voters do not. Gross population disparities violate the mandate of equal representation by denying voters residing in
heavily populated districts, as a group, the opportunity to
elect the number of representatives to which their voting
strength otherwise would entitle them. While population
disparities do dilute the weight of individual votes, their discriminatory effect is felt only when those individual votes are
combined. Thus, the fact that individual voters in heavily
populated districts are free to cast their ballot has no bearing
on a claim of malapportionment.
Second, at the same time that it announced the principle of
"one person, one vote" to compel States to eliminate gross
disparities among district populations, the Court plainly recognized that redistricting should be based on a number of
neutral criteria, of which districts of equal population was
only one. Reynolds v. Sims identified several of the factors
that should guide a legislature engaged in redistricting. For
example, the Court observed that districts should be compact
and cover contiguous territory, precisely because the alternative, "[i]ndiscriminate districting," would be "an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering." 377 U. S., at 578-579.
Similarly, a State properly could choose to give "independent
representation" to established political subdivisions. Adherence to community boundaries, the Court reasoned, would
both "deter the possibilities of gerrymandering," and allow
communities to have a voice in the legislature that directly
controls their local interests. I d., at 580-581. See also
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 325-326 (1973). Thus,
Reynolds v. Sims contemplated that "one person, one vote"
would be only one among several neutral factors that serve
the constitutional mandate of fair and effective representa-
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tion. See Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, at 748-749. It was
not itself to be the only goal of redistricting. 5
A standard that judges the constitutionality of a districting
plan solely by reference to the doctrine of "one person, one
vote" may cause two detrimental results. 6 First, as a perceived way to avoid litigation, legislative bodies may place
undue emphasis on mathematical exactitude, subordinating or
ignoring entirely other criteria that bear directly on the fairness of redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at
753 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 774 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 749. Second, as this
case illustrates, and as Reynolds v. Sims anticipated, exclusive
or primary reliance on "one person, one vote" can betray the
constitutional promise of fair and effective representation by
enabling a legislature to engage intentionally in clearly
discriminatory gerrymandering. See Wells v. Rockefeller,
394 U. S. 542, 551 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

c
In light of the foregoing principles, I believe that the
Court's opinion is seriously flawed in several respects.
5
The doctrine of "one person, one vote" originally was regarded as a
means to prevent discriminatory gerrymandering since "opportunities for
gerrymandering are greatest when there is freedom to construct unequally
populated districts." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526, 534, n. 4
(1969). Advances in computer technology achieved since the doctrine was
announced have drastically reduced its deterrent value by permitting political cartographers to draw districts of equal population that intentionally
discriminate against cognizable groups of voters. See Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U. S. 725, 752, n. 10 (1983) (STEVENS, J. , concurring). For "one
person, one vote" to serve its intended purpose of implementing the constitutional mandate of fair and effective representation, therefore,
consideration also must be given to other neutral factors.
6
In decisions concerning congressional redistricting, the Court has
focused its attention almost exclusively on whether a challenged plan satisfies "one person, one vote." See Karcher v. Daggett, supra; White v.
Weiser, 412 U. S. 783 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, supra. In cases
involving state legislative redistricting, such as the case before us today,
the Court has refused to limit a legislature to the single goal of precise
population equality. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 745; Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 322-325 (1973).
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First, apparently to avoid the forceful evidence that some district lines indisputably were designed to and did discriminate
against Democrats, the Court describes appellees' claim as alleging that "Democratic voters over the State as a whole, not
Democratic voters in particular districts, have been subjected
to unconstitutional discrimination." Ante, at 13. This characterization is not inconsistent with appellees' proof, and the
District Court's finding, of statewide discriminatory effect
resulting from "individual districting" that "exemplif[ies]
this discrimination." Ibid. If Democratic voters in a number
of critical districts are the focus of unconstitutional discrimination, as the District Court found, the effect of that discrimination will be felt over the State as a whole.
The Court also erroneously characterizes the harm members of the losing party suffer as a group when they are deprived, through deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district
boundaries, of the opportunity to elect representatives of
their choosing. See ante, at 17-18. 7 It may be, as the
Court suggests, that representatives will not "entirely ignore
The Court correctly concludes that a redistricting plan is not unconstitutional merely because the plan makes it more difficult for a group of
voters to elect the candidate of its choice or merely because the plan does
not provide proportional representation. Ante, at 17-18. While the
"Equal Protection Clause confers a substantive right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters," Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U. S. 55, 77 (1979) (plurality opinion), the Constitution does not guarantee
proportional representation or protect any group from defeat at the polls,
id., at 77-80; see White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). But
the Court leaps from that conclusion to the assumption that "[a]n individual
or group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is usually deemed
to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to have as
much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district." Ante, at 18. Thus, the Court apparently concludes that effects on
election results are of little import, as long as the losers have some access
to their representatives. Though effects on election results do not suffice
to establish an unconstitutional gerrymander, they certainly are relevant
to such a claim, and they may suffice to show that the claimants have been
injured by the redistricting they challenge.
7
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the interests" of opposition voters. Ante, at 18. But it defies political reality to suppose that members of a losing party
have as much political influence over state government as do
members of the victorious party. Even the most conscientious state legislators do not disregard opportunities to reward persons or groups who were active supporters in their
election campaigns. Similarly, no one doubts that partisan
considerations play a major role in the passage of legislation
and the appointment of state officers. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the District Court expressly found that "[c]ontrol
of the General Assembly is crucial" to members of the major
political parties in Indiana. 603 F. Supp., at 1483. 8 In light
of those findings, I cannot accept the Court's apparent conclusion that loss of this "crucial" position is constitutionally
insignificant as long as the losers are not "entirely ignored"
by the winners.
The Court relies almost exclusively on the "one person, one
vote" standard to reject appellees' convincing proof that the
redistricting plan had a seriously discriminatory effect on
their voting strength in particular districts. The Court
properly describes the claim in this case as a denial of fair and
effective "representation," ante, at 12, but it does not provide any explanation of how complying with "one person, one
vote" deters or identifies a gerrymander that unconstitutionally discriminates against a cognizable group of voters.
8

The District Court found that: "Control of the General Assembly is
crucial to a political party for a number of reasons. The majority party
elects the Speaker of the House, a person who wields considerable power in
the assigning of bills to committees, the conduct of the actual legislative
sessions, and is empowered, under legislative rules, to prevent bills from
reaching the floor for debate or vote. Similarly, the majority party elects
floor leaders in both houses who control the flow of legislation, the assignment of members to committees, and the appointment of committee chairmen. All of these powers are important to the achievement of a party's
legislative goals. There is little doubt that the minority party plays a less
substantial role in the drafting and enactment of legislation." 603 F .
Supp., at 1483.
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While that standard affords some protection to the voting
rights of individuals, "it protects groups only indirectly at
best," Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 752 (STEVENS, J.,
concurring), even when the group's identity is determined
solely by reference to the fact that its members reside in a
particular voting district. "One person, one vote" alone does
not protect the voting rights of a group made up of persons
affiliated with a particular political party who seek to achieve
representation through their combined voting strength.
Thus, the facts that the legislature permitted each Democratic voter to cast his or her one vote, erected no direct barriers to Democratic voters' exercise of the franchise, and
drew districts of equal population, are irrelevant to a claim
that district lines were drawn for the purpose and with the
effect of substantially debasing the strength of votes cast by
Democrats as a group. 9
The final and most basic flaw in the Court's opinion is its
failure to enunciate any standard that affords guidance to legislatures and courts. 10 Legislators and judges are left to
9
As was said in the context of a constitutional challenge by black voters
to an at-large voting scheme, "[t]he absence of official obstacles to registration, voting and running for office heretofore has never been deemed to insulate an electoral system" from constitutional attack. Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U. S., at 102 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
10
The Court describes its standard as requiring a "threshold" showing
that the "electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently
degrade a voter's or group of voters' influence in the political process as a
whole." Ante, at 18; see ante, at 19, 20, n. 12. Plaintiffs apparently can
meet the Court's "threshold" only after a number of elections have been
held under the challenged plan. Ante, at 21, 22, 25. At one point, the
Court acknowledges that this formulation is "somewhat different" from any
standard we have previously used to test an electoral plan against an equal
protection challenge, ante, at 19, and also takes pains to say that its opinion
here does not suggest any "alteration of the standards developed" for evaluating racial challenges, ante, at 19, n. 11; see ante, at 20, n. 12. Curiously, the Court then goes on to claim that its standard is consistent with
that used when a racial group challenges an electoral scheme, ante, at 26,
and with our "equal protection cases generally," ante, at 27. This claim is
simply incorrect.
Our cases have construed the Equal Protection Clause to require proof of
intentional discrimination, placing the burden on plaintiffs to trace the
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wonder whether compliance with "one person, one vote" completely insulates a partisan gerrymander from constitutional
scrutiny, or whether a fairer but as yet undefined standard
applies. The failure to articulate clear doctrine in this area
places the Court in the curious position of inviting further
litigation even as it appears to signal the "constitutional
green light" 11 to would-be gerrymanderers.
"'invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory ... to a
racially discriminatory purpose.'" Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616
(1982), quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 240 (1976). In none
of those cases was the Court willing to assume discriminatory intent,
as the Court suggests today is the proper course. Ante, at 27. While the
Court correctly observes that our prior decisions have held that disproportionate election results alone do not violate the Constitution, the
Court erroneously suggests that those holdings flowed solely from the
"perception that the power to influence the political process is not limited
to winning elections.'' Ante, at 18. The Court wholly ignores the basic
problem underlying all of those prior decisions, namely, that the plaintiffs
came into court with no direct proof of discriminatory intent. In those
cases, the Court concluded that proof of discriminatory effect, including
disproportionate election results, if serious enough, could give rise to an
inference of purposeful discrimination. See Rogers v. Lodge, supra, at
618. As JUSTICE WHITE has explained, the Court's decisions in both
White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U. S. 124 (1971), rested on the proposition that the requisite "invidious discriminatory purpose" can be inferred from proof of "objective factors" concerning discriminatory effect. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 u. s.Aat 95; see id.,
at 94-97, 102-103 (WHITE, J., dissenting); see also White v. Regester,
supra, at 765 (multimember districts are unconstitutional "where used invidiously to cancel out" racial groups' voting strength). I cannot agree, as
the Court suggests, that a standard requiring proof of "heightened effect,"
where invidious intent has been established directly, has support in any of
our cases, or that an equal protection violation can be established "only
where a history (actual or projected) of disproportionate results appears.''
Ante, at 25. If a racial minority established that the legislature adopted a
redistricting law for no purpose other than to disadvantage that group, the
Court's new and erroneous standard ordinarily will require plaintiffs to
wait for the results of several elections, creating a history of discriminatory
effect, before they can challenge the law in court. Ante, at 23.
11
Edwards, The Gerrymander and "One Man, One Vote," 46 N. Y. U. L.
Rev. 879, 880 (1971).

A
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III
In Karcher v. Daggett, JUSTICE STEVENS, echoing the decision in Reynolds v. Sims, described factors that I believe
properly should guide both legislators who redistrict and
judges who test redistricting plans against constitutional
challenges. 462 U. S., at 753-761. The most important of
these factors are the shapes of voting districts and adherence
to established political subdivision boundaries. 12 Other relevant considerations include the nature of the legislative
procedures by which the apportionment law was adopted
and legislative history reflecting contemporaneous legislative
goals. To make out a case of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, the plaintiff should be required to offer proof
concerning these factors, which bear directly on the fairness
of a redistricting plan, as well as evidence concerning population disparities and statistics tending to show vote dilution.
No one factor should be dispositive. 13
In this case, appellees offered convincing proof of the ease
with which mapmakers, consistent with the "one person, one
12
In some cases, proof of grotesque district shapes may, without more,
provide convincing proof of unconstitutional gerrymandering. In addition
to the maps appended to this opinion, see the redistricting maps appended
to the Court's opinions in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 346 U. S. 339, 348 (1960),
and in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 744.
18
Groups may consistently fail to elect representatives under a perfectly
neutral election scheme. Thus, a test that turns only on election results,
as the Court's standard apparently does, likely would identify an unconstitutional gerrymander where none existed. The test that I would adopt
requires consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the plan, including factors initially identified in Reynolds v. Sims, to determine if a
constitutional violation has occurred. Since democracy can work well and
fairly only when citizens have an opportunity to become familiar with their
voting districts, where they must focus their political activities, district
boundaries must have some rationality. Confusion inevitably follows, as
clearly will be the case in Indiana, when a citizen finds himself or herself
forced to associate with several artificial communities, depending on which
office is on the ballot. Thus, irrational lines themselves affect the ability
of all voters to exercise their political influence, with disproportionate election results illustrating the effect of a plan that was deliberately designed
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vote" standard, may design a districting plan that purposefully discriminates against political opponents as well as
racial minorities. Computer technology now enables gerrymanderers to achieve their purpose while adhering perfectly
to the requirement that districts be of equal population. Relying on the factors correctly described by JUSTICE STEVENS
in Karcher v. Daggett, the District Court carefully reviewed
appellees' evidence and found that the redistricting law was
intended to and did unconstitutionally discriminate against
Democrats as a group. We have held that a district court's
ultimate determination that a redistricting plan was "being
maintained for discriminatory purposes," as well as its "subsidiary findings of fact," may not be set aside by a reviewing
court unless they are clearly erroneous. Rogers v. Lodge,
458 U. S. 613, 622-623 (1982); see, e. g., White v. Regester,
412 U. S. 755, 769-770 (1973). The Court ignores these
precedents. 14 The Court also disregards the various factors
discussed by the District Court as adequate indicia of unconstitutional gerrymandering.

A
A court should look first to the legislative process by which
the challenged plan was adopted. Here, the District Court
found that the procedures used in redistricting Indiana were
carefully designed to exclude Democrats from participating
to serve no purpose other than to minimize the voting strength of a disfavored group.
14
The Court, making new law, ignores the "clearly erroneous" standard
of Rule 52(a), by saying that it has not rejected any of the District Court's
findings of fact, but has "merely ... disregarded those that were irrelevant in this case and held insufficient those that inadequately supported
the District Court's ultimate legal conclusions." Ante, at 27, n. 17. In a
gerrymandering case the facts as to how, where, and why the legislature
drew the district boundaries are at the heart of the equal protection
violation. Beyond stating that appellees' statistical proof failed to satisfy
the Court's new threshold~\ the Court makes no effort to explain its flat
assertions that the District Court's careful findings were "irrelevant" or
"insufficient."

1)
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in the legislative process. In February 1981, both houses of
the General Assembly passed reapportionment bills with no
substantive content and referred them to the other chamber
where conflicting amendments were made. The purpose of
this process was to send "vehicle bills" to a Conference Committee whose task was to apportion representation. Four
conferees and four advisors served on the Committee. The
conferees, all Republicans, were responsible for designing
the voting districts and were entitled to vote on the result of
their own efforts. The advisors, Democrats, were excluded
from the mapmaking process and were given no committee
vote. 603 F. Supp., at 1483.
The legislative process consisted of nothing more than the
majority party's private application of computer technology
to mapmaking. The Republican State Committee engaged
the services of a computer firm to aid the conferees in their
task. !d., at 1483-1484. According to the Conference Committee chairman, the only data used in the computer program
were precinct population, race of precinct citizens, precinct
political complexion, and statewide party voting trends. Access to the mapmaking process was strictly limited. No
member of the Democratic party and no member of the public
was provided with any of the information used in or generated by the computer program. When questioned about the
lack of minority party participation in the redistricting process, the chairman of the Conference Committee stated that
the Democrats would "have the privilege to offer a minority
map. But I will advise you in advance that it will not be
accepted." ld., at 1484.
Republicans promised to hold public hearings on redistricting. No hearing was held during the mapmaking process,
the only time during which voters' views could be expected to
influence their legislators. Ibid. Two days before the end
of the General Assembly's regular session, during the first
and only public hearing on reapportionment, the Conference
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Committee revealed for the first time the result of its mapmaking effort. This timing gave the Democrats but 40 hours
in which' to review the districting of more than 4,000 precincts. Ibid. On the last day of the session, April 30, 1981,
the Conference Committee report was introduced for a vote
and was adopted by party line vote in both houses of the
General Assembly. 15 Ibid.
B

Next, the District Court found that the maps "conspicuously ignore[d] traditional political subdivisions, with no concern for any adherence to principles of community interest."
Id., at 1493. The court carefully described how the mapmakers carved up counties, cities, and even townships in
their effort to draw lines beneficial to the majority party.
Many districts meander through several counties, picking up
a number of townships from each.'6 The District Court explained why this failure to honor county boundaries could be
expected to have a detrimental impact on citizens' exercise of
their vote. In Indiana, the county government is the seat of
local affairs. Id., at 1494. The redistricting dissects counties into strange shapes lacking in common interests, on one
occasion even placing the seat of one county in a voting district composed of townships from other counties. I d., at
1487; see House Districts 45, 46. Under these conditions,
the District Court expressly found that "the potential for
voter disillusion and nonparticipation is great," as voters are
forced to focus their political activities in artificial electoral
units. 603 F. Supp., at 1494. Intelligent voters, regardless
15
Presumably as a result of the haste with which the redistricting law
was pushed through the General Assembly, parts of the state were "wholly
omitted in the 1981legislation." 603 F. Supp., at 1484. In the 1982legislative session, therefore, amendments were passed to assign the omitted
areas to voting districts. Ibid.
16
E. g. , House Districts 20, 22, 25, 28, 42, 45, 46, 55, 57, 62, 66, 70, 73,
74; Senate Districts 7, 24, 37, 39, 45, 47. See the redistricting maps
appended to this opinion.
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of party affiliation, resent this sort of political manipulation of
the electorate for no public purpose.
Deposition testimony of the Chairman of the Conference
Committee revealed that the mapmakers gave no consideration to the interests of communities. In the Chairman's
view, the concept of honoring community interests meant
only that mapmakers should refuse to divide a small, suburban community. The shapes of the voting districts and the
manner in which the districts divide established communities, from the county to the township level, illustrate that
community interests were ignored by appellants. As the
District Court observed, for example, "it is difficult to conceive the interests shared by blacks in Washington Township
and white suburbanites in Hamilton and Boone Counties, or
the shared interest of Allen and Noble County farmers with
residents of downtown Fort Wayne." !d., at 1487.

c
In addition to the foregoing findings that apply to both the
House and Senate plans, the District Court also noted the
substantial evidence that appellants were motivated solely by
partisan considerations. !d., at 1484. There is no evidence
that the public interest in a fair electoral process was given
any consideration by appellants. Indeed, as noted above,
the mapmakers' partisan goals were made explicitly clear by
contemporaneous statements of Republican leaders who
openly acknowledged that their goal was to disadvantage
Democratic voters. As one Republican House member concisely put it, "The name of the game is to keep us in power." 17
NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 232 (Indianapolis Star, Mar. 22,
17
Evidence of partisan sparring during the redistricting process, of
course, is not sufficient to establish an equal protection violation or to show
that the legislature pursued no legitimate objectives in adopting the plan.
But such evidence is probative of contemporaneous legislative goals, adding support to the objective facts showing that the legislature adopted the
plan for the sole purpose of disadvantaging members of the political party
that happened to be out of power.
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1981, § 2, page 3). When the plan was completed, Republican leaders announced that the House map was designed to
yield 56 "safe" Republican seats and 30 Democratic seats,
with the remainder being "tossups." NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 242 (Post-Tribune, April 29, 1981, p. 1). Republicans
expected that their Senate map would regularly produce 30
Republican seats and 8 to 10 Democratic seats so that Republicans would maintain their grip on the Senate even if Democrats won the remaining seats. NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit
241 (Post-Tribune, April 29, 1981, p. 1). In short, the
record unequivocally demonstrates that in 1981 the Republican-dominated General Assembly deliberately sought to
design a redistricting plan under which members of the Democratic party would be deprived of a fair opportunity to win
control of the General Assembly at least until1991, the date
of the next redistricting.
IV
A

I turn now to the District Court's findings with respect
particularly to the gerrymandering of the House Districts.
The court found that the plan contained voting districts
whose irrational shapes called for justification. E. g., House
Districts 20, 22, 25, 45, 56, 48, 62, 66, 70, 73. The findings
concerning the district configurations reflect the panel's familiarity with Indiana geography and the particular characteristics of the State's political subdivisions. As the District
Court noted, the voter confusion generated by irrational district boundaries is exacerbated in this case by the fact that
the lines in the House Plan were drawn independently of
those in the Senate Plan. 603 F. Supp., at 1484-1485.
When the Senate voting districts are overlaid on the House
districts, the potential for voter confusion becomes readily
apparent as lines and districts intersect in a crazy-quilt. 18
18
Since the Indiana House of Representatives has 100 members, and the
Senate has 50, the mapmakers readily could have designed a "nested" plan,
that is, a plan that included "two House districts within one Senate district." 603 F. Supp., at 1484. By permitting voters readily to identify
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The District Court carefully considered the multimember
districts contained in the House plan and found that they
were intentionally employed to minimize Democratic voting
power. This Court has expressly recognized that "[a] districting plan may create multimember districts perfectly acceptable under equal population standards, but invidiously
discriminatory because they are employed 'to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of
the voting population."' Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S.,
at 751 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439
(1965)). 19 In this case, invidious purpose may be inferred
from the mapmakers' selection of areas to be divided into
multimember districts. These districts appear in some areas
where they had been used previously and not in others, in
some urban areas and not in others, and in some areas where
their use required combining rural townships with urban
areas from another county. 20 The only discernible pattern is
the appearance of these districts in areas where their winnertake-all aspects can best be employed to debase Democratic
voting strength. The District Court determined that the
multimember districts diluted Democratic voting strength by
their voting districts and corresponding representatives, a nested plan can
be expected to foster voter participation. See Grofman, supra, at 88, 92.
Instead, as the District Court observed, the mapmakers drew House districts that were "not at all relevant to the Senate districts." 603 F. Supp.,
at 1484.
19
In the context of racial gerrymandering claims, the Court has refused
to adopt a per se rule barring the use of multimember districts. White v.
Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765 (1973). But the Court has repeatedly recognized that the characteristics of multimember districts, namely their
tendency to submerge the voting strength of the minority by allowing the
majority to capture all of the district's assigned seats, make them a ready
means for legislative discrimination against racial groups or political
opponents. E. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616 (1982).
20
The multimember districts are House Districts 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15,
19, 20, 31, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 75.
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"stacking" Democrats into districts "where their majority
would be overwhelming" and by fragmenting populations of
Democratic voters among other districts where their voting
strength would be reduced. 603 F. Supp., at 1488-1489,
1494. For example, the mapmakers split Fort Wayne, a city
with a demonstrated tendency to vote for Democratic candidates, and associated each of the halves with areas from outlying counties whose residents had a pattern of voting for Republican candidates. !d., at 1488, 1494; see House Districts
19, 20.
Similarly, the redistricting of Marion County
presents a clear example of dilution of Democrats' voting
strength through the use of multimember districts. Though
population figures entitled the county to elect exactly 14
House members, the mapmakers decided to tack on portions
of 2 neighboring counties in order artificially to create a population base entitled to elect 15 representatives. Then, they
carved that artificial geographical unit into five threemember districts whose irregular shapes were designed to
fence Democrats into one heavily Democratic district and
scatter pockets of Democratic strength among the other four
districts. !d., at 1487, 1489; see House Districts 48, 49, 50,
51, 52. 21
21
The District Court found that the multimember districts employed in
Marion County were "particularly suspect with respect to compactness."
603 F. Supp., at 1487. Of all the districts in the challenged plan, the court
determined that House District 48 "presents the most grievous example of
the political cartographer's handiwork in this case." Ibid. That district
"forms the letter 'C' around the central city of Indianapolis" and "includes
portions of the urban southwestside of the city, the airport and suburban
area around Ben Davis High School on the west side, and the Meridian
Hills area at the northern part of the county." Ibid. The court expressly
determined that, even though House District 48 satisfies "one person, one
vote," there was "simply no conceivable justification for this kind of district." Ibid.
The following map, taken from an exhibit provided by the parties, shows
this grotesque gerrymandering. The legislature first proceeded to disregard Marion County's boundary lines, which essentially form a square, and
then carved the area it created into oddly shaped multimember districts.
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Appellees further demonstrated through a statistical showing that the House Plan debased the effectiveness of their
votes. In 1982, all 100 House seats were up for election.
Democratic candidates received about 51.9 percent of the
vote, and Republican candidates received about 48.1 percent.
Forty-three Democratic representatives were elected; 57
Republicans were elected. 22 Appellees offered startling
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The District Court also noted the discriminatory purpose served by the
Marion County House Districts, including District 48: "the powerful
Marion County delegation forced neighboring counties to cede turf to
permit a preservation of the multi-member districts which had consistently
returned Republicans to the Statehouse. " /d., at 1487, n. 1. Moreover,
as appellees' statistical showing of vote dilution plainly demonstrates,
these gerrymandered districts had a discriminatory impact on the votes of
Democrats as a group.
22
In the 1984 election, Democratic candidates earned approximately 44
percent of the vote, and Republicans earned approximately 56 percent.
Thirty-nine Democrats were elected to the House, and 61 Republicans
were elected. The figures for the 1984 elections cited in this opinion were
provided by the Elections Research Center, Washington, D. C. A Supplemental Statement filed by appellants in the District Court following
trial also quoted some of the 1984 election results, including the fact that in
1984 the Democratic candidate for Governor won 48% of the vote.

84-1244-CON CUR/DISSENT
22

DAVIS v. BANDEMER

statistics with respect to House results in Marion and Allen
Counties, two areas in which multimember districts were
used. In these counties, Democratic candidates earned 46.3
percent of the vote, but won only 3 of 21 House seats. As
the District Court observed, "such a disparity speaks for itself." Id., at 1489. 23
B
Since half of the Senate membership is up for election
every two years, the only election results under the challenged plan available at trial related to 25 of the 50 Senate
seats. Those results showed that, of the seats up for election in 1982, Democrats were elected to 13 seats and Republicans to 12. Democratic candidates earned about 53.1 percent of the vote, and Republicans received about 46.9
percent. At trial, it was appellees' contention that most of
the Senate seats won by Democrats in 1982 were "safe" Democratic seats so that their party's success at the polls in
that year was fully consistent with the statewide Republican
gerrymander. This contention is borne out by the results of
the 1984 Senate election. In that election, Democratic candidates received 42.3 percent of the vote, and Republicans 57.7
percent. Yet, of the 25 Senate positions up for election, only
7 were captured by Democrats. 24
23
The 1984 House election in the Marion and Allen County House Districts reflected a similar disparity, when Republicans again captured 18 of
the 21 House seats and the Democrats 3 despite the fact that Democratic
candidates earned approximately 38 percent of the vote in these counties.
24
The District Court's discussion of district shapes focused primarily on
the House Plan. As the following map of the Senate districts in the Marion County area illustrates, the Senate Plan also contains districts with unusual shapes. Although the population of Marion County, whose boundary lines form a square, was entitled to elect exactly seven Senators, 603
F. Supp., at 1487, n. 1, the mapmakers ignored both that population figure
and the county boundaries, and created eight wholly irrational voting districts. As one Democratic voter remarked when the Senate Plan was unveiled, "People who live near the [district line separating Senate districts
33 and 34] are going to need an Indian guide and a compass to figure out
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c
The District Court found, and I agree, that appellants
failed to justify the discriminatory impact of the plan by
showing that the plan had a rational basis in permissible neutral criteria. Appellants' primary justification was that the
plan comports with the principle of "one person, one vote."
Their plan did adhere to that objective, with population deviations between House districts of 1. 05 percent and between
which district they're in." NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 252 (Indianapolis
Star, May 10, 1981, § 2, page 3).
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Senate districts of 1.15 percent. But reliance on "one person, one vote" does not sufficiently explain or justify the
discrimination the plan inflicted on Democratic voters as a
group. The District Court expressly found that the irregular district shapes could not be justified on the basis of population distribution. 603 F. Supp., at 1494. Nor does adherence to "one person, one vote" excuse the mapmakers' failure
to honor established political or community boundaries. It
does not excuse the irrational use of multimember districts,
with their devastating impact on the voting strength of
Democrats. The only other justification offered by appellants, for which the District Court found some support as a
contemporaneous goal, was that the mapmakers sought to
maintain "the black representation in the General Assembly
that existed prior to the new districting plan." But the court
further determined that the impact of the redistricting fell
most harshly on black voters who predominantly are Democrats. !d., at 1488, 1489-1490. None of these critical findings was found by the Court today to be clearly erroneous.

v
In conclusion, I want to make clear the limits of the standard that I believe the Equal Protection Clause imposes
on legislators engaged in redistricting. Traditionally, the
determination of electoral districts within a State has been a
matter left to the legislative branch of the state government.
Apart from the doctrine of separation of powers and the federal system prescribed by the Constitution, federal judges
are ill-equipped generally to review legislative decisions
respecting redistricting. As the Court's opinion makes
clear, however, our precedents hold that a colorable claim of
discriminatory gerrymandering presents a justiciable controversy under the Equal Protection Clause. Federal courts in
exercising their duty to adjudicate such claims should impose
a heavy burden of proof on those who allege that a redistricting plan violates the Constitution. In light of Baker v. Carr,

II

INDIANA
HOUSE
DISTRICTS

84-1244-CONCUR/DISSENT
DAVIS v. BANDEMER

25

Reynolds v. Sims, and their progeny, including such comparatively recent decisions as Gaffney v. Cummings, this case
presents a paradigm example of unconstitutional discrimination against the members of a political party that happened to
be out of power. The well-grounded findings of the District
Court to this effect have not been, and I believe cannot be,
held clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the District
Court.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1244

SUSAN J. DAVIS, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.
IRWIN C. BANDEMER ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
[June-, 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins,
concun-ing in Part II of the Court's opinion, and dissenting.
This case presents the question whether a state legislature
violates the Equal Protection Clause by adopting a redistricting plan designed solely to preserve the power of the
dominant political party, when the plan follows the doctrine
of "one person, one vote" but ignores all other neutral factors
relevant to the fairness of redistricting. 1
In answering this question, the Court expresses the view,
with which I agree, that a partisan political gerrymander violates the Equal Protection Clause only on proof of "both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group
and an actual discriminatory effect on that group." Ante, at
13. The Court acknowledges that the record in this case
supports a finding that the challenged redistricting plan was
1
This opinion uses the term "redistricting" to refer to the process by
which state legislators draw the boundaries of voting districts. The terms
"redistricting," "apportionment," and ''reapportionment" frequently are
used interchangeably. Backstrom, Robins, & Eller, Issues in Gerrymandering: An Exploratory Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering Applied to
Minnesota, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1121, 1121, n. 1 (1978); Grofman, Criteria for
Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 77, 78,
n. 6 (1985). Technically, the words "apportionment" and ''reapportionment" apply to the "allocation of a finite number of representatives among
a fixed number of pre-established areas," while "districting" and "redistricting" refer to the drawing of district lines. Backstrom, Robins, &
Eller, supra, at 1121, n. 1; see Grofman, supra, at 78, n. 6.
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adopted for the purpose of discriminating against Democratic
voters. Ante, at 15-16. The Court concludes, however,
that appellees failed to establish that their voting strength
was diluted statewide despite uncontradicted proof that
certain key districts were grotesquely gerrymandered to enhance the election prospects of Republican candidates. This
conclusion appears to rest solely on the ground that the legislature accomplished its gerrymander consistent with "one
person, one vote," in the sense that the legislature designed
voting districts of approximately equal population and
erected no direct barriers to Democratic voters' exercise of
the franchise. Since the essence of a gerrymandering claim
is that the members of a political party as a group have been
denied their right to "fair and effective representation,"
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 565 (1964), I believe that
the claim cannot be tested solely by reference to "one person,
one vote." Rather, a number of other relevant neutral
factors must be considered. Because the Court ignores such
factors and fails to enunciate standards by which to determine whether a legislature has enacted an unconstitutional
gerrymander, I dissent.
I
The facts are described in the Court's opinion and may be
briefly restated here. In 1981, the Republican Party controlled both houses of the Indiana General Assembly, and its
candidate held the Governor's seat. Pursuant to the requirements of the State Constitution, the General Assembly
undertook legislative redistricting based on 1980 census data.
A Conference Committee, all of whose members were Republicans, was assigned the task of drawing district maps
with the assistance of a private computer firm. The information fed into the computer primarily concerned the political complexion of the State's precincts. The redistricting
process was conducted in secret. Democratic legislators
were not afforded any participation in designing the district
maps that were adopted. There were no hearings where
members of the public were invited to express their views.
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The Republican Committee revealed its proposed redistricting plan two days before the end of the legislative session,
and the Democrats hurriedly presented an alternative plan.
On the last day of the session, the Republican plan was
adopted by party line vote in both houses of the General Ass~mbly. The Governor signed the plan into law.
In 1982 and 1984, elections were held under the new redistricting plan. Prior to the 1982 election, this lawsuit was
commenced by appellees, a group of Indiana Democrats who
claimed that the plan constitutes a partisan political gerrymander designed to disenfranchise Democratic voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 Since trial was completed after the 1982 election, appellees relied in part on the disparity between votes
cast for Democratic legislative candidates in that election and
seats captured by Democrats. The case was heard by a
three-judge panel in the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The District Court, over the dissent of
Judge Pell, made extensive findings of fact and determined
that appellees had established an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander. 603 F. Supp. 1479 (SD Ind. 1984). The
In the District Court, appellees' lawsuit was consolidated with a suit
brought by the Indiana NAACP. The plaintiffs in the NAACP suit
argued that the redistricting intentionally fragmented concentrations of
black voters in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
and of§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973. The District Court determined that the plan discriminated against black voters,
not because of their race, but because blacks had a demonstrated and overwhelming tendency to vote as a bloc for Democratic candidates. Indeed,
the District Court explicitly found that the "disadvantaging effect of the
plan's multi-member districts falls particularly hard and harsh upon black
voters in the state." 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1488 (SD Ind. 1984). Rather
than taking a cross-appeal challenging the District Court's rejection of
their constitutional and statutory claims, the NAACP plaintiffs have filed a
brief in this Court urging affirmance of the District Court's judgment that
the plan unconstitutionally discriminates against Democratic voters as a
group and against blacks as members of that group.
2
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Court today reverses the District Court, without concluding
that any of its findings was clearly erroneous.
II
A

Gerrymandering is "the deliberate and arbitrary distortion
of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal
political purposes." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526,
538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring). 3 As JUSTICE STEVENS
correctly observed, gerrymandering violates the Equal Protection Clause only when the redistricting plan serves "no
purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial,
ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a
position of strength at a particular time, or to disadvantage a
politically weak segment of the community." Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 748 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring).
The tenn "gerrymandering," however, is also used loosely
to describe the common practice of the party in power to
choose the redistricting plan that gives it an advantage at the
polls. An intent to discriminate in this sense may be present
whenever redistricting occurs. See Gaffney v. Cummings,
412 U. S. 735, 753 (1973); Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F. 2d 830, 847 (CA7) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 409 U. S. 893 (1972). Moreover, since legislative
3
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged ed. 1961)
defines "gerrymander" as "to divide (a territorial unit) into election districts in an unnatural and unfair way with the purpose of giving one political party an electoral majority in a large number of districts while
concentrating the voting strength of the opposition in as few districts as
possible." The term "gerrymander" was coined by combining the last
name of Elbridge Gerry with the word "salamander" in order to describe
the "fancied resemblance to a salamander . . . of the irregularly shaped
outline of an election district in northeastern Massachusetts that had been
formed for partisan purposes in 1812 during Gerry's governorship" of that
State. Ibid. Though many of the voting districts appearing in the plans
challenged here have bizarre shapes, House District 66 perhaps most
closely resembles a salamander. See the redistricting maps appended to
this opinion.
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bodies rarely reflect accurately the popular voting strength
of the principal political parties, the effect of any particular
redistricting may be perceived as unfair. See id., at
752-754. Consequently, only a sensitive and searching inquiry can distinguish gerrymandering in the "loose" sense
from gerrymandering that amounts to unconstitutional discrimination. Because it is difficult to develop and apply
standards that will identify the unconstitutional gerrymander, courts may seek to avoid their responsibility to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause by finding that a claim of gerrymandering is nonjusticiable. I agree with the Court that
such a course is mistaken, and that the allegations in this case
raise a justiciable issue. 4
Moreover, I am convinced that appropriate judicial standards can and should be developed. Justice Fortas' definition
of unconstitutional gerrymandering properly focuses on
whether the boundaries of the voting districts have been
distorted deliberately and arbitrarily to achieve illegitimate
ends. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S., at 538. Under
this definition, the merits of a gerrymandering claim must be
determined by reference to the configurations of the districts, the observance of political subdivision lines, and other
criteria that have independent relevance to the fairness of redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 755-759
(STEVENS, J., concurring). In this case, the District Court
examined the redistricting in light of such factors and found,
among other facts, that the boundaries of a number of districts were deliberately distorted to deprive Democratic
voters of an equal opportunity to participate in the State's
legislative processes. The Court makes no reference to
any of these findings of fact. It rejects the District Court's
ultimate conclusion with no explanation of the respects in
• As the Court properly explains, our prior decisions make clear that an
equal protection challenge to redistricting does not present a nonjusticiable
political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735 (1973).
Accordingly, I join Part II of the Court's opinion.
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which appellees' proof fell short of establishing discriminatory effect. A brief review of the Court's jurisprudence in
the context of another kind of challenge to redistricting, a
claim of malapportionment, demonstrates the pressing need
for the Court to enunciate standards to guide legislators who
redistrict and judges who determine the constitutionality of
the legislative effort.
B
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees citizens that their
state will govern them impartially. See Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring). In the context
of redistricting, that guarantee is of critical importance because the franchise provides most citizens their only voice in
the legislative process. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at
561-562, 565-566. Since the contours of a voting district
powerfully may affect citizens' ability to exercise influence
through their vote, district lines should be determined in accordance with neutral and legitimate criteria. When deciding where those lines will fall, the state should treat its voters as standing in the same position, regardless of their
political beliefs or party affiliation. Chapman v. Meier, 420
U. S. 1, 17 (1975); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 751.
The first cases in which this Court entertained equal protection challenges to redistricting involved allegations that
state legislatures had refused to redesign States' voting districts to eliminate gross population disparities among those
districts. E. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, supra. The Court's decision in Reynolds v.
Sims illustrates two concepts that are vitally important in
evaluating an equal protection challenge to redistricting.
First, the Court recognized that equal protection encompasses a guarantee of equal representation, requiring a State
to seek to achieve through redistricting "fair and effective
representation for all citizens." Reynolds v. Sims, 377
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U. S., at 565-566; see Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, at 748.
The concept of "representation" necessarily applies to
groups: groups of voters elect representatives, individual
voters do not. Gross population disparities violate the mandate of equal representation by denying voters residing in
heavily populated districts, as a group, the opportunity to
elect the number of representatives to which their voting
strength otherwise would entitle them. While population
disparities do dilute the weight of individual votes, their discriminatory effect is felt only when those individual votes are
combined. Thus, the fact that individual voters in heavily
populated districts are free to cast their ballot has no bearing
on a claim of malapportionment.
Second, at the same time that it announced the principle of
"one person, one vote" to compel States to eliminate gross
disparities among district populations, the Court plainly recognized that redistricting should be based on a number of
neutral criteria, of which districts of equal population was
only one. Reynolds v. Sims identified several of the factors
that should guide a legislature engaged in redistricting. For
example, the Court observed that districts should be compact
and cover contiguous territory, precisely because the alternative, "[i]ndiscriminate districting," would be "an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering." 377 U. S., at 578-579.
Similarly, a State properly could choose to give "independent
representation" to established political subdivisions. Adherence to community boundaries, the Court reasoned, would
both "deter the possibilities of gerrymandering," and allow
communities to have a voice in the legislature that directly
controls their local interests. I d., at 580-581. See also
Mahan v. Howell , 410 U. S. 315, 325-326 (1973). Thus,
Reynolds v. Sims contemplated that "one person, one vote"
would be only one among several neutral factors that serve
the constitutional mandate of fair and effective representa-
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tion. See Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, at 748-749. It was
not itself to be the only goal of redistricting. 5
A standard that judges the constitutionality of a districting
plan solely by reference to the doctrine of "one person, one
vote" may cause two detrimental results. 6 First, as a perceived way to avoid litigation, legislative bodies may place
undue emphasis on mathematical exactitude, subordinating or
ignoring entirely other criteria that bear directly on the fairness of redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at
753 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at .774 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 749. Second, as this
case illustrates, and as Reynolds v. Sims anticipated, exclusive
or primary reliance on "one person, one vote" can betray the
constitutional promise of fair and effective representation by
enabling a legislature to engage intentionally in clearly
discriminatory gerrymandering. See Wells v. Rockefeller,
394 U. S. 542, 551 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

c
In light of the foregoing principles, I believe that the
Court's opinion is seriously flawed in several respects.
5
The doctrine of "one person, one vote" originally was regarded as a
means to prevent discriminatory gerrymandering since "opportunities for
gerrymandering are greatest when there is freedom to construct unequally
populated districts." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526, 534, n. 4
(1969). Advances in computer technology achieved since the doctrine was
announced have drastically reduced its deterrent value by permitting political cartographers to draw districts of equal population that intentionally
discriminate against cognizable groups of voters. See Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U. S. 725, 752, n. 10 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring). For "one
person, one vote" to serve its intended purpose of implementing the constitutional mandate of fair and effective representation, therefore,
consideration also must be given to other neutral factors.
5
In decisions concerning congressional redistricting, the Court has
focused its attention almost exclusively on whether a challenged plan satisfies "one person, one vote." See Karcher v. Daggett, supra; White v.
Weiser, 412 U. S. 783 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, supra. In cases
involving state legislative redistricting, such as the case before us today,
the Court has refused to limit a legislature to the single goal of precise
population equality. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 745; Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 322-325 (1973).
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First, apparently to avoid the forceful evidence that some district lines indisputably were designed to and did discriminate
against Democrats, the Court describes appellees' claim as alleging that "Democratic voters over the State as a whole, not
Democratic voters in particular districts, have been subjected
to unconstitutional discrimination." Ante, at 13. This characterization is not inconsistent with appellees' proof, and the
District Court's finding, of statewide discriminatory effect
resulting from "individual districting" that "exemplif[ies]
this discrimination." Ibid. If Democratic voters in a number
of critical districts are the focus of unconstitutional discrimination, as the District Court found, the effect of that discrimination will be felt over the State as a whole.
The Court also erroneously characterizes the harm members of the losing party suffer as a group when they are deprived, through deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district
boundaries, of the opportunity to elect representatives of
their choosing. See ante, at 17-18. 7 It may be, as the
Court suggests, that representatives will not "entirely ignore
1
The Court correctly concludes that a redistricting plan is not unconstitutional merely because the plan makes it more difficult for a group of
voters to elect the candidate of its choice or merely because the plan does
not provide proportional representation. Ante, at 17-18. While the
"Equal Protection Clause confers a substantive right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters," Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U. S. 55, 77 (1979) (plurality opinion), the Constitution does not guarantee
proportional representation or protect any group from defeat at the polls,
id., at 77-80; see White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). But
the Court leaps from that conclusion to the assumption that "(a]n individual
or group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is usually deemed
to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to have as
much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district." Ante, at 18. Thus, the Court apparently concludes that effects on
election results are of little import, as long as the losers have some access
to their representatives. Though effects on election results do not suffice
to establish an unconstitutional gerrymander, they certainly are relevant
to such a claim, and they may suffice to show that the claimants have been
injured by the redistricting they challenge.
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the interests" of opposition voters. Ante, at 18. But it defies political reality to suppose that members of a losing party
have as much political influence over state government as do
members of the victorious party. Even the most conscientious state legislators do not disregard opportunities to reward persons or groups who were active supporters in their
election campaigns. Similarly, no one doubts that partisan
considerations play a major role in the passage of legislation
and the appointment of state officers. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the District Court expressly found that "[c]ontrol
of the General Assembly is crucial" to members of the major
political parties in Indiana. 603 F. Supp., at 1483. 8 In light
of those findings, I cannot accept the Court's apparent conclusion that loss of this "crucial" position is constitutionally
insignificant as long as the losers are not "entirely ignored"
by the winners.
The Court relies almost exclusively on the "one person, one
vote" standard to reject appellees' convincing proof that the
redistricting plan had a seriously discriminatory effect on
their voting strength in particular districts. The Court
properly describes the claim in this case as a denial of fair and
effective "representation," ante, at 12, but it does not provide any explanation of how complying with "one person, one
vote" deters or identifies a gerrymander that unconstitutionally discriminates against a cognizable group of voters.
8

The District Court found that: "Control of the General Assembly is
crucial to a political party for a number of reasons. The majority party
elects the Speaker of the House, a person who wields considerable power in
the assigning of bills to committees, the conduct of the actual legislative
sessions, and is empowered, under legislative rules, to prevent bills from
reaching the floor for debate or vote. Similarly, the majority party elects
floor leaders in both houses who control the flow of legislation, the assignment of members to committees, and the appointment of committee chairmen. All of these powers are important to the achievement of a party's
legislative goals. There is little doubt that the minority party plays a less
substantial role in the drafting and enactment of legislation." 603 F.
Supp., at 1483.
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While that standard affords some protection to the voting
rights of individuals, "it protects groups only indirectly at
best," Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 752 (STEVENS, J.,
concurring), even when the group's identity is determined
solely by reference to the fact that its members reside in a
particular voting district. "One person, one vote" alone does
not protect the voting rights of a group made up of persons
affiliated with a particular political party who seek to achieve
representation through their combined voting strength.
Thus, the facts that the legislature permitted each Democratic voter to cast his or her one vote, erected no direct barriers to Democratic voters' exercise of the franchise, and
drew districts of equal population, are irrelevant to a claim
that district lines were drawn for the purpose and with the
effect of substantially debasing the strength of votes cast by
Democrats as a group. 9
The final and most basic flaw in the Court's opinion is its
failure to enunciate any standard that affords guidance to legislatures and courts. 10 Legislators and judges are left to
• As was said in the context of a constitutional challenge by black voters
to an at-large voting scheme, "[t]he absence of official obstacles to registration, voting and running for office heretofore has never been deemed to insulate an electoral system" from constitutional attack. Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U. S., at 102 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
10
The Court describes its standard as requiring a "threshold" showing
that the "electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently
degrade a voter's or group of voters' influence in the political process as a
whole." Ante, at 18; see ante, at 19, 20, n. 12. Plaintiffs apparently can
meet the Court's "threshold" only after a number of elections have been
held under the challenged plan. Ante, at 21, 22, 25. At one point, the
Court acknowledges that this formulation is "somewhat different" from any
standard we have previously used to test an electoral plan against an equal
protection challenge, ante, at 19, and also takes pains to say that its opinion
here does not suggest any "alteration of the standards developed" for evaluating racial challenges, ante, at 19, n. 11; see ante, at 20, n. 12. Curiously, the Court then goes on to claim that its standard is consistent with
that used when a racial group challenges an electoral scheme, ante, at 26,
and with our "equal protection cases generally," ante, at 27. This claim is
simply incorrect.
Our cases have construed the Equal Protection Clause to require proof of
intentional discrimination, placing the burden on plaintiffs to trace the
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wonder whether compliance with "one person, one vote" completely insulates a partisan gerrymander from constitutional
scrutiny, or whether a fairer but as yet undefined standard
applies. The failure to articulate clear doctrine in this area
places the Court in the curious position of inviting further
litigation even as it appears to signal the "constitutional
green light" 11 to would-be gerrymanderers.
"'invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory ... to a
racially discriminatory purpose."' Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616
(1982), quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 240 (1976). In none
of those cases was the Court willing to assume discriminatory intent,
as the Court suggests today is the proper course. Ante, at 27. While the
Court correctly observes that our prior decisions have held that disproportionate election results alone do not violate the Constitution, the
Court erroneously suggests that those holdings flowed solely from the
''perception that the power to influence the political process is not limited
to winning elections." Ante, at 18. The Court wholly ignores the basic
problem underlying all of those prior decisions, namely, that the plaintiffs
came into court with no direct proof of discriminatory intent. In those
cases, the Court concluded that proof of discriminatory effect, including
disproportionate election results, if serious enough, could give rise to an
inference of purposeful discrimination. See Rogers v. Lodge, supra, at
618. As JUSTICE WHITE has explained, the Court's decisions in both
White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U. S. 124 (1971), rested on the proposition that the requisite ''invidious discriminatory purpose" can be inferred from proof of "objective factors" concerning discriminatory effect. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 95; see id.,
at 94-97, 102-103 (WHITE, J., dissenting); see also White v. Regester,
supra, at 765 (multimember districts are unconstitutional "where used invidiously to cancel out" racial groups' voting strength). I cannot agree, as
the Court suggests, that a standard requiring proof of "heightened effect,"
where invidious intent has been established directly, has support in any of
our cases, or that an equal protection violation can be established "only
where a history (actual or projected) of disproportionate results appears."
Ante, at 25. If a racial minority established that the legislature adopted a
redistricting law for no purpose other than to disadvantage that group, the
Court's new and erroneous standard ordinarily will require plaintiffs to
wait for the results of several elections, creating a history of discriminatory
effect, before they can challenge the law in court. Ante, at 23.
11
Edwards, The Gerrymander and "One Man, One Vote," 46 N. Y. U. L.
Rev. 879, 880 (1971).

84-1244-CONCUR/DISSENT
DAVIS v. BANDEMER

13

III
In Karcher v. Daggett, JUSTICE STEVENS, echoing the decision in Reynolds v. Sims, described factors that I believe
properly should guide both legislators who redistrict and
judges who test redistricting plans against constitutional
challenges. 462 U. S., at 753-761. The most important of
these factors are the shapes of voting districts and adherence
to established political subdivision boundaries. 12 Other relevant considerations include the nature of the legislative
procedures by which the apportionment law was adopted
and legislative history reflecting contemporaneous legislative
goals. To make out a case of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, the plaintiff should be required to offer proof
concerning these factors, which bear directly on the fairness
of a redistricting plan, as well as evidence concerning population disparities and statistics tending to show vote dilution.
No one factor should be dispositive. 13
In this case, appellees offered convincing proof of the ease
with which mapmakers, consistent with the "one person, one
In some cases, proof of grotesque district shapes may, without more,
provide convincing proof of unconstitutional gerrymandering. In addition
to the maps appended to this opinion, see the redistricting maps appended
to the Court's opinions in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 346 U. S. 339, 348 (1960),
and in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 744.
13
Groups may consistently fail to elect representatives under a perfectly
neutral election scheme. Thus, a test that turns only on election results,
as the Court's standard apparently does, likely would identify an unconstitutional gerrymander where none existed. The test that I would adopt
requires consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the plan, including factors initially identified in Reynolds v. Sims, to determine if a
constitutional violation has occurred. Since democracy can work well and
fairly only when citizens have an opportunity to become familiar with their
voting districts, where they must focus their political activities, district
boundaries must have some rationality. Confusion inevitably follows, as
clearly will be the case in Indiana, when a citizen finds himself or herself
forced to associate with several artificial communities, depending on which
office is on the ballot. Thus, irrational lines themselves affect the ability
of all voters to exercise their political influence, with disproportionate election results illustrating the effect of a plan that was deliberately designed
11
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vote" standard, may design a districting plan that purposefully discriminates against political opponents as well as
racial minorities. Computer technology now enables gerrymanderers to achieve their purpose while adhering perfectly
to the requirement that districts be of equal population. Relying on the factors correctly described by JUSTICE STEVENS
in Karcher v. Daggett, the District Court carefully reviewed
appellees' evidence and found that the redistricting law was
intended to and did unconstitutionally discriminate against
Democrats as a group. We have held that a district court's
ultimate determination that a redistricting plan was "being
maintained for discriminatory purposes," as well as its "subsidiary findings of fact," may not be set aside by a reviewing
court unless they are clearly erroneous. Rogers v. Lodge,
458 U. S. 613, 622-623 (1982); see, e. g., White v. Regester,
412 U. S. 755, 769-770 (1973). The Court ignores these
precedents. 14 The Court also disregards the various factors
discussed by the District Court as adequate indicia of unconstitutional gerrymandering.

A
A court should look first to the legislative process by which
the challenged plan was adopted. Here, the District Court
found that the procedures used in redistricting Indiana were
carefully designed to exclude Democrats from participating
to serve no purpose other than to minimize the voting strength of a disfavored group.
1
' The Court, making new law, ignores the "clearly erroneous" standard
of Rule 52( a), by saying that it has not rejected any of the District Court's
findings of fact, but has "merely ... disregarded those that were irrelevant in this case and held insufficient those that inadequately supported
the District Court's ultimate legal conclusions." Ante, at 27, n. 17. In a
gerrymandering case the facts as to how, where, and why the legislature
drew the district boundaries are at the heart of the equal protection
violation. Beyond stating that appellees' statistical proof failed to satisfy
the Court's new threshold, the Court makes no effort to explain its fiat
assertions that the District Court's careful findings were "irrelevant" or
"insufficient."
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in the legislative process. In February 1981, both houses of
the General Assembly passed reapportionment bills with no
substantive content and referred them to the other chamber
where conflicting amendments were made. The purpose of
this process was to send "vehicle bills" to a Conference Committee whose task was to apportion representation. Four
conferees and four advisors served on the Committee. The
conferees, all Republicans, were responsible for designing
the voting districts and were entitled to vote on the result of
their own efforts. The advisors, Democrats, were excluded
from the mapmaking process and were given no committee
vote. 603 F. Supp., at 1483.
The legislative process consisted of nothing more than the
majority party's private application of computer technology
to mapmaking. The Republican State Committee engaged
the services of a computer firm to aid the conferees in their
task. I d., at 1483-1484. According to the Conference Committee chairman, the only data used in the computer program
were precinct population, race of precinct citizens, precinct
political complexion, and statewide party voting trends. Access to the mapmaking process was strictly limited. No
member of the Democratic party and no member of the public
was provided with any of the information used in or generated by the computer program. When questioned about the
lack of minority party participation in the redistricting process, the chairman of the Conference Committee stated that
the Democrats would "have the privilege to offer a minority
map. But I will advise you in advance that it will not be
accepted." I d., at 1484.
Republicans promised to hold public hearings on redistricting. No hearing was held during the mapmaking process,
the only time during which voters' views could be expected to
influence their legislators. Ibid. Two days before the end
of the General Assembly's regular session, during the first
and only public hearing on reapportionment, the Conference
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Committee revealed for the first time the result of its mapmaking effort. This timing gave the Democrats but 40 hours
in which to review the districting of more than 4,000 precincts. Ibid. On the last day of the session, April 30, 1981,
the Conference Committee report was introduced for a vote
and was adopted by party line vote in both houses of the
General Assembly. 15 Ibid.
B
Next, the District Court found that the maps "conspicuously ignore( d) traditional political subdivisions, with no concern for any adherence to principles of community interest."
Id., at 1493. The court carefully described how the mapmakers carved up counties, cities, and even townships in
their effort to draw lines beneficial to the majority party.
Many districts meander through several counties, picking up
a number of townships from each. 18 The District Court explained why this failure to honor county boundaries could be
expected to have a detrimental impact on citizens' exercise of
their vote. In Indiana, the county government is the seat of
local affairs. Id., at 1494. The redistricting dissects counties into strange shapes lacking in common interests, on one
occasion even placing the seat of one county in a voting district composed of townships from other counties. I d., at
1487; see House Districts 45, 46. Under these conditions,
the District Court expressly found that "the potential for
voter disillusion and nonparticipation is great," as voters are
forced to focus their political activities in artificial electoral
units. 603 F. Supp., at 1494. Intelligent voters, regardless
Presumably as a result of the haste with which the redistricting law
was pushed through the General Assembly, parts of the state were ''wholly
omitted in the 1981 legislation." 603 F. Supp., at 1484. In the 1982 legislative session, therefore, amendments were passed to assign the omitted
areas to voting districts. Ibid.
16
E . g., House Districts 20, 22, 25, 28, 42, 45, 46, 55, 57, 62, 66, 70, 73,
74; Senate Districts 7, 24, 37, 39, 45, 47. See the redistricting maps
appended to this opinion.
16
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of party affiliation, resent this sort of political manipulation of
the electorate for no public purpose.
Deposition testimony of the Chairman of the Conference
Committee revealed that the mapmakers gave no consideration to the interests of communities. In the Chairman's
view, the concept of honoring community interests meant
only that mapmakers should refuse to divide a small, suburban community. The shapes of the voting districts and the
manner in which the districts divide established communities, from the county to the township level, illustrate that
community interests were ignored by appellants. As the
District Court observed, for example, "it is difficult to conceive the interests shared by blacks in Washington Township
and white suburbanites in Hamilton and Boone Counties, or
the shared interest of Allen and Noble County farmers with
residents of downtown Fort Wayne." !d., at 1487.

c
In addition to the foregoing findings that apply to both the
House and Senate plans, the District Court also noted the
substantial evidence that appellants were motivated solely by
partisan considerations. I d., at 1484. There is no evidence
that the public interest in a fair electoral process was given
any consideration by appellants. Indeed, as noted above,
the mapmakers' partisan goals were made explicitly clear by
contemporaneous statements of Republican leaders who
openly acknowledged that their goal was to disadvantage
Democratic voters. As one Republican House member concisely put it, "The name of the game is to keep us in power." 17
NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 232 (Indianapolis Star, Mar. 22,
17
Evidence of partisan sparring during the redistricting process, of
course, is not sufficient to establish an equal protection violation or to show
that the legislature pursued no legitimate objectives in adopting the plan.
But such evidence is probative of contemporaneous legislative goals, adding support to the objective facts showing that the legislature adopted the
plan for the sole purpose of disadvantaging members of the political party
that happened to be out of power.
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1981, § 2, page 3). When the plan was completed, Republican leaders announced that the House map was designed to
yield 56 "safe" Republican seats and 30 Democratic seats,
with the remainder being "tossups." NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 242 (Post-Tribune, April 29, 1981, p. 1). Republicans
expected that their Senate map would regularly produce 30
Republican seats and 8 to 10 Democratic seats so that Republicans would maintain their grip on the Senate even if Democrats won the remaining seats. NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit
241 (Post-Tribune, April 29, 1981, p. 1). In short, the
record unequivocally demonstrates that in 1981 the Republican-dominated General Assembly deliberately sought to
design a redistricting plan under which members of the Democratic party would be deprived of a fair opportunity to win
control of the General Assembly at least until1991, the date
of the next redistricting.
IV
A
I turn now to the District Court's findings with respect
particularly to the gerrymandering of the House Districts.
The court found that the plan contained voting districts
whose irrational shapes called for justification. E. g., House
Districts 20, 22, 25, 45, 56, 48, 62, 66, 70, 73. The findings
concerning the district configurations reflect the panel's familiarity with Indiana geography and the particular characteristics of the State's political subdivisions. As the District
Court noted, the voter confusion generated by irrational district boundaries is exacerbated in this case by the fact that
the lines in the House Plan were drawn independently of
those in the Senate Plan. 603 F. Supp., at 1484-1485.
When the Senate voting districts are overlaid on the House
districts, the potential for voter confusion becomes readily
apparent as lines and districts intersect in a crazy-quilt.'8
18
Since the Indiana House of Representatives has 100 members, and the
Senate has 50, the mapmakers readily could have designed a "nested" plan,
that is, a plan that included "two House districts within one Senate district." 603 F. Supp., at 1484. By permitting voters readily to identify
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The District Court carefully considered the multimember
districts contained in the House plan and found that they
were intentionally employed to minimize Democratic voting
power. This Court has expressly recognized that "[a] districting plan may create multimember districts perfectly acceptable under equal population standards, but invidiously
discriminatory because they are employed 'to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of
the voting population."' Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S.,
at 751 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439
(1965)). 19 In this case, invidious purpose may be inferred
from the mapmakers' selection of areas to be divided into
multimember districts. These districts appear in some areas
where they had been used previously and not in others, in
some urban areas and not in others, and in some areas where
their use required combining rural townships with urban
areas from another county. 20 The only discernible pattern is
the appearance of these districts in areas where their winnertake-all aspects can best be employed to debase Democratic
voting strength. The District Court determined that the
multimember districts diluted Democratic voting strength by
their voting districts and corresponding representatives, a nested plan can
be expected to foster voter participation. See Grofman, supra, at 88, 92.

Instead, as the District Court observed, the mapmakers drew House districts that were "not at all relevant to the Senate districts." 603 F. Supp.,
at 1484.
"In the context of racial gerrymandering claims, the Court has refused
to adopt a per se rule barring the use of multimember districts. White v.
Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765 (1973). But the Court has repeatedly recognized that the characteristics of multimember districts, namely their
tendency to submerge the voting strength of the minority by allowing the
majority to capture all of the district's assigned seats, make them a ready
means for legislative discrimination against racial groups or political
opponents. E. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616 (1982).
20
The multimember districts are House Districts 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15,
19, 20, 31, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 75.
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"stacking" Democrats into districts "where their majority
would be overwhelming" and by fragmenting populations of
Democratic voters among other districts where their voting
strength would be reduced. 603 F. Supp., at 1488-1489,
1494. For example, the mapmakers split Fort Wayne, a city
with a demonstrated tendency to vote for Democratic candidates, and associated each of the halves with areas from outlying counties whose residents had a pattern of voting for Republican candidates. I d., at 1488, 1494; see House Districts
19, 20.
Similarly, the redistricting of Marion County
presents a clear example of dilution of Democrats' voting
strength through the use of multimember districts. Though
population figures entitled the county to elect exactly 14
House members, the mapmakers decided to tack on portions
of 2 neighboring counties in order artificially to create a population base entitled to elect 15 representatives. Then, they
carved that artificial geographical unit into five threemember districts whose irregular shapes were designed to
fence Democrats into one heavily Democratic district and
scatter pockets of Democratic strength among the other four
districts. Id., at 1487, 1489; see House Districts 48, 49, 50,
51, 52. 21
21
The District Court found that the multimember districts employed in
Marion County were ''particularly suspect with respect to compactness."
603 F. Supp., at 1487. Of all the districts in the challenged plan, the court
determined that House District 48 "presents the most grievous example of
the political cartographer's handiwork in this case." Ibid. That district
"forms the letter 'C' around the central city of Indianapolis" and "includes
portions of the urban southwestside of the city, the airport and suburban
area around Ben Davis High School on the west side, and the Meridian
Hills area at the northern part of the county." Ibid. The court expressly
determined that, even though House District 48 satisfies "one person, one
vote," there was "simply no conceivable justification for this kind of district." Ibid.
The following map, taken from an exhibit provided by the parties, shows
this grotesque gerrymandering. The legislature first proceeded to disregard Marion County's boundary lines, which essentially form a square, and
then carved the area it created into oddly shaped multimember districts.

84-1244-CONCUR/DISSENT
DAVIS v. BANDEMER

21

Appellees further demonstrated through a statistical showing that the House Plan debased the effectiveness of their
votes. In 1982, all 100 House seats were up for election.
Democratic candidates received about 51.9 percent of the
vote, and Republican candidates received about 48.1 percent.
Forty-three Democratic representatives were elected; 57
Republicans were elected. 22 Appellees offered startling
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The District Court also noted the discriminatory purpose served by the
Marion County House Districts, including District 48: "the powerful
Marion County delegation forced neighboring counties to cede turf to
permit a preservation of the multi-member districts which had consistently
returned Republicans to the Statehouse." !d., at 1487, n. 1. Moreover,
as appellees' statistical showing of vote dilution plainly demonstrates,
these gerrymandered districts had a discriminatory impact on the votes of
Democrats as a group.
22
In the 1984 election, Democratic candidates earned approximately 44
percent of the vote, and Republicans earned approximately 56 percent.
Thirty-nine Democrats were elected to the House, and 61 Republicans
were elected. The figures for the 1984 elections cited in this opinion were
provided by the Elections Research Center, Washington, D. C. A Supplemental Statement filed by appellants in the District Court following
trial also quoted some of the 1984 election results, including the fact that in
1984 the Democratic candidate for Governor won 48% of the vote.
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statistics with respect to House results in Marion and Allen
Counties, two areas in which multimember districts were
used. In these counties, Democratic candidates earned 46.3
percent of the vote, but won only 3 of 21 House seats. As
the District Court observed, "such a disparity speaks for itself." I d., at 1489. 23
B
Since half of the Senate membership is up for election
every two years, the only election results under the challenged plan available at trial related to 25 of the 50 Senate
seats. Those results showed that, of the seats up for election in 1982, Democrats were elected to 13 seats and Republicans to 12. Democratic candidates earned about 53.1 percent of the vote, and Republicans received about 46.9
percent. At trial, it was appellees' contention that most of
the Senate seats won by Democrats in 1982 were "safe" Democratic seats so that their party's success at the polls in
that year was fully consistent with the statewide Republican
gerrymander. This contention is borne out by the results of
the 1984 Senate election. In that election, Democratic candidates received 42.3 percent of the vote, and Republicans 57.7
percent. Yet, of the 25 Senate positions up for election, only
7 were captured by Democrats. 24
21

The 1984 House election in the Marion and Allen County House Districts reflected a similar disparity, when Republicans again captured 18 of
the 21 House seats and the Democrats 3 despite the fact that Democratic
candidates earned approximately 38 percent of the vote in these counties.
a The District Court's discussion of district shapes focused primarily on
the House Plan. As the following map of the Senate districts in the Marion County area illustrates, the Senate Plan also contains districts with unusual shapes. Although the population of Marion County, whose boundary lines form a square, was entitled to elect exactly seven Senators, 603
F. Supp., at 1487, n. 1, the mapmakers ignored both that population figure
and the county boundaries, and created eight wholly irrational voting districts. As one Democratic voter remarked when the Senate Plan was unveiled, "People who live near the [district line separating Senate districts
33 and 34] are going to need an Indian guide and a compass to figure out
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c
The District Court found, and I agree, that appellants
failed to justify the discriminatory impact of the plan by
showing that the plan had a rational basis in permissible neutral criteria. Appellants' primary justification was that the
plan comports with the principle of "one person, one vote."
Their plan did adhere to that objective, with population deviations between House districts of 1. 05 percent and between
which district they,'re in." NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 252 (Indianapolis
Star, May 10, 1981, § 2, page 3).
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Senate districts of 1.15 percent. But reliance on "one person, one vote" does not sufficiently explain or justify the
discrimination the plan inflicted on Democratic voters as a
group. The District Court expressly found that the irregular district shapes could not be justified on the basis of population distribution. 603 F. Supp., at 1494. Nor does adherence to "one person, one vote" excuse the mapmakers' failure
to honor established political or community boundaries. It
does not excuse the irrational use of multimember districts,
with their devastating impact on the voting strength of
Democrats. The only other justification offered by appellants, for which the District Court found some support as a
contemporaneous goal, was that the mapmakers sought to
maintain "the black representation in the General Assembly
that existed prior to the new districting plan." But the court
further determined that the impact of the redistricting fell
most harshly on black voters who predominantly are Democrats. /d., at 1488, 1489-1490. None of these critical findings was found by the Court today to be clearly erroneous.

v
In conclusion, I want to make clear the limits of the standard that I believe the Equal Protection Clause imposes
on legislators engaged in redistricting. Traditionally, the
determination of electoral districts within a State has been a
matter left to the legislative branch of the state government.
Apart from the doctrine of separation of powers and the federal system prescribed by the Constitution, federal judges
are ill-equipped generally to review legislative decisions
respecting redistricting. As the Court's opinion makes
clear, however, our precedents hold that a colorable claim of
discriminatory gerrymandering presents a justiciable controversy under the Equal Protection Clause. Federal courts in
exercising their duty to adjudicate such claims should impose
a heavy burden of proof on those who allege that a redistricting plan violates the Constitution. In light of Baker v. Carr,
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Reynolds v. Sims, and their progeny, including such comparatively recent decisions as Gaffney v. Cummings, this case
presents a paradigm example of unconstitutional discrimination against the members of a political party that happened to
be out of power. The well-grounded findings of the District
Court to this effect have not been, and I believe cannot be,
held clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1244

SUSAN J. DAVIS, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.
IRWIN C. BANDEMER ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
[June 30, 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins,
concurring in Part II, and dissenting.
This case presents the question whether a state legislature
violates the Equal Protection Clause by adopting a redistricting plan designed solely to preserve the power of the
dominant political party, when the plan follows the doctrine
of "one person, one vote" but ignores all other neutral factors
relevant to the fairness of redistricting. 1
In answering this question, the plurality expresses the
view, with which I agree, that a partisan political gerrymander violates the Equal Protection Clause only on proof of
"both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group."
Ante, at 15. The plurality acknowledges that the record in
this case supports a finding that the challenged redistricting
'This opinion uses the term "redistricting" to refer to the process by
which state legislators draw the boundaries of voting districts. The terms
"redistricting," "apportionment," and "reapportionment" frequently are
used interchangeably. Backstrom, Robins, & Eller, Issues in Gerrymandering: An Exploratory Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering Applied to
Minnesota, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1121, 1121, n. 1 (1978); Grofman, Criteria for
Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 77, 78,
n. 6 (1985). Technically, the words "apportionment" and "reapportionment" apply to the "allocation of a finite number of representatives
among a fixed number of pre-established areas," while "districting" and
"redistricting" refer to the drawing of district lines. Backstrom, Robins,
& Eller, supra, at 1121, n. 1; see Grofman, supra, at 78, n. 6.
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plan was adopted for the purpose of discriminating against
Democratic voters. Ante, at 15-16. The plurality argues,
however, that appellees failed to establish that their voting
strength was diluted statewide despite uncontradicted proof
that certain key districts were grotesquely gerrymandered to
enhance the ·election prospects of ~epublican candidates.
This argument appears to rest solely on the ground that the
legislature accomplished its gerrymander consistent with
"one person, one vote," in the sense that the legislature
designed voting districts of approximately equal population
and erected no direct barriers to Democratic voters' exercise
of the franchise. Since the essence of a gerrymandering
claim is that the members of a political party as a group have
been denied their right to "fair and effective representation,"
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 565 (1964), I believe that
the claim cannot be tested solely by reference to "one person,
one vote." Rather, a number of other relevant ·neutral
factors must be considered. Because the plurality ignores
such factors and fails to enunciate standards by which to
determine whether a legislature has enacted an unconstitutional gerrymander, I dissent.
I

The facts are exhaustively described in the District Court's
opinion and may be briefly restated here. In 1981, the Republican Party controlled both houses of the Indiana General
Assembly, and its candidate held the Governor's seat. Pursuant to the requirements of the State Constitution, the General Assembly undertook legislative redistricting based on
1980 census data. A Conference Committee, all of whose
members were Republicans, was assigned the task of drawing district maps with the assistance of a private computer
firm. The information fed into the computer primarily concerned the political complexion of the State's precincts. The
redistricting process was conducted in secret. Democratic
legislators were not afforded any participation in designing
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the district maps that were adopted. There were no hearings where members of the public were invited to express
their views. The Republican Committee revealed its proposed redistricting plan two days before the end of the legislative session, and the Democrats hurriedly presented an
alternative plan. On the last day of the session, the Republican plan was adopted by party line vote in both houses of the
General Assembly. The Governor signed the plan into law.
In 1982 and 1984, elections were held under the new redistricting plan. Prior to the 1982 election, this lawsuit was
commenced by appellees, a group of Indiana Democrats who
claimed that the plan constitutes a partisan political gerrymander designed to disenfranchise Democratic voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 Since trial was completed after the 1982 election, appellees relied in part on the disparity between votes
cast for Democratic legislative candidates in that election and
seats captured by Democrats. The case was heard by a
three-judge panel in the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The District Court, over the dissent of
Judge Pell, made extensive findings of fact and determined
that appellees had established an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander. 603 F. Supp. 1479 (SD Ind. 1984). The
2

In the District Court, appellees' lawsuit was consolidated with a
suit brought by the Indiana NAACP. The plaintiffs in the NAACP suit
argued that the redistricting intentionally fragmented concentrations of
black voters in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
and of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973. The District Court determined that the plan discriminated against black voters,
not because of their race, but because blacks had a demonstrated and overwhelming tendency to vote as a bloc for Democratic candidates. Indeed,
the District Court explicitly found that the "disadvantaging effect of the
plan's multi-member districts falls particularly hard and harsh upon black
voters in the state." 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1488 (SD Ind. 1984). Rather
than taking a cross-appeal challenging the District Court's rejection of
their constitutional and statutory claims, the NAACP plaintiffs have filed a
brief in this Court urging affirmance of the District Court's judgment that
the plan unconstitutionally discriminates against Democratic voters as a
group and against blacks as members of that group.

:.
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Court today reverses the District Court, without concluding
that any of its findings was clearly erroneous.

n
A

Gerrymandering is "the deliberate and arbitrary distortion
of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal
political purposes." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526,
538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring). 3 As JUSTICE STEVENS
correctly observed, gerrymandering violates the Equal Protection Clause only when the redistricting plan serves "no
purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial,
ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a
position of strength at a particular time, or to disadvantage a
politically weak segment of the community." Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 748.(1983) (STEVENS, J ., concurring).
The term "gerrymandering," however, is also used loosely
to describe the common practice of the party in power to
choose the redistricting plan that gives it an advantage at the
polls. An intent to discriminate in this sense may be present
whenever redistricting occurs. See Gaffney v. Cummings,
412 U. S. 735, 753 (1973); Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F. 2d 830, 847 (CA7) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 409 U. S. 893 (1972). Moreover, since legislative
3
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged ed. 1961)
defines "gerrymander" as "to divide (a territorial unit) into election districts in an unnatural and unfair way with the purpose of giving one political
party an electoral majority in a large number of districts while concentrating
the voting strength of the opposition in as few districts as possible." The
term "gerrymander" was coined by combining the last name of Elbridge
Gerry with the word "salamander" in order to describe the "fancied resemblance to a salamander . . . of the irregularly shaped outline of an election
district in northeastern Massachusetts that had been formed for partisan
purposes in 1812 during Gerry's governorship" of that State. Ibid. Though
many of the voting districts appearing in the plans challenged here have
bizarre shapes, House District 66 perhaps most closely resembles a salamander. See the redistricting maps appended to this opinion. These maps
were reproduced from trial exhibits provided by the parties.
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bodies rarely reflect accurately the popular voting strength
of the principal political parties, the effect of any particular
redistricting may be perceived as unfair. See id., at
752-754. Consequently, only a sensitive and searching inquiry can distinguish gerrymandering in the "loose" sense
from gerrymandering that amounts to unconstitutional discrimination. Because it is difficult to develop and apply
standards that will identify the unconstitutional gerrymander, courts may seek to avoid their responsibility to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause by finding that a claim of gerrymandering is nonjusticiable. I agree with the plurality that
such a course is mistaken, and that the allegations in this case
raise a justiciable issue. 4
Moreover, I am convinced that appropriate judicial standards can and should be developed. Justice Fortas' definition
of unconstitutional gerrymandering properly focuses on
whether the boundaries of the voting districts have been
distorted deliberately and arbitrarily to achieve illegitimate
ends. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S., at 538. Under
this definition, the merits of a gerrymandering claim must be
determined by reference to the configurations of the districts, the observance of political subdivision lines, and other
criteria that have independent relevance to the fairness of redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 755-759
· (STEVENS, J., concurring). In this case, the District Court
examined the redistricting in light of such factors and found,
among other facts, that the boundaries of a number of districts were deliberately distorted to deprive Democratic
voters of an equal opportunity to participate in the State's
legislative processes. The plurality makes no reference _to
any of these findings of fact. It rejects the District Court's
ultimate conclusion with no explanation of the respects in
' As the plurality properly explains, our prior decisions make clear
that an equal protection challenge to redistricting does not present a
nonjusticiable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962);
Reynolds v. Sims , 377 U. S. 533 (1964); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S.
735 (1973). Accordingly, I join Part II of the plurality's opinion.
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which appellees' proof fell short of establishing discriminatory effect. A brief review of the Court's jurisprudence in
the context of another kind of challenge to redistricting, a
claim of malapportionment, demonstrates the pressing need
for the Court to enunciate standards to guide legislators who
redistrict and judges who determine the constitutionality of
the legislative effort.
B
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees citizens that their
state will govern them impartially. See Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring). In the context
of redistricting, that guarantee is of critical importance be-:
cause the franchise provides most citizens their only voice in
the legislative process. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at
_561-562, 565-566. Since the contours of a voting district
powerfully may affect citizens' ability to exercise influence
through their vote, district lines should be determined in accordance with neutral and legitimate criteria. When deciding where those lines will fall, the state should treat its voters as standing in the same position, regardless of their
political beliefs or party affiliation. Chapman v. Meier, 420
U. S. 1, 17 (1975); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 751.
The first cases in which this Court entertained equal protection challenges to redistricting involved allegations that
state legislatures had refused to redesign States' voting districts to eliminate gross population disparities among those
districts. E. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, supra. The Court's decision in Reynolds v.
Sims illustrates two concepts that are vitally important in
evaluating an equal protection challenge to redistricting.
First, the Court recognized that equal protection encompasses a guarantee of equal representation, requiring a State
to seek to achieve through redistricting "fair and effective
representation for all citizens." Reynolds v. Sims, 377
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U. S., at 565-566; see Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, at 748.
The concept of "representation" necessarily applies to
groups: groups of voters elect representatives, individual
voters do not. Gross population disparities violate the mandate of equal representation by denying voters residing in
heavily populated districts, as a group, the opportunity to
elect the number of representatives to which their voting
strength otherwise would entitle them. While population
disparities do dilute the weight of individual votes, their discriminatory effect is felt only when those individual votes are
combined. Thus, the fact that individual voters in heavily
populated districts are free to cast their ballot has no bearing
on a claim of malapportionment.
Second, at the same time that it announced the principle of
"one person, one vote" to compel States to eliminate gross
disparities among district populations, the Court plainly recognized that redistricting should be based on a number of
neutral criteria, of which districts of equal population was
only one. Reynolds v. Sims identified several of the factors
that should guide a legislature engaged in redistricting. For
example, the Court observed that districts should be compact
and cover contiguous territory, precisely because the alternative, "[i]ndiscriminate districting," would be "an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering." 377 U. S., at 578-579.
Similarly, a State properly could choose to give "independent
representation" to established political subdivisions. Adherence to community boundaries, . the Court reasoned, would
both "deter the possibilities of gerrymandering," and allow
communities to have a voice in the legislature that directly
controls their local interests. I d., at 580-581. · See also
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 325-326 (1973). Thus,
Reynolds v. Sims contemplated that "one person, one vote"
would be only one among several neutral factors that serve
the constitutional mandate of fair and effective representa-

84-1244--CONCUR/DISSENT
8

DAVIS v. BANDEMER

tion. See Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, at 748-749. It was
not itself to be the only goal of redistricting. 5 .
A standard that judges the constitutionality of a districting
plan solely by reference to the doctrine of "one person, one
vote" may cause two detrimental results. 6 First, as a perceived way to avoid litigation, legislative bodies may place
undue emphasis on mathematical exactitude, subordinating or
ignoring entirely other criteria that bear directly on the fairness of redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at
753 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 774 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 749. Second, as this
case illustrates, and as Reynolds v. Sims anticipated, exclusive
or primary reliance on "one person, one vote" can betray the
constitutional promise of fair and effective representation by
enabling a legislature to engage intentionally in clearly
discriminatory gerrymandering. See Wells v. Rockefeller,
394 U. S. 542, 551 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

c
In light of the foregoing principles, I believe that the plurality's opinion is seriously flawed in several respects.
6
The doctrine of "one person, one vote" originally was regarded as a
means to prevent discriminatory gerrymandering since "opportunities for
gerrymandering are greatest when there is freedom to construct unequally
populated districts." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526, 534, n. 4
(1969). Advances in computer technology achieved since the doctrine was
announced have drastically reduced its deterrent value by pennitting political cartographers to draw districts of equal population that intentionally
discriminate against cognizable groups of voters. See Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U. S. 725, 752, n. 10 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring). For "one
person, one vote" to serve its intended purpose of implementing the constitutional mandate of fair and effective representation, therefore ,
consideration also must be given to other neutral factors.
6
In decisions concerning congressional redistricting, the Court has
focused its attention almost exclusively on whether a challenged plan satisfies "one person, one vote. " See Karcher v. Daggett, supra; White v.
Weiser, 412 U. S. 783 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, supra. In cases
involving state legislative redistricting, such as the case before us today,
the Court has refused to limit a legislature to the single goal of precise
population equality. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 745; Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 322-325 (1973).

·l
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First, apparently to avoid the forceful evidence that some district lines indisputably were designed to and did discriminate
against Democrats, the plurality describes appellees' claim as
alleging that "Democratic voters over the State as a whole, not
Democratic voters in particular districts, have been subjected
to unconstitutional discrimination." Ante, at 15. This characterization is not inconsistent with appellees' proof, and the
District Court's finding, of statewide discriminatory effect
resulting from "individual districting" that "exemplif[ies]
this discrimination." Ibid. If Democratic voters in anumber of critical districts are the focus of unconstitutional
discrimination, as the District Court found, the effect of that
discrimination will be felt over the State as a whole.
The plurality also erroneously characterizes the harm
members of the losing party suffer as a group when they are
deprived, through deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries, of the opportunity to elect representatives
of their choosing. 7 It may be, as the plurality suggests, that
representatives will not "entirely ignore the interests" of
'The plurality correctly concludes that a redistricting plan is not unconstitutional merely because the plan makes it more difficult for a group of
voters to elect the candidate of its choice or merely because the plan does
not provide proportional representation. Ante, at 19-20. While the
"Equal Protection Clause confers a substantive right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters," Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U. S. 55, 77 (1979) (plurality opinion), the Constitution does not guarantee
proportional representation or protect any group from defeat at the polls,
id., at 77-80; see White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). But
the plurality leaps from that conclusion to the assumption that "[a]n individual or group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is usually
deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to have
as much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district." Ante, at ~ Thus, the plurality apparently believes that e(fects
on election result~ are of little import, as long as the losers have some
access to their representatives. Though effects on election results do not
suffice to establish an unconstitutional gerrymander, they certainly are
relevant to such a claim, and they may suffice to show that the claimants
have been injured by the redistricting they challenge.

I
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opposition voters. Ante, at 20. But it defies political reality to suppose that m~mbers of a losing party have as much
political influence over state government as do members of
the victorious party. Even the most conscientious state legislators do not disregard opportunities to reward persons or
groups who were active supporters in their election campaigns. Similarly, no one doubts that partisan considerations play a major role in the passage of legislation and the
appointment of state officers. Not surprisingly, therefore,
the District Court expressly found that "[c]ontrol of the General Assembly is crucial" to members of the major political
parties in Indiana. 603 F. Supp., at 1483. 8 In light of those
findings, I cannot accept the plurality's apparent conclusion
that loss of this "crucial" position is constitutionally insignificant as long as the losers are not "entirely ignored" by the
winners.
The plurality relies almost exclusively on the "one person,
one vote" standard to reject appellees' convincing proof that
the redistricting plan had a seriously discriminatory effect on
their voting strength in particular districts. The plurality
properly describes the claim in this case as a denial of fair and
effective "representation," ante, at 12, but it does not provide any explanation of how complying with "one person, one
vote" deters or identifies a gerrymander that unconstitutionally discriminates against a cognizable group of voters.
8
The District Court found that: "Control of the General Assembly is
crucial to a political party for a number of reasons. The majority party
elects the Speaker of the H.9use, a person ·who wields considerable power in
the assigning of bills to committees, the conduct of the actual legislative
sessions, and is empowered, under legislative rules, to prevent bills from
reaching the floor for debate or vote. Similarly, the majority party elects
floor leaders in both houses who control the flow of legislation, the assignment of members to committees, and the appointment of committee chairmen. All of these powers are important to the achievement of a party's
legislative goals. There is little doubt that the minority party plays a less
substantial role in the drafting and enactment of legislation." 603 F.
·
Supp., at 1483.

.
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While that standard affords some protection to the voting
rights of individuals, "it protects groups only indirectly at
best," Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 752 (STEVENS, J.,
concurring), even when the group's identity is determined
solely by reference to the fact that its members reside in a
particular voting district. "One person, one vote" alone does
not protect the voting rights of a group made up of persons
affiliated with a particular political party who seek to achieve
representation through their combined voting strength.
Thus, the facts that the legislature permitted each Democratic voter to cast his or her one vote, erected no direct barriers to Democratic voters' exercise of the franchise, and
drew districts of equal population, are irrelevant to a claim
that district lines were drawn for the purpose and with the
effect of substantially debasing the strength of votes cast by
Democrats as a group. 9
The final and most basic flaw in the plurality's opinion is its
failure to enunciate any standard that affords guidance to legislatures and courts. 10 Legislators and judges are left to
9

As was said in the context of a constitutional challenge by black voters
to an at-large voting scheme, "[t]he absence of official obstacles to registration, voting and running for office heretofore has never been deemed to insulate an electoral system" from constitutional attack. Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U. S., at 102 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
10
The plurality describes its standard as requiring a "threshold" showing
that the "electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently
degrade a voter's or group of voters' influence in the political process as a
whole." Ante, at 20; see ante, at 21-22, n. 14. Plaintiffs apparently can
meet the plurality's "threshold" only after a number of elections have been
held under the challenged plan. Ante, at 23-24. At one point, the plurality acknowledges that this formulation is "somewhat different" from any
standard we have previously used to test an electoral plan against an equal
protection challenge, ante, at 20, and also takes pains to say that its opinion
here does not suggest any "alteration of the standards developed" for evaluating racial challenges, ante, at 21, n. 13; see ante, at 22, n. 14. Curiously, the plurality then goes on to claim that its standard is consistent
with that used when a racial group challenges an electoral scheme, ante, at
27-28, and with our "equal protection cases generally," ante, at 30. This
claim is simply incorrect.
Our cases have construed the Equal Protection Clause to require proof of
intentional discrimination, placing the burden on plaintiffs to trace the

'
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wonder whether compliance with "one person, one vote" completely insulates a partisan gerrymander from constitutional
scrutiny, or whether a fairer but as yet undefined standard
applies. The failure to articulate clear doctrine in this area
places the plurality in the curious position of inviting further
litigation even as it appears to signal the "constitutional
green light" 11 to would-be gerrymanderers.

I

"'invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory ... to a
racially discriminatory purpose.'" Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616
(1982), quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 240 (1976). In none
of those cases was the Court willing to assume discriminatory intent, as
the plurality suggests today is the proper course. Ante, at 30. While the
plurality correctly observes that our prior decisions have held that disproportionate election results alone do not violate the Constitution, it
erroneously suggests that those holdings flowed solely from the "perception that the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections." Ante, at 20. The plurality wholly ignores the basic problem underlying all of those prior decisions, namely, that the plaintiffs came
into court with no direct proof of discriminatory intent. In those cases,
the Court concluded that proof of discriminatory effect, including disproportionate election results, if serious enough, could give rise to an
inference of purposeful discrimination. See Rogers v. Lodge, supra, at
618. As JUSTICE WHITE has explained, the Court's decisions in both
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 '
U. S. 124 (1971), rested on the proposition that the requisite "invidious discriminatory purpose" can be inferred from proof of "objective factors" concerning discriminatory effect. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 95; see id.,
at 94-97, 102-103 (WHITE, J., dissenting); see also White v. Regester,
supra, at 765 (multimember districts are unconstitutional "where used invidiously to cancel out" racial groups' voting strength). I cannot agree, as
the plurality suggests, that a standard requiring proof of "heightened effect," where invidious intent has been established directly, has support in
any of our cases, or that an equal protection violation can be established
"only where a history (actual or projected) of disproportionate results appears." Ante, at 28. If a racial minority established that the legislature [
adopted a redistricting law for no purpose other than to disadvantage that
group, the plurality's new and erroneous standard would require plaintiffs
to wait for the results of several elections, creating a history of discriminatory effect, before they can challenge the law in court. Ante, at 23.
11
Edwards, The Gerrymander and "One Man, One Vote," 46 N. Y. U. L.
Rev. 879, 880 (1971).

I

..
84-1244-CONCUR/DISSENT
DAVIS v. BANDEMER

13

III
In Karcher v. Daggett, JUSTICE STEVENS, echoing the decision in Reynolds v. Sims, described factors that I believe
properly should guide both legislators who redistrict and
judges who test redistricting plans against constitutional
challenges. 462 U. S., at 753-761. The most important of
these factors are the shapes of voting districts and adherence
to established political subdivision boundaries. 12 Other relevant considerations include the nature of the legislative
procedures by which the apportionment law was adopted
and legislative history reflecting contemporaneous legislative
goals. To make out a case of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, the plaintiff should be required to offer proof
concerning these factors, which bear directly on the fairness
of a redistricting plan, as well as evidence concerning population disparities and statistics tending to show vote dilution.
No one factor should be dispositive. 13
In this case, appellees offered convincing proof of the ease
with which mapmakers, consistent with the "one person, one
12
In some cases, proof of grotesque district shapes may, without more ,
provide convincing proof of unconstitutional gerrymandering. In addition
to the maps appended to this opinion, see the redistricting maps appended
to the Court's opinions in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 346 U. S. 339, 348 (1960),
and in Karcher v. Daggett , 462 U. S., at 744.
·
13
Groups may consistently fail to elect representatives under a perfectly
neutral election scheme. Thus, a test that turns only on election results,
as the plurality's standard apparently does, likely would identify an unconstitutional gerrymander where none existed. The test that I would adopt
requires consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the plan, including factors initially identified in Reynolds v. Sims, to determine if a
constitutional violation has occurred. Since democracy can work well and
fairly only when citizens have an opportunity to become familiar with their
voting districts, where they must focus their political activities, district
b6undaries must have some rationality. Confusion inevitably follows, as
clearly will be the case in Indiana, when a citizen finds himself or herself
forced to associate with several artificial communities, depending on which
office is on the ballot. Thus, irrational lines themselves affect the ability
of all voters to exercise their political influence, with disproportionate election results illustrating the effect of a plan that was deliberately designed
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vote" standard, may design a districting plan that purposefully discriminates against political opponents as well as
racial minorities. Computer technology now enables gerrymanderers to achieve their purpose while adhering perfectly
to the requirement that districts be of equal population. Relying on the factors correctly described by JUSTICE STEVENS
in Karcher v. Daggett, the District Court carefully reviewed
appellees' evidence and found that the redistricting law was
intended to and did unconstitutionally discriminate against
Democrats as a group. We have held that a district court's
ultimate determination that a redistricting plan was "being
maintained for discriminat~ry purposes," as well as its "subsidiary findings of fact," may not be set aside by a reviewing
court unless they are clearly erroneous. Rogers v. Lodge,
458 U. S. 613, 622-623 (1982); see, e. g., White v. Regester,
412 U. S. 755, 769-770 (1973). The plurality ignores these I
precedents. 14 The plurality also disregards the various factors discussed by the District Court as adequate indicia of unconstitutional gerrymandering.
A

A court should look first to the legislative process by which
the challenged plan was adopted. Here, the District Court
found that the procedures used in redistricting Indiana were
carefully designed to exclude Democrats from participating
to serve no purpose other than to minimize the voting strength of a disfavored group.
"The plurality ignores the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a), by
saying that it has not rejected any of the District Court's findings of fact,
but has "merely . . . disregarded those that were irrelevant in this case and
held insufficient those that inadequately supported the District Court's ultimate legal conclusions." Ante, at 30, n. 20. In a gerrymandering case
the facts as to how, where, and why the legislature drew the district
boundaries are at the heart of the equal protection violation. Beyond stating that appellees' statistical proof failed to satisfy its proposed threshold,
the plurality makes no effort to explain its flat assertions that the District
Court's careful findings were "irrelevant" or "insufficient."

.,
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in the legislative process. In February 1981, both houses of
the General Assembly passed reapportionment bills with no
substantive content and referred them to the other chamber
where conflicting amendments were made. The purpose of
this process was to send "vehicle bills" to a Conference Committee whose task was to apportion representation. Four
conferees and four advisors served on the Committee. The
conferees, all Republicans, were responsible for designing
the voting districts and were entitled to vote on the result of
their own efforts. The advisors, Democrats, were excluded
from the mapmaking process and were given no committee
vote. 603 F. Supp., at 1483.
The legislative process consisted of nothing more than the
majority party's private application of computer technology
to mapmaking. The Republican State Committee engaged
the services of a computer firm to aid the conferees in their
task. !d., at 1483-1484. According to the Conference Committee chairman, the only data used in the computer program
were precinct population, race of precinct citizens, precinct
political complexion, and statewide party voting trends. Access to the mapmaking process was strictly limited. No
member of the Democratic party and no member of the public
was provided with any of the information used in or generated by the computer program. When questioned about the
lack of minority party participation in the redistricting process, the chairman of the Conference Committee stated that
the Democrats would "have the privilege to offer a minority
map. But I will advise you in advance that it will not be
accepted." !d., at 1484.
Republicans promised to hold public hearings on redistricting. No hearing was held during the mapmaking process,
the only time during which voters' views could be expected to
influence their legislators. Ibid. Two days before the end
of the General Assembly's regular session, during the first
and only public hearing on reapportionment, the Conference
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Committee revealed for the first time the result of its mapmaking effort. This timing gave the Democrats but 40 hours
in which to review the districting of more than 4,000 precincts. Ibid. On the last day of the session, April30, 1981,
the Conference Committee report was introduced for a vote
and was adopted by party line vote in both houses of the
General Assembly. 15 Ibid.
B
Next, the District Court found that the maps "conspicuously ignore[d] traditional political subdivisions, with no concern for any adherence to principles of community interest."
I d., at 1493. The court carefully described how the mapmakers carved up counties, cities, and even townships in
their effort to draw lines beneficial to the majority party.
Many districts meander through several counties, picking up
a number of townships from each. 16 The District Court explained why this failure to honor county boundaries could be
expected to have a detrimental impact on citizens' exercise of
their vote. In Indiana, the county government is the seat of
local affairs. I d., at 1494. The redistricting dissects counties into strange shapes lacking in common interests, on one
occasion even placing the seat of one county in a voting district composed of townships from other counties. I d., at
1487; see House Districts 45, 46. Under these conditions,
the District Court expressly found that "the potential for
voter disillusion and nonparticipation is great," as voters are
forced to focus their political activities in artificial electoral
units. 603 F. Supp. , at 1494. Intelligent voters, regardless
Presumably as a result of the haste with which the redistricting law
was pushed through the General Assembly, parts of the state were "wholly
omitted in the 1981legislation." 603 F. Supp., at 1484. In the 1982legislative session, therefore, amendments were passed to assign the omitted
areas to voting districts. Ibid.
16
E . g. , House Districts 20, 22, 25, 28, 42, 45, 46, 55, 57, 62, 66, 70, 73,
74; Senate Districts 7, 24, 37, 39, 45, 47. See the redistricting maps
appended to this opinion.
16
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of party affiliation, resent this sort of political manipulation of
the electorate for no public purpose.
Deposition testimony of the Chairman of the Conference
Committee revealed that the mapmakers gave no consideration to the interests of communities. In the Chairman's
view, the concept of honoring community interests meant
only that mapmakers should refuse to divide a small, suburban community. The shapes of the voting districts and the
manner in which the districts divide established communities, from the county to the township level, illustrate that
community interests were ignored by appellants. As · the
District Court observed, for example, "it is difficult to conceive the interests shared by blacks in Washington Township
and white suburbanites in Hamilton and Boone Counties, or
the shared interest of Allen and Noble County farmers with
residents of downtown Fort Wayne." !d. , at 1487.

c
In addition to the foregoing findings that apply to both the
House and Senate plans, the District Court also noted the
substantial evidence that appellants were motivated solely by
partisan considerations. I d., at 1484. There is no evidence
that the public interest in a fair electoral process was given
any consideration by appellants. Indeed, as noted above,
the mapmakers' partisan goals were made explicitly clear by
contemporaneous statements of Republican leaders who
openly acknowledged that their goal was to disadvantage
Democratic voters. As one Republican House member concisely put it, "The name of the game is to keep us in power." 17
NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 232 (Indianapolis Star, Mar. 22,
17

Evidence of partisan sparring during the redistricting process, of
course, is not suffiCient to establish an equal protection violation or to show
that the legislature pursued no legitimate objectives in adopting the plan.
But such evidence is probative of contemporaneous legislative goals, adding support to the objective facts showing that the legislature adopted the
plan for the sole purpose of disadvantaging members of the political party
that happened to be out of power.
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1981, § 2, page 3). When the plan was completed, Republican leaders announced that the House map was designed to
yield 56 "safe" Republican seats and 30 Democratic seats,
with the remainder being "tossups." NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 242 (Post-Tribune, April 29, 1981, p. 1). Republicans
expected that their Senate map would regularly produce 30
Republican seats and 8 to 10 Democratic seats so that Republicans would maintain their grip on the Senate even if Democrats won the remaining seats. NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit
241 (Post-Tribune, April 29, 1981, p. 1). In short, the
record unequivocally demonstrates that in 1981 the Republican-dominated General Assembly deliberately sought to
design a redistricting plan under which members of the Democratic party would be deprived of a fair opportunity to win
control of the General Assembly at least until1991, the date
of the next redistricting.
IV
A

I turn now to the District Court's findings with respect
particularly to the gerrymandering of the House Districts.
The court found that the plan contained voting districts
whose irrational shapes called for justification. E. g., House
Districts 20, 22, 25, 45, 56, 48, 62, 66, 70, 73. The findings
concerning the district configurations reflect the panel's familiarity with Indiana geography and the particular characteristics of the State's political subdivisions. As the District
Court noted, the voter confusion generated .by irrational district boundaries is exacerbated in this case by the fact that
the lines in the House Plan were drawn independently of
those in the Senate Plan. 603 F. Supp., at 1484-1485.
When the Senate voting districts are overlaid on the House
districts, the potential for voter confusion becomes readily
apparent as lines and districts intersect in a crazy-quilt. 18
8

Since the Indiana House of Representatives has 100 members, and the
Senate has 50, the mapmakers readily could have designed a "nested" plan,
that is, a plan that included "two House districts within one Senate district." 603 F. Supp., at 1484. By permitting voters readily to identify
'
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The District Court carefully considered the multimember
districts contained in the House plan and found that they
were intentionally employed to minimize Democratic voting
power. This Court has expressly recognized that "[a] districting plan may create multimember districts perfectly acceptable under equal population standards, but invidiously
discriminatory because they are employed 'to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of
the voting population."' Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S.,
at 751 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439
(1965)). 19 In this case, invidious purpose may be inferred
from the mapmakers' selection of areas to be divided into
multimember districts. These districts appear in some areas
where they had been used previously and not in others, in
some urban areas and not in others, and in some areas where
their use required combining rural townships with urban
areas from another county. 20 The only discernible pattern is
the appearance of these districts in areas where their winnertake-all aspects can best be employed to debase Democratic
voting strength. The District Court determined that the
multimember districts diluted Democratic voting strength by
their voting districts and corresponding representatives, a nested plan can
be expected to foster voter participation. See Grofman, supra, at 88, 92.
Instead, as the District Court observed, the mapmakers drew House districts that were "not at all relevant to the Senate districts." 603 F. Supp.,
at 1484.
18
In the context of racial gerrymandering claims, the Court has refused
to adopt a per se rule barring the use of multimember districts. White v.
Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765 (1973). But the Court has repeatedly recognized that the characteristics of multimember districts, namely their
tendency to submerge the voting strength of the minority by allowing the
majority to capture all of the district's assigned seats, make them a ready
means for legislative discrimination against racial groups or political
opponents. E. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616 (1982).
20
The multimember districts are House Districts 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15,
19, 20, 31, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 75.
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"stacking" Democrats into districts "where their majority
would be overwhelming" and by fragmenting populations of
Democratic voters among other districts where their voting
strength would be reduced. 603 F. Supp., at 1488-1489,
1494. For example, the mapmakers split Fort Wayne, a city
with a demonstrated tendency to vote for Democratic candidates, and associated each of the halves with areas from outlying counties whose residents had a pattern of voting for Republican candidates. I d., at 1488, 1494; see House Districts
19, 20.
Similarly, the redistricting of Marion County
presents a clear example of dilution of Democrats' voting
strength through the use of multimember districts. Though
population figures entitled the county to elect exactly 14
House members, the mapmakers decided to tack on portions
of 2 neighboring counties in order artificially to create a population base entitled to elect 15 representatives. Then, they
carved that artificial geographical unit into five threemember districts whose irregular shapes were designed to
fence Democrats into one heavily Democratic district and
scatter pockets of Democratic strength among the other four
districts. !d., at 1487, 1489; see House Districts 48, 49, 50,
51, 52. 21
21
The District Court found that the multimember districts employed in
Marion County were "particularly suspect with respect to compactness."
603 F. Supp., at 1487. Of all the districts in the challenged plan, the court
determined that House District 48 "presents the most grievous example of
the political cartographer's handiwork in this case." Ibid. That district
"forms .the letter 'C' around the central city of Indianapolis" and "includes
portions of the urban south westside of the city, the airport and suburban
area around Ben Davis High School on the west side, and the Meridian
Hills area at the northern part of the county." Ibid. The court expressly
determined that, even though House District 48 satisfies "one person, one
vote," there was "simply no conceivable justification for this kind of district." Ibid.
The following map, taken from an exhibit provided by the parties, shows
this grotesque gerrymandering. The legislature first proceeded to disregard Marion County's boundary lines, which essentially form a square, and
then carved the area it created into oddly shaped multimember districts.
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Appellees further demonstrated through a statistical showing that the House Plan debased the effectiveness of their
votes. In 1982, all 100 House seats were up for election.
Democratic candidates received about 51.9 percent of the
vote, and Republican candidates received about 48.1 percent.
Forty-three Democratic representatives were elected; 57
Republicans were elected. 22 Appellees offered startling
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The District Court also noted the discriminatory purpose served by the
Marion County House Districts, including District 48: "the powerful
Marion County delegation forced neighboring counties to cede turf to
permit a preservation of the multi-mem~er districts which had consistently
returned Republicans to the Statehouse." ld., at 1487, n. 1. Moreover,
as appellees' statistical showing of vote dilution plainly demonstrates,
these gerrymandered districts had a discriminatory impact on the votes of
Democrats as a group.
·
22
In the 1984 election, Democratic candidates earned approximately 44
percent of the vote, and Republicans earned approximately 56 percent.
Thirty-nine Democrats were elected to the House, and 61 Republicans
were elected. The figures for the 1984 elections cited in this opinion were
provided by the Elections Research Center, Washington, D. C. A Supplemental Statement filed by appellants in the District Court following
trial also quoted some of the 1984 election results, including the fact that in
1984 the Democratic candidate for Governor won 48% of the vote.
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statistics with respect to House results in Marion and Allen
Counties, two areas in which multimember districts were
used. In these counties, Democratic candidates earned 46.3
percent of the vote, but won only 3 of 21 House seats. As
the District Court observed, "such a disparity speaks for itself." ld., at 1489. 23
B
Since half of the Senate membership is up for election
every two years, the only election results under the challenged plan available at trial related to 25 of the 50 Senate
seats. Those results showed that, of the seats up for election in 1982, Democrats were elected to 13 seats and Republicans to 12. Democratic candidates earned about 53.1 percent of the vote, and Republicans received about 46.9
percent. At trial, it was appellees' contention that most of
the Senate seats won by Democrats in 1982 were "safe" Democratic seats so that their party's success at the polls in
that year was fully consistent with the statewide Republican
gerrymander. This contention is borne out by the results of
the 1984 Senate election. In that election, Democratic candidates received 42.3 percent of the vote, and Republicans 57.7
percent. Yet, of the 25 Senate positions up for election, only
7 were captured by Democrats. 24
23

The 1984 House election in the Marion and Allen County House Districts reflected a similar disparity, when Republicans again captured 18 of
the 21 House seats and the Democrats 3 despite the fact that Democratic
candidates earned approximately 38 percent of the vote in these counties.
24
The District Court's discussion of district shapes focused primarily on
the House Plan. . As the following map of the Senate districts in the Marion County area illustrates, the Senate Plan also contains districts with unusual shapes. Although the population of Marion County, whose bound. ary lines form a square, was entitled to elect exactly seven Senators, 603
F. Supp., at 1487, n. 1, the mapmakers ignored both that population figure
and the county boundaries, and created eight wholly irrational voting districts. As one Democratic voter remarked when the Senate Plan was unveiled, "People who live near the [district line separating Senate districts
33 and 34] are going to need an Indian guide and a compass to figure out
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c
The District Court found, and I agree, that appellants
failed to justify the discriminatory impact of the plan by
showing that the plan had a rational basis in permissible neutral criteria. Appellants' primary justification was that the
plan comports with the principle of "one person, one vote."
Their plan did adhere to that objective, with population deviations between House districts of 1. 05 percent and between
which district they're in." NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 252 (Indianapolis
Star, May 10, 1981, § 2, page 3).
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Senate districts of 1.15 percent. But reliance on "one person, one vote" does not sufficiently explain or justify the
discrimination the plan inflicted on Democratic voters as a
group. The District Court expressly found that the irregular district shapes could not be justified on the basis of population distribution. 603 F. Supp., at 1494. Nor does adherence to "one person, one vote" excuse the mapmakers' failure
to honor established political or community boundaries. It
does not excuse the irrational use of multimember districts,
with their devastating impact on the voting strength of
Democrats. The only other justification offered by appellants, for which the District Court found some support as a
contemporaneous goal, was that the mapmakers sought to
maintain "the black representation in the General Assembly
that existed prior to the new districting plan." But the court
further determined that the impact of the redistricting fell
most harshly on black voters who predominantly are Democrats. !d., at 1488, 1489-1490. None of these critical findings was found by the plurality today to be clearly erroneous.

v
In conclusion, I want to make clear the limits of the standard that I believe. the Equal Protection Clause imposes
on legislators engaged in redistricting. Traditionally, the
determination of electoral districts within a State has been a
matter left to the legislative branch of the state government.
Apart from the doctrine of separation of powers and the federal system prescribed by the Constitution, federal judges
are ill-equipped generally to review legislative decisions
respecting redistricting. As the plurality opinion makes J
clear, however, our precedents hold that a colorable claim of
discriminatory gerrymandering presents a justiciable controversy under the Equal Protection Clause. Federal courts in
exercising their duty to adjudicate such claims should impose
a heavy burden of proof on those who allege that a redistrict. ing plan violates the Constitution. In light of Baker v. Carr,
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Reynolds v. Sims, and their progeny, including such comparatively recent decisions as Gaffney v. Cummings, this case
presents a paradigm example of unconstitutional discrimination against the members of a political party that happened to
be out of power. The well-grounded findings of the District
Court to this effect have not been, and I believe cannot be,
held clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the District
Court. 25

25
As is evident from the several opinions filed today, there is no "Court"
for a standard that properly should be applied in determining whether a
challenged redistricting plan is an unconstitutional partisan political gerrymander. The standard proposed by the plurality is explicitly rejected
by two Justices, and three Justices also have expressed the view that the
plurality's standard will "prove unmanageable and arbitrary." Ante, at 12
(O'CONNOR, J ., joined by BURGER, C. J. , and REHNQUIST, J. , concurring
in the judgment).
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plan was adopted for the purpose of discriminating against
Democratic voters. Ante, at 15-16. The plurality argues,
however, that appellees failed to establish that their voting
strength was diluted statewide despite uncontradicted proof
that certain key districts were grotesquely gerrymandered to
enhance the ·election prospects of Republican candidates.
This argument appears to rest solely on the ground that the I ·
legislature accomplished its gerrymander consistent with
"one person, one vote," in the sense that the legislature
designed voting districts of approximately equal population
and erected no direct barriers to Democratic voters' exercise
of the franchise. Since the essence of a gerrymandering
claim is that the members of a political party as a group have
been denied their right to "fair and effective representation,"
Reynolds v, Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 565 (1964), I believe that
the claim cannot be tested solely by reference to "one person,
one vote." Rather, a number of other relevant ·neutral
factors must be considered. Because the plurality ignores /
such factors and fails to enunciate standards by which to
determine whether a legislature has enacted an unconstitutional gerrymander, I dissent.
I

The facts are exhaustively described in the District Court's
opinion and may be briefly restated here. In 1981, the Republican Party controlled both houses of the Indiana General
Assembly, and its candidate held the Governor's seat. Pursuant to the requirements of the State Constitution, the General Assembly undertook legislative redistricting based on
1980 census data. A Conference Committee, all of whose
members were Republicans, was assigned the task of drawing district maps with the assistance of a private computer
firm. The information fed into the computer primarily concerned the political complexion of the State's precincts. The
redistricting process was conducted in secret. Democratic
legislators were not afforded any participation in designing
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins,
concurring in Part II, and dissenting.
This case presents the question whether a state legislature
violates the Equal Protection Clause by adopting a redistricting plan designed solely to preserve the power of the
dominant political party, when the plan follows the doctrine
of "one person, one vote" but ignores all other neutral factors
relevant to the fairness of redistricting. 1
In answering this question, the plurality expresses the
view, with which I agree, that a partisan political gerrymander violates the Equal Protection Clause only on proof of
"both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group."
Ante, at 15. The plurality acknowledges that the record in
this case supports a finding that the challenged redistricting
1
This opinion uses the term "redistricting" to refer to the process by
which state legislators draw the boundaries of voting districts. The terms
"redistricting," "apportionment," and "reapportionment" frequently are
used interchangeably. Backstrom, Robins, & Eller, Issues in Gerrymandering: An Exploratory Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering Applied to
Minnesota, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1121, 1121, n. 1 (1978); Grofman, Criteria for
Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 77, 78,
n. 6 (1985). Technically, the words "apportionment" and "reapportionment" apply to the "allocation of a finite number of representatives
among a fixed number of pre-established areas," while "districting" and
"redistricting" refer to the drawing of district lines. Backstrom, Robins,
& Eller, supra, at 1121, n. 1; see Grofman, supra, at 78,. n. 6.
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plan was adopted for the purpose of discriminating against
Democratic voters. Ante, at 15-16. The plurality argues ,
however, that appellees failed to establish that their voting
strength was diluted statewide despite uncontradicted proof
that certain key districts were grotesquely gerrymandered to
enhance the ·election prospects of Republican candidates.
This argument appears to rest solely on the ground that the I ·
legislature accomplished its gerrymander consistent with
"one person, one vote," in the sense that the legislature
designed voting districts of approximately equal population
and erected no direct barriers to Democratic voters' exercise
of the franchise. Since the essence of a gerrymandering
claim is that the members of a political party as a group have
been denied their right to "fair and effective representation,"
Reynolds v, Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 565 (1964), I believe that
the claim cannot be tested solely by reference to "one person,
one vote." Rather, a number of other relevant ·n eutral
factors must be considered. Because the plurality ignores /
such factors and fails to enunciate standards by which to
determine whether a legislature has enacted an unconstitutional gerrymander, I dissent.
I

The facts are exhaustively described in the District Court's
opinion and may be briefly restated here. In 1981, the Republican Party controlled both houses of the Indiana General
Assembly, and its candidate held the Governor's seat. Pursuant to the requirements of the State Constitution, the General Assembly undertook legislative redistricting based on
1980 census data. A Conference Committee, all of whose
members were Republicans, was assigned the task of drawing district maps with the assistance of a private computer
firm. The information fed into the computer primarily concerned the political complexion of the State's precincts. The
redistricting process was conducted in secret. Democratic
legislators were not afforded any participation in designing
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the district maps that were adopted. There were no hearings where members of the public were invited to express
their views. The Republican Committee revealed its proposed redistricting plan two days before the end of the legislatiye session, and the Democrats hurriedly presented an
alternative plan. On the last day of the session, the Republican plan was adopted by party line vote in both houses of the
General Assembly. The Governor signed the plan into law.
In 1982 and 1984, elections were held under the new redistricting plan. Prior to the 1982 election, this lawsuit was
commenced by appellees, a group of Indiana Democrats who
claimed that the plan constitutes a partisan political gerrymander designed to disenfranchise Democratic voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 Since trial was completed after the 1982 election, appellees relied in part on the disparity between votes
cast for Democratic legislative candidates in that election and
seats captured by Democrats. The case was heard by a
three-judge panel in the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The District Court, over the dissent of
Judge Pell, made extensive findings of fact and determined
that appellees had established an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander. 603 F. Supp. 1479 (SD Ind. 1984). The
In the District Court, appellees' lawsuit was consolidated with a
suit brought by the Indiana NAACP. The plaintiffs in the NAACP suit
argued that the redistricting intentionally fragmented concentrations of
black voters in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
and of§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973. The District Court determined that the plan discriminated against black voters,
not because of their race, but because blacks had a demonstrated and overwhelming tendency to vote as a bloc for Democratic candidates. Indeed,
the District Court explicitly found that the "disadvantaging effect of the
plan's multi-member districts falls particularly hard and harsh upon black
voters in the state." 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1488 (SD Ind. 1984). Rather
than taking a cross-appeal challenging the District Court's rejection of
their constitutional and statutory claims, the NAACP plaintiffs have filed a
brief in this Court urging affirmance of the District Court's judgment that
the plan unconstitutionally discriminates against Democratic voters as a
group and against blacks as members of that group.
2
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Court today reverses the District Court, without concluding
that any of its findings was clearly erroneous.
II
A

Gerrymandering is "the deliberate and arbitrary distortion
of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal
political purposes." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526,
538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring). 3 As JUSTICE STEVENS
correctly observed, gerrymandering violates the Equal Protection Clause only when the redistricting plan serves "no
purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial,
ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a
position of strength at a particular time, or to disadvantage a
politically weak segment of the community." Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 748.(1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring).
The term "gerrymandering," however, is also used loosely
to describe the common practice of the party in power to
choose the redistricting plan that gives it an advantage at the
polls. An intent to discriminate in this sense may be present
whenever redistricting occurs. See Gaffney v. Cummings,
412 U. S. 735, 753 (1973); Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F. 2d 830, 847 (CA7) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 409 U. S. 893 (1972). Moreover, since legislative
3
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged ed. 1961)
defines "gerrymander" as "to divide (a territorial unit) into election districts in an unnatural and unfair way with the purpose of giving one political
party an electoral majority in a large number of districts while concentrating
the voting strength of the opposition in as few districts as possible." The
term "gerrymander" was coined by combining the last name of Elbridge
Gerry with the word "salamander" in order to describe the "fancied resemblance to a salamander . . . of the irregularly shaped outline of an election
district in northeastern Massachusetts that had been formed for partisan
purposes in 1812 during Gerry's governorship" of that State. Ibid. Though
many of the voting districts appearing in the plans challenged here have
bizarre shapes, House District 66 perhaps most closely resembles a salamander. See the redistricting maps appended to this opinion. These maps J
were reproduced from trial exhibits provided by the parties.

84-1244-CONCUR/DISSENT
DAVIS v. BANDEMER

5

bodies rarely reflect accurately the popular voting strength
of the principal political parties, the effect of any particular
redistricting may be perceived as unfair. See id., at
752-754. Consequently, only a sensitive and searching inquiry can distinguish gerrymandering in the "loose" sense
from gerrymandering that amounts to unconstitutional discrimination. Because it is difficult to develop and apply
standards that will identify the unconstitutional gerrymander, courts may seek to avoid their responsibility to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause by finding that a claim of gerrymandering is nonjusticiable. I agree with the plurality that
such a course is mistaken, and that the allegations in this case
raise a justiciable issue. 4
Moreover, I am convinced that appropriate judicial standards can and should be developed. Justice Fortas' definition
of unconstitutional gerrymandering properly focuses on
whether the boundaries of the voting districts have been
distorted deliberately and arbitrarily to achieve illegitimate
ends. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S., at 538. Under
this definition, the merits of a gerrymandering claim must be
determined by reference to the configurations of the districts, the observance of political subdivision lines, and other
criteria that have independent relevance to the fairness of redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 755-759
(STEVENS, J., concurring). In this case, the District Court
examined the redistricting in light of such factors and found,
among other facts, that the boundaries of a number of districts were deliberately distorted to deprive Democratic
voters of an equal opportunity to participate in the State's
legislative processes. The plurality makes no reference _to
any of these findings of fact. It rejects the District Court's
ultimate conclusion with no explanation of the respects in
'As the plurality properly explains, our prior decisions make clear
that an equal protection challenge to redistricting @oes no present a
1
fOi}justiciable politica~ question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U. . 186 (1962);
Reynolds v. ims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S.
735 (1973). Accordingly, I join Part II of the plurality's opinion.

.s
I
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which appellees' proof fell short of establishing discriminatory effect. A brief review of the Court's jurisprudence in
the context of another kind of challenge to redistricting, a
claim of malapportionment, demonstrates the pressing need
for the Court to enunciate standards to guide legislators who
redistrict :md judges who determine the constitutionality of
the legislative effort.
B
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees citizens that their
state will govern them impartially. See Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring). In the context
of redistricting, that guarantee is of critical importance because the franchise provides most citizens their only voice in
the legislative process. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at
_561-562, 565-566. Since the contours of a voting district
powerfully may affect citizens' ability to exercise influence
through their vote, district lines should be determined in accordance with neutral and legitimate criteria. When deciding where those lines will fall, the state should treat its voters as standing in the same position, regardless of their
political beliefs or party affiliation. Chapman v. Meier, 420
U. S. 1, 17 (1975); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S., at 751.
The first cases in which this Court entertained equal protection challenges to redistricting involved allegations that
state legislatures had refused to redesign States' voting districts to eliminate gross population disparities among those
districts. E. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, supra. The Court's decision in Reynolds v.
Sims illustrates two concepts that are vitally important in
evaluating an equal protection challenge to redistricting.
First, the Court recognized that equal protection encompasses a guarantee of equal representation, requiring a State
to seek to achieve through redistricting "fair and effective
representation for all citizens." Reynolds v. Sims, 377
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U. S., at 565-566; see Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, at 748.
The concept of "representation" necessarily applies to
groups: groups of voters elect representatives, individual
voters do not. Gross population disparities violate the mandate of equal representation by denying voters residing in
heavily populated districts, as a group, the opportunity to
elect the number of representatives to which their voting
strength otherwise would entitle them. While population
disparities do dilute the weight of individual votes, their discriminatory effect is felt only when those individual votes are
combined. Thus, the fact that individual voters in heavily
populated districts are free to cast their ballot has no bearing
on a claim of malapportionment.
Second, at the same time that it announced the principle of
"one person, one vote" to compel States to eliminate gross
disparities among district populations, the Court plainly recognized that redistricting should be based on a number of
neutral criteria, of which districts of equal population was
only one. Reynolds v. Sims identified several of the factors
that should guide a legislature engaged in redistricting. For
example, the Court observed that districts should be compact
and cover contiguous territory, precisely because the alternative, "[i]ndiscriminate districting," would be "an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering." 377 U. S., at 578-579.
Similarly, a State properly could choose to give "independent
representation" to established political subdivisions. Adherence to community boundaries, the Court reasoned, would
both "deter the possibilities of gerrymandering," and allow
communities to have a voice in the legislature that directly
controls their local interests. I d., at 580-581. See also
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 325-326 (1973). Thus,
Reynolds v. Sims contemplated that "one person, one vote"
would be only one among several neutral factors that serve
the constitutional mandate of fair and effective representa-
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tion. See Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, at 748-749. It was
not itself to be the only goal of redistricting. 5 .
A standard that judges the constitutionality of a districting
plan solely by reference to the doctrine of "one person, one
vote" may cause two detrimental results. 6 First, as a perceived way to avoid litigation, legislative bodies may place
undue emphasis on mathematical exactitude, subordinating or
ignoring entirely other criteria that bear directly on the fairness of redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at
753 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id. , at 774 (WHITE , J., dissenting); Gaffney v. Cummings , 412 U. S., at 749. Second, as this
case illustrates, and as Reynolds v. Sims anticipated, exclusive
or primary reliance on "one person, one vote" can betray the
constitutional promise of fair and effective representation by
enabling a legislature to engage intentionally in clearly
discriminatory gerrymandering. See Wells v. Rockefeller,
394 U. S. 542, 551 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

c
In light of the foregoing principles, I believe that the plu- f
rality's opinion is seriously flawed in several respects.
5
The doctrine of "one person, one vote" originally was regarded as a
means to prevent discriminatory gerrymandering since "opportunities for
gerrymandering are greatest when there is freedom to construct unequally
populated districts. " Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526, 534, n. 4
(1969). Advances in computer technology achieved since the doctrine was
announced have drastically reduced its deterrent value by permitting political cartographers to draw districts of equal population that intentionally
discriminate against cognizable groups of voters. See Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U. S. 725, 752, n. 10 (1983) (STEVENS, J ., concurring). For "one
person, one vote" to serve its intended purpose of implementing the constitutional mandate of fair and effective representation, therefore ,
consideration also must be given to other neutral factors.
8
In decisions concerning congressional redistricting, the Court has
focused its attention almost exclusively on whether a challenged plan satisfies "one person, one vote." See Karcher v. Daggett, supra; White v.
Weiser, 412 U. S. 783 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, supra. In cases
involving state legislative redistricting, such as the case before us today,
the Court has refused to limit a legislature to the single goal of precise
population equality. Gaffney v. Cummings , 412 U. S. , at 745; Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 322-325 (1973).

84-1244-CONCUR/DISSENT
-

DAVIS v. BANDEMER

9

First, apparently to avoid the forceful evidence that some district lines indis.putably were designed to and did discriminate
against Democrats, the plurality describes appellees' claim as /
alleging that "Democratic voters over the State as a whole, not
Democratic voters in particular districts, have been subjected
to unconstitutional discrimination." Ante, at 15. This characterization is not inconsistent with appellees' proof, and the
District Court's finding, of statewide discriminatory effect
resulting from "individual districting" that "exemplif[ies]
this discrimination." Ibid. If Democratic voters in a number of critical districts are the focus of unconstitutional
discrimination, as the District Court found, the effect of that
discrimination will be felt over the State as a whole.
The plurality also erroneously characterizes the harm
members of the losing party suffer as a group when they are
deprived, through deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries, of the opportunity to elect representatives
of their choosing. 7 It may be, as the plurality suggests, that
representatives will not "entirely ignore the interests" of
7

The plurality correctly concludes that a redistricting plan is not unconstitutional merely because the plan makes it more difficult for a group of
voters to elect the candidate of its choice or mer·ely because the plan does
not provide proportional representation. Ante, at 19- 20. While the
"Equal Protection Clause confers a substantive right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters ," Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U. S. 55, 77 (1979) (plurality opinion), the Constitution does not guarantee
proportional representation or protect any group from defeat at the polls,
id., at 77-80; see White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). But
the plurality leaps from that conclusion to the assumption that "[a]n individual or group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is usually
deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to have
as much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district." Ante , at ~ Thus, the plurality apparently believes that effects
on election results are of little import, as long as the losers have some
access to their representatives. Though effects on election results do not
suffice to establish an unconstitutional gerrymander, they certainly are
relevant to such a claim, and they may suffice to show that the claimants
have been injured by the redistricting they challenge.

'J.-0 .
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opposition voters. Ante, at 20. But it defies political real- /
ity to suppose that m~mbers of a losing party have as much
political influence over state government as do members of
the victorious party. Even the most conscientious state legislators do not disregard opportunities to reward persons or
groups who were active supporters in their election campaigns. Similarly, no one doubts that partisan considerations play a major role in the passage of legislation and the
appointment of state officers. Not surprisingly, therefore,
the District Court expressly found that "[c]ontrol of the General Assembly is crucial" to members of the major political
parties in Indiana. 603 F. Supp., at 1483. 8 In light of those
findings, I cannot accept the plurality's apparent conclusion
that loss of this "crucial" position is constitutionally insignificant as long as the losers are not "entirely ignored" by the
winners.
The plurality relies almost exclusively on the "one person,
one vote" standard to reject appellees' convincing proof that
the redistricting plan had a seriously discriminatory effect on
their voting strength in particular districts. The plurality
properly describes the claim in this case as a denial of fair and
effective "representation," ante, at 12, but it does not provide any explanation of how complying with "one person, one
vote" deters or identifies a gerrymander that unconstitutionally discriminates against a cognizable group of voters.
8
The District Court found that: "Control of the General Assembly is
crucial to a political party for a number of reasons. The majority party
elects the Speaker of the House, a person who wields considerable power in
the assigning of bills to committees, the conduct of the actual legislative
sessions, and is empowered, under legislative rules , to prevent bills from
reaching the floor for debate or vote. Similarly, the majority party elects
floor leaders in both houses who control the flow of legislation, the assignment of members to committees, and the appointment of committee chairmen. All of these powers are important to the achievement of a party's
legislative goals. There is little doubt that the minority party plays a less
substantial role in the drafting and enactment of legislation." 603 F .
Supp. , at 1483.
·
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While that standard affords some protection to the voting
rights of individuals, "it protects groups only indirectly at
best," Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. 8., at 752 (STEVENS, J.,
concurring), even when the group's identity is determined
solely by reference to the fact that its members reside in a
particular voting district. "One person, one vote" alone does
not protect the voting rights of a group made up of persons
affiliated with a particular political party who seek to ac·hieve
representation through their combined voting strength.
Thus, the facts that the legislature permitted each Democratic voter to cast his or her one vote, erected no direct barriers to Democratic voters' exercise of the franchise, and
drew districts of equal population, are irrelevant to a claim
that district lines were drawn for the purpose and with the
effect of substantially debasing the strength·of votes cast by
Democrats as a group. 9
The final and most basic flaw in the plurality's opinion is its
failure to enunciate any standard that affords guidance to legislatures and courts. 10 Legislators and judges are left to
9
As was said in the context of a constitutional challenge by black voters
to an at-large voting scheme, "[t]he absence of official obstacles to registration, voting and running for office heretofore has never been deemed to insulate an electoral system" from constitutional attack. Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U. S., at 102 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
10
The plurality describes its standard as requiring a "threshold" showing
that the "electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently
degrade a voter's or group of voters' influence in the political process as a
whole." Ante, at 20; see ante, at 21-22, n. 14. Plaintiffs apparently can
meet the plurality's "threshold" only after a number of elections have been
held under the challenged plan. Ante, at 23-24. At one point, the plurality acknowledges that this formulation is "somewhat different" from any
standard we have previously used to test an electoral plan against an equal
protection challenge, ante, at 20, and also takes pains to say that its opinion
here does not suggest any "alteration of the standards developed" for evaluating racial challenges, ante, at 21, n. 13; see ante, at 22, n. 14. Curiously, the plurality then goes on to claim that its standard is consistent
with that used when a racial group challenges an electoral scheme, ante, at
27-28, and with our "equal protection cases generally," ante, at 30. This
claim is simply incorrect.
Our cases have construed the Equal Protection Clause to require proof of
intentional discrimination, placing the burden on plaintiffs to trace the
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wonder whether compliance with "one person, one vote" completely insulates a partisan gerrymander from constitutional
scrutiny, or whether a fairer but as yet undefined standard
applies. The failure to articulate clear doctrine in this area
places the plurality in the curious position of inviting further
litigation even as it appears to signal the "constitutional
green light" 11 to would-be gerrymanderers.
"'invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory ... to a
racially discriminatory purpose.'" Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616
(1982), quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 240 (1976). In none
of those cases was the Court willing to assume discriminatory intent, as
the plurality suggests today is the proper course. Ante, at 30. While the
plurality correctly observes that our prior decisions have held that disproportionate election results alone do not violate the Constitution, it
erroneously suggests that those holdings flowed solely from the "perception that the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections.'' Ante, at 20. The plurality wholly ignores the basic problem underlying all of those prior decisions, namely, that the plaintiffs came
into court with no direct proof of discriminatory intent. In those cases,
the Court concluded that proof of discriminatory effect, including disproportionate election results, if serious enough, could give rise to an
inference of purposeful discrimination. See Rogers v. Lodge, supra, at
618. As JUSTICE WHITE has explained, the Court's decisions in both
White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U. S. 124 (1971), rested on the proposition that the requisite "invidious discriminatory purpose" can be inferred from proof of "objective factors" concerning discriminatory effect. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 95; see id.,
at 94-97, 102-103 (WHITE, J., dissenting); see also White v. Regester,
supra, at 765 (multimember districts are unconstitutional "where used invidiously to cancel out" racial groups' voting strength). I cannot agree, as
the plurality suggests, that a standard requiring proof of "heightened effect," where invidious intent has been established directly, has support in
any of our cases, or that an equal protection violation can be established
"only where a history (actual or projected) of disproportionate results appears." Ante, at 28. If a racial minority established that the legislature
adopted a redistricting law for no purpose other than to disadvantage that
group, the plurality's new and erroneous standard would require plaintiffs
to wait for the results of several elections, creating a history of discriminatory effect, before they can challenge the law in court. Ante, at 23.
11
Edwards, The Gerrymander and "One Man, One Vote," 46 N.Y. U. L.
Rev. 879, 880 (1971).
·
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III
In Karcher v. Daggett, JUSTICE STEVENS, echoing the decision in Reynolds v. Sims, described factors that I believe
properly should guide both legislators who redistrict and
judges who test redistricting plans against constitutional
challenges. 462 U. S., at 753-761. The most important of
these factors are the shapes of voting districts and adherence
to established political subdivision boundaries. 12 Other relevant considerations include the nature of the legislative
procedures by which the apportionment law was adopted
and legislative history reflecting contemporaneous legislative
goals. To make out a case of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, the plaintiff should be required to offer proof
concerning these. factors, which bear directly on the fairness
of a redistricting plan, as well as evidence concerning population disparities and statistics tending to show vote dilution.
No one factor should be dispositive. 13
In this case, appellees offered convincing proof of the ease
with which mapmakers, consistent with the "one person, one
12

In some cases, proof of grotesque district shapes may, without more,
provide convincing proof of unconstitutional gerrymandering. In addition
to the maps appended to this opinion, see the redistricting maps appended
to the Court's opinions in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 346 U. S. 339, 348 (1960),
·
and in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S., at 744.
3
' Groups may consistently fail to elect representatives under a perfectly
neutral election scheme. Thus, a test that turns only on election results,
as the plurality's standard apparently does , likely would identify an unconstitutional gerrymander where none existed. The test that I would adopt
requires consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the plan, including factors initially identified in Reynolds v. Sims, to determine if a
constitutional violation has occurred. Since democracy can work well and
fairly only when citizens have an opportunity to become familiar with their
voting districts, where they must focus their political activities, district
boundaries must have some rationality. Confusion inevitably follows, as
clearly will be the case in Indiana, when a citizen finds himself or herself
forced to associate with several artificial communities, depending on which
office is on the ballot. Thus, irrational lines themselves affect the ability
of all voters to exercise their political influence, with disproportionate election results illustrating the effect of a plan that was deliberately designed
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vote" standard, may design a districting plan that purposefully discrinlinates against political opponents as well as
racial minorities. Computer technology now enables gerrymanderers to achieve their purpose while adhering perfectly
to the requirement that districts be of equal population. Relying on the factors correctly described by JUSTICE STEVENS
in Karcher v. Daggett, the District Court carefully reviewed
appellees' evidence and found that the redistricting law was
intended to and did unconstitutionally discriminate against
Democrats as a group. We have held that a district court's
ultimate determination that a redistricting plan was "being
maintained for discriminat9ry purposes," as well as its "subsidiary findings of fact," may not be set aside by a reviewing
court unless they are clearly erroneous. Rogers v. Lodge,
458 U. S. 613, 622-623 (1982); see, e. g., White v. Regester,
412 U. S. 755, 769-770 (1973). The plurality ignores these
precedents. 14 The plurality also disregards the various factors discussed by the District Court as adequate indicia of unconstitutional gerrymandering.

I

A

A court should look first to the legislative process by which
the challenged plan was adopted. Here, the District Court
found that the procedures used in redistricting Indiana were
carefully designed to exclude Democrats from participating
to serve no purpose other than to minimize the voting strength of a disfavored group.
"The plurality ignores the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52( a), by
saying that it has not rejected any of the District Court's findings of fact,
but has "merely . . . disregarded those that were irrelevant in this case and
held insufficient those that inadequately supported the District Court's ultimate legal conclusions." Ante, at 30, n. 20. In a gerrymandering case
the facts as to how, where, and why the legislature drew the district
boundaries are at the heart of the equal protection violation. Beyond stating that appellees' statistical proof failed to satisfy its proposed threshold,
the plurality makes no effort to explain its fiat assertions that the District
Court's careful findings were "irrelevant" or "insufficient."

I

.,
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in the legislative process. In February 1981, both houses of
the General Assembly passed reapportionment bills with no
substantive content and ·referred them to the other chamber
where conflicting amendments were made. The purpose of
this process was to send "vehicle bills" to a Conference Committee whose task was to apportion representation. Four
conferees and four advisors served on the Committee. The
conferees, all Republicans, were responsible for designing
the voting districts and were entitled to vote on the result of
their own efforts. The advisors, Democrats, were excluded
from the mapmaking process and were given no committee
vote. 603 F. Supp., at 1483.
The legislative process consisted of nothing more than the
majority party's private application of computer technology
to mapmaking. The Republican State Committee engaged
the services of a computer firm to aid the conferees in their
task. I d., at 1483-1484. According to the Conference Committee chairman, the only data used in the computer program
were precinct population, race of precinct citizens, precinct
political complexion, and statewide party voting trends. Access to the mapmaking process was strictly limited. No
member of the Democratic party and no member of the public
was provided with any of the information used in or generated by the computer program. When questioned about the
lack of minority party participation in the redistricting process, the chairman of the Conference Committee stated that
the Democrats would "have the privilege to offer a minority
map. But I will advise you in advance that it will not be
accepted." Id., at 1484.
Republicans promised to hold public hearings on redistricting. No hearing was held during the mapmaking process,
the only time during which voters' views could be expected to
influence their legislators. Ibid. Two days before the end
of the General Assembly's regular session, during the first
and only public hearing on reapportionment, the Conference
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Committee revealed for the first time the result of its mapmaking effort. This timing gave the Democrats but 40 hours
in which to review the districting of more than 4,000 precincts. Ibid. On the last day of the session, April30, 1981,
the Conference Committee report was introduced for a vote
and was adopted by party line vote in both houses of the
General Assembly. 15 Ibid.
B

Next, the District Court found that the maps "conspicuously ignore[d] traditional political subdivisions, with no concern for any adherence to principles of community interest."
I d., at 1493. The court carefully described how the mapmakers carved up counties, cities, and even townships in
their effort to draw lines beneficial to the majority party .
. Many districts meander through several counties, picking up
a number of townships from each. 16 The District Court explained why this failure to honor county boundaries could be
expected to have a detrimental impact on citizens' exercise of
their vote. In Indiana, the county government is the seat of
local affairs. I d., at 1494. The redistricting dissects counties into strange shapes lacking in common interests, on one
occasion even placing the seat of one county in a voting district composed of townships from other counties. I d., at
1487; see House Districts 45, 46. Under these conditions,
the District Court expressly found that "the potential for
voter disillusion and nonparticipation is great," as voters are
forced to focus their political activities in artificial electoral
units. 603 F. Supp., at 1494. Intelligent voters, regardless
15

Presumably as a result of the haste with which the redistricting law
was pushed through the General Assembly, parts of the state were "wholly
omitted in the 1981legislation." 603 F. Supp., at 1484. In the 1982legislative session, therefore, amendments were passed to assign the omitted
areas to voting districts. Ibid.
16
E. g., House Districts 20, 22, 25, 28, 42, 45, 46, 55, 57, 62, 66, 70, 73,
74; Senate Districts 7, 24, 37, 39, 45, 47. See the redistricting maps
appended to this opinion.
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of party affiliation, resent this sort of political manipulation of
the electorate for no public purpose.
Deposition testimony of the Chairman of the Conference
Committee revealed that the mapmakers gave no consideration to the interests of communities. In the Chairman's
view, the concept of honoring community interests meant
only that mapmakers should refuse to divide a small, suburban community. The shapes of the voting districts and the
manner in which the districts divide established communities, from the county to the township level, illustrate that
community interests were ignored by appellants. As the
District Court observed, for example, "it is difficult to conceive the interests shared by blacks in Washington Township
and white suburbanites in Hamilton and Boone Counties, or
the shared interest of Allen and Noble County farmers with
residents of downtown Fort Wayne." !d., at 1487.

c
In addition to the foregoing findings that apply to both the
House and Senate plans, the District Court also noted the
substantial evidence that appellants were motivated solely by
partisan considerations. I d., at 1484. There is no evidence
that the public interest in a fair electoral process was given
any consideration by appellants. Indeed, as noted above,
the mapmakers' partisan goals were made explicitly clear by
contemporaneous statements of Republican leaders who
openly acknowledged that their goal was to disadvantage
Democratic voters. As one Republican House member concisely put it, "The name of the game is to keep us in power." 17
NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 232 (Indianapolis Star, Mar. 22,
17
Evidence of partisan sparring during the redistricting process, of
course, is not sufficient to establish an equal protection violation or to show
that the legislature pursued no legitimate objectives in adopting the plan.
But such evidence is probative of contemporaneous legislative goals, adding support to the objective facts showing that the legislature adopted the
plan for the sole purpose of disadvantaging members of the political party
that happened to be out of power.
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1981, § 2, page 3). When the plan was completed, Republican leaders announced that the House map was designed to
yield 56 "safe" Republican seats and 30 Democratic seats,
with the remainder being "tossups." NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 242 (Post-Tribune, April 29, 1981, p. 1). Republicans
expected that their Senate map would regularly produce 30
Republican seats and 8 to 10 Democratic seats so that Republicans would maintain their grip on the Senate even if Democrats won the remaining seats. NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit
241 (Post-Tribune, April 29, 1981, p. 1). In short, the
record unequivocally demonstrates that in 1981 the Republican-dominated General Assembly deliberately sought to
design a redistricting plan under which members of the Democratic party would be deprived of a fair opportunity to win
control of the General Assembly at least unti11991, the date
of the next redistricting.
IV
A
I turn now to the District Court's findings with respect
particularly to the gerrymandering of the House Districts.
The court found that the plan contained voting districts
whose irrational shapes called for justification. E. g., House
Districts 20, 22, 25, 45, 56, 48, 62, 66, 70, 73. The findings
concerning the district configurations reflect the panel's familiarity with Indiana geography and the particular characteristics of the State's political subdivisions. As the District
Court noted, the voter confusion generated by irrational district boundaries is exacerbated in this case by the fact that
the lines in the House Plan were drawn independently of
those in the Senate Plan. 603 F. Supp., at 1484-1485.
When the Senate voting districts are overlaid on the House
districts, the potential for voter confusion becomes readily
apparent as lines and districts intersect in a crazy-quilt. 18
18

Since the Indiana House of Representatives has 100 members, and the
Senate has 50, the mapmakers readily could have designed a "nested" plan,
that is, a plan that included "two House districts within one Senate district." 603 F. Supp., at 1484. By permitting voters readily to identify
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The District Court carefully considered the multimember
districts contained in the House plan and found that they
were intentionally employed to minimize Democratic voting
power. This Court has expressly recognized that "[a] districting plan may create multimember districts perfectly acceptable under equal population standards, but invidiously
discriminatory because they are employed 'to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of
the voting population."' Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S.,
at 751 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439
(1965)). 19 In this case, invidious purpose may be inferred
from the mapmakers' selection of areas to be divided into
multimember districts. These districts appear in some areas
where they had been used previously and not in others, in
some urban areas and not in others, and in some areas where
their use required combining rural townships with urban
areas from another county. 20 The only discernible pattern is
the appearance of these districts in areas where their winnertake-all aspects can best be employed to debase Democratic
voting strength. The District Court determined that the
multimember districts diluted Democratic voting strength by
their voting districts and corresponding representatives, a nested plan can
be expected to foster voter participation. See Grofman, supra, at 88, 92.
Instead, as the District Court observed, the mapmakers drew House districts that were "not at all relevant to the Senate districts." 603 F. Supp.,
at 1484.
19
In the context of racial gerrymandering claims, the Court has refused
to adopt a per se rule barring the use of multimember districts. White v.
Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765 (1973). But the Court has repeatedly recognized that the characteristics of multimember districts, namely their
tendency to submerge the voting strength of the minority by allowing the
majority to capture all of the district's assigned seats, make them a ready
means for legislative discrimination against racial groups or political
opponents. E. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616 (1982).
20
The multimember districts are House Districts 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15,
19, 20, 31, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 75.
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"stacking" Democrats into districts "where their majority
would be overwhelming" and by fragmenting populations of
Democratic voters among other districts where their voting
strength would be reduced. 603 F. Supp., at 1488-1489,
1494. For example, the mapmakers split Fort Wayne, a city
with a demonstrated tendency to vote for Democratic candidates, and associated each of the halves with areas from outlying counties whose residents had a pattern of voting for Republican candidates. I d., at 1488, 1494; see House Districts
19, 20.
Similarly, the redistricting of Marion County
presents a clear example of dilution of Democrats' voting
strength through the use of multimember districts. Though
population figures entitled the county to elect exactly 14
House members, the mapmakers decided to tack on portions
of 2 neighboring counties in order artificially to create a population base entitled to elect 15 representatives. Then, they
carved that artificial geographical unit into five threemember districts whose irregular shapes were designed to
fence Democrats into one heavily Democratic district and
scatter pockets of Democratic strength among the other four
districts. Id., at 1487, 1489; see House Districts 48, 49, 50,
51, 52. 21
21
The District Court found that the multimember districts employed in
Marion County were ''particularly suspect with respect to compactness."
603 F. Supp., at 1487. Of all the districts in the challenged plan, the court
determined that House District 48 "presents the most grievous example of
the political cartographer's handiwork in this case." Ibid. That district
"forms .the letter 'C' around the central city of Indianapolis" and "includes
portions of the urban southwestside of the city, the airport and suburban
area around Ben Davis High School on the west side, and the Meridian
Hills area at the northern part of the county." Ibid. The court expressly
determined that, even though House District 48 satisfies "one person, one
vote," there was "simply no conceivable justification for this kind of district." Ibid.
The following map, taken from an exhibit provided by the parties, shows
this grotesque gerrymandering. The legislature first proceeded to disregard Marion County's boundary lines, which essentially form a square, and
then carved the area it created into oddly shaped multimember districts.

84-1244-CONCUR/DISSENT
DAVIS v. BANDEMER

21

Appellees further demonstrated through a statistical showing that the House Plan debased the effectiveness of their
votes. In 1982, all 100 House seats were up for election.
Democratic candidates received about 51.9 percent of the
vote, and Republican candidates received about 48.1 percent.
Forty-three Democratic representatives were elected; 57
Republicans were elected. 22 Appellees offered startling
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The District Court also noted the discriminatory purpose served by the
Marion County House Districts, including District 48: "the powerful
Marion County delegation forced neighboring counties to cede turf to
permit a preservation of the multi-member districts which had consistently
returned Republicans to the Statehouse." /d., at 1487, n. 1. Moreover,
as appellees' statistical showing of vote dilution plainly demonstrates,
these gerrymandered districts had a discriminatory impact on the votes of
·
Democrats as a group.
22
In the 1984 election, Democratic candidates earned approximately 44
percent of the vote , and Republicans earned approximately 56 percent.
Thirty-nine Democrats were elected to the House, and 61 Republicans
were elected. The figures for the 1984 elections cited in this opinion were
provided by the Elections Research Center, Washington, D. C. A Supplemental Statement filed by appellants in the District Court following
trial also quoted some of the 1984 election results , including the fact that in
1984 the Democratic candidate for Governor won 48% of the vote.
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statistics with respect to House results in Marion and Allen
Counties, two areas in which multimember districts were
used. In these counties, Democratic candidates earned 46.3
percent of the vote, but won only 3 of 21 House seats. As
the District Court observed, "such a disparity speaks for itself." I d., at 1489. 23
B
Since half of the Senate membership is up for election
every two years, the only election results under the challenged plan available at trial related to 25 of the 50 Senate
seats. Those results showed that, of the seats up for election in 1982, Democrats were elected to 13 seats and Republicans to 12. Democratic candidates earned about 53.1 percent of the vote, and Republicans received about 46.9
percent. At trial, it was appellees' contention that most of
the Senate seats won by Democrats in 1982 were "safe" Democratic seats so that their party's success at the polls in
that year was fully consistent with the statewide Republican
gerrymander. This contention is borne out by the results of
the 1984 Senate election. In that election, Democratic candidates received 42.3 percent of the vote, and Republicans 57.7
percent. Yet, of the 25 Senate positions up for election, only
7 were captured by Democrats. 24
23
The 1984 House election in the Marion and Allen County House Districts reflected a similar disparity, when Republicans again captured 18 of
the 21 House seats and the Democrats 3 despite the fact that Democratic
candidates earned approximately 38 percent of the vote in these counties.
24
The District Court's discussion of district shapes focused primarily on
the House Plan. . As the following map of the Senate districts in the Marion County area illustrates, the Senate Plan also contains districts with unusual shapes. Although the population of Marion County, whose boundary lines form a square, was entitled to elect exactly seven Senators, 603
F. Supp., at 1487, n. 1, the mapmakers ignored both that population figure
and the county boundaries, and created eight wholly irrational voting districts. As one Democratic voter remarked when the Senate Plan was unveiled, "People who live near the [district line separating Senate districts
33 and 34] are going to need an Indian guide and a compass to figure out

84-1244-CONCUR/DISSENT
DAVIS v. BANDEMER

23

c
The District Court found, and I agree, that appellants
failed to justify the discriminatory impact of the plan by
showing that the plan had a rational basis in permissible neutral criteria. Appellants' primary justification was that the
plan comports with the principle of "one person, one vote."
Their plan did adhere to that objective, with population deviations between House districts of 1.05 percent and between
which district they're in." NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 252 (Indianapolis
Star, May 10, 1981, § 2, page 3).
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Senate districts of 1.15 percent. But reliance on "one person, one vote" does not sufficiently explain or justify the
discrimination the plan inflicted on Democratic voters as a
group. The District Court expressly found that the irregular district shapes could not be justified on the basis ofpopulation distribution. 603 F. Supp., at 1494. Nor does adherence to "one person, one vote" excuse the mapmakers' failure
to honor established political or community boundaries. It
does not excuse the irrational use of multimember districts,
with their devastating impact on the voting strength of
Democrats. The only other justification offered by appellants, for which the District Court found some support as a
contemporaneous goal, was that the mapmakers sought to
maintain "the black representation in the General Assembly
that existed prior to the new districting plan." But the court
further determined that the impact of the redistricting fell
most harshly on black voters who predominantly are Democrats. !d., at 1488, 1489-1490. None of these critical findings was found by the plurality today to be clearly erroneous.

v
In conclusion, I want to make clear the limits of the standard that · I believe. the Equal Protection Clause imposes
on legislators engaged in redistricting. Traditionally, the
determination of electoral districts within a State has been a
matter left to the legislative branch of the state government.
Apart from the doctrine of separation of powers and the federal system prescribed by the Constitution, federal judges
are ill-equipped generally to review legislative decisions
respecting redistricting. As the plurality opinion makes
clear, however, our precedents hold that a colorable claim of
discriminatory gerrymandering presents a justiciable controversy under the Equal Protection Clause. Federal courts in
exercising their duty to adjudicate such claims should impose
a heavy burden of proof on those who allege that a redistrict. ing plan violates the Constitution. In light of Baker v. Carr,

I
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Reynolds v. Sims, and their progeny, including such comparatively recent decisions as Gaffney v. Cummings, this case
presents a paradigm example of unconstitutional discrimination against the members of a political party that happened to
be out of power. The well-grounded findings of the District
Court to this effect have not been, and I believe cannot be,
held clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the District
Court. 25

~As is evident from the several opinions filed today, there is no "Court"
for a standard that properly should be applied in determining whether a
challenged redistricting plan is an unconstitutional partisan political gerrymander. The standard proposed by the plurality is explicitly rejected
by two Justices, and three Justices also have expressed the view that the
plurality's standard will "prove unmanageable and arbitrary." Ante, at 12
(O'CONNOR, J ., joined by BURGER, C. J., and REHNQUIST, J ., concurring
in the judgment).
·
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JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
~ 111 ')... 1 ~
In this case, we review a judgment from a three-judge
trict Court, which sustained an Equal Protection challenge to
Indiana's 1981 state apportionment on the basis that the law ~ ~
unconstitutionally diluted the votes of Indiana Democrats.
603 F. Supp. 1479 (1984). Although we find such political
gerrymandering to be justiciable, we conclude that the District Court applied an insufficiently demanding standard in
finding unconstitutional vote dilution. Consequently, we
reverse.
I

Dis- ~ ~

The Indiana Legislature, also known as the "General Assembly," consists of a House of Representatives and a Senate. There are 100 members of the House of Representatives, and 50 members of the Senate. The members of the
House serve two-year terms, with elections held for all seats
every two years. The members of the Senate serve fouryear terms, and Senate elections are staggered so that half of
the seats are up for election every two years. The members
of both Houses are elected from legislative districts; but,
while all Senate members are elected from single-member
districts, House members are elected from a mixture of single-member and multi-member districts. The division of the
State into districts is accomplished by legislative enactment,

84-1244-0PINION
DAVIS v. BANDEMER

2

which is signed by the Governor into law. Reapportionment
is required every ten years and is based on the federal decennial census. There is no prohibition against more frequent
reapportionments.
In early 1981, the General Assembly initiated the process
of reapportioning the State's legislative districts pursuant to
the 1980 census. At this time, there were Republican majorities in both the House and the Senate, and the Governor
was Republican. 1 Bills were introduced in both Houses, and
a reapportionment plan was duly passed and approved by the
Governor. 2 This plan provided 50 single-member districts
for the Senate; for the House, it provided 7 triple-member, 9
double-member, and 61 single-member districts. In the
Senate plan, the population deviation between districts was
1.15%; in the House plan, the deviation was 1.05%. The
multi-member districts generally included the more metropolitan areas of the State, although not every metropolitan
area was in a multi-member district. Marion County, which
Politically speaking, the State of Indiana is a "swing" state: It has supported both the Democrats and the Republicans at various times, often following national trends and major candidates. Although at times within
the last few decades the State has voted up to 56% Democratic, in 1980 the
Republicans took the State.
' These bills were "vehicle bills"-bills that had no real content. Both
bills were passed and were then referred to the other House and eventually
to a conference committee, which consisted entirely of Republican members. Four Democratic "advisers" to the committee were appointed, but
they had no voting powers. Further, they were excluded from the substantive work of the committee: The Republican State Committee funded a
computerized study by an outside firm that produced the districting map
that was eventually used, and the Democratic "advisers" were not allowed
access to the computer or to the results of the study. They nevertheless
attempted to develop apportionment proposals of their own using the 1980
census data. A few days before the end of the 1981legislative session, the
conference committee presented its plan to the legislature. The Democratic minority also presented its alternative plan. The majority plan was
passed in both Houses with voting along party lines and was signed into
law by the Governor.
1
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includes Indianapolis, was combined with portions of its
neighboring counties to form five triple-member districts.
Fort Wayne was divided into two parts, and each part was
combined with portions of the surrounding county or counties
to make two double-member districts. On the other hand,
South Bend was divided and put partly into a double-member
district and partly into a single-member district (each part
combined with part of the surrounding county or counties).
Although county and city lines were not consistently followed, township lines generally were. The two plans, the
Senate and the House, were not nested; that is, each Senate
district was not divided exactly into two House districts.
There appears to have been little relation between the lines
drawn in the two plans.
In early 1982, this suit was filed by several Indiana Democrats (here the appellees) against various State officials (here
the appellants), alleging that the 1981 reapportionment plans
constituted a political gerrymander intended to disadvantage
Democrats. Specifically, they contended that the particular
district lines that were drawn and the mix of single- and
multi-member districts were intended to and did violate their
right, as Democrats, to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge district court was convened to hear these claims.
In November 1982, before the case went to trial, elections
were held under the new districting plan. All of the House
seats and half of the Senate seats were up for election. Over
all the House races statewide, Democratic candidates received 51.9% of the vote. Only 43 Democrats, however,
were elected to the House. Over all the Senate races statewide, Democratic candidates received 53.1% of the vote.
Thirteen (of 25) Democrats were elected. In Marion and
Allen Counties, both divided into multi-member House districts, Democratic candidates drew 46.6% of the vote, but
only 3 of the 21 House seats were filled by Democrats.
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On December 13, 1984, a divided District Court issued a
decision declaring the reapportionment to be unconstitutional, enjoining the appellants from holding elections pursuant to the 1981 redistricting, ordering the General Assembly
to prepare a new plan, and retaining jurisdiction over the
case. See Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479 (1984).
To the District Court majority, the results of the 1982 elections seemed "to support an argument that there is a built-in
bias favoring the majority party, the Republicans, which instituted the reapportionment plan." !d., at 1486. Although
the court thought that these figures were unreliable predictors of future elections, it concluded that they warranted further examination of the circumstances surrounding the passage of the reapportionment statute. See id. 3 In the
course of this further examination, the Court noted the irregular shape of some district lines, the peculiar mix of singleand multi-member districts, 4 and the failure of the district
lines to adhere consistently to political subdivision boundaries to define communities of interest. The Court also
found inadequate the other explanations given for the configuration of the districts, such as adherence to the one-person, one-vote imperative and the Voting Right Act's no retrogression requirement.
These factors, concluded the
A multitude of conflicting statistical evidence was also introduced at
the trial. The District Court, however, specifically declined to credit any
of this evidence, noting that it did not "wish to choose which statistician is
more credible or less credible." Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479,
1485 (1984).
4
The Court noted that various House districts combined urban and suburban or rural voters with dissimilar interests and that many of the districts were unwieldy shapes. Using Marion County as one example, the
Court observed that the County itself had exactly the population to support 14 House seats; nevertheless, it was combined with various surrounding areas to form five triple-member districts, which maintained the
County's prior 15-member delegation even though it had in fact suffered a
population decrease. Believing that the resulting multi-member districts
were suspect in terms of compactness, the Court concluded that no rational
reason could support them.
3
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Court, evidenced an intentional effort to favor Republican
incumbents and candidates and to disadvantage Democratic
voters. 5 This was achieved by "stacking" Democrats into
districts with large Democratic majorities and "splitting"
them in other districts so as to give Republicans safe but not
excessive majorities in those districts. 6 Because the 1982
elections indicated that the plan also had a discriminatory effect in that the proportionate voting influence of Democratic
voters had been adversely affected and because any scheme
"which purposely inhibit[s] or prevent[s] proportional representation cannot be tolerated," 603 F. Supp., at 1492, the
District Court invalidated the statute. 7
5
In addition, the Court quoted from the deposition testimony of the
Speaker of the House as follows:
"MR. SUSSMAN: What I would like you to do here again is to give me
whatever reasons were operative to your mind in maintaining or creating
multi-member districts with regard to (Districts) 48 through 52 [the Marion County districts].
MR. DAILEY: Political.
MR. SUSSMAN: What were the political factors?
MR. DAILEY: We wanted to save as many incumbent Republicans as
possible."
The Court also quoted from the deposition testimony of Senator Bosma
as follows:
"MR. SUSSMAN: This (newspaper) article says further, "Under further
questioning from Townsend about input in actual map drawing, Bosma said
'You will have the privilege to offer a minority map. But I will advise you
in advance that it will not be accepted."' Is that accurate?
MR. BOSMA: That's accurate. I might add that I don't make goals for
the opposite team."
603 F . Supp. , at 1484.
6
These are familiar techniques of political gerrymandering. Democratic (or Republican, as the case may be) votes are "stacked" and "wasted"
by creating districts where Democrats form majorities much greater than
the 50% necessary to carry those districts. Concurrently, Republican
votes are spread among districts in which they form safe, perhaps 55%,
majorities, and Democratic votes are "cracked" or "split" by dispersing
them in such a way as to be ineffectual.
7
Judge Pel!, writing in dissent, disagreed. Assuming for the purposes
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The defendants appealed, seeking review of the District
Court's rulings that the case was justiciable and that, if justiciable, an equal protection violation had occurred. 8 We
noted probable jurisdiction.
U. S. - - , 105 S. Ct.
1840 (1985).
II

We address first the question whether this case presents a
justiciable controversy or a non-justiciable political question.
Although the District Court never explicitly stated that the
case was justiciable, its holding clearly rests on such a finding. The appellees urge that this Court has in the past acknowledged and acted upon the justiciability of purely political gerrymandering claims. The appellants contend that we
have affirmed on the merits decisions of lower courts finding
such claims to be non-justiciable.
of his analysis that a political gerrymandering case was justiciable, he concluded that the appellees had not proven discrimination. Rather, once the
relative voting strengths were properly ascertained, it was his view that
the plan had advantaged and disadvantaged both parties equally: The
Democrats won more than their voting strength in the Senate and less in
the House. See Bandemer, supra, 603 F. Supp., at 1501-1502. Judge
Pell also rejected the majority's analysis of the multi-member districts and
thought that the state had followed rational nondiscriminatory criteria in
formulating the 1981 plan.
8
Consolidated with this suit in the proceedings below was another lawsuit, filed by the Indiana NAACP. The NAACP suit challenged the plans
as unconstitutional dilutions of the black vote in Indiana in violation of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
42 U. S. C. § 1973 (as amended).
In rejecting the NAACP claims, the District Court majority found that
"the voting efficacy of the NAACP plaintiffs was impinged upon because of
their politics and not because of their race. It is not in dispute that blacks
in this state vote overwhelmingly Democratic." Bandemer v. Davis, 603
F. Supp. 1479, 1489-1490 (1984). Consequently, the majority found no
Fifteenth Amendment or Voting Rights Act violation. The dissent concurred with this result but gave different reasons for reaching this
conclusion.
The NAACP did not appeal these dispositions. Consequently, the only
claims now before us are the political gerrymandering claims.
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A

Since Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), we have consistently adjudicated Equal Protection claims in the legislative
districting context regarding inequalities in population between districts. In the course of these cases, we have developed and enforced the "one person, one vote" principle.
See, e. g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964).
Our past decisions also make clear that even where there is
no population deviation among the districts, racial gerrymandering presents a justiciable Equal Protection claim. In the
multi-member district context, we have reviewed, and on occasion rejected, districting plans that unconstitutionally diminished the effectiveness of the votes of racial minorities.
See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613 (1982); Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U. S. 55 (1980); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973);
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433
(1965). We have also adjudicated claims that the configuration of single-member districts violated equal protection with
respect to racial and ethnic minorities, although we have
never struck down an apportionment plan because of such a
claim. See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430
U. S. 144 (1977); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964).
In the multi-member district cases, we have also repeatedly stated that districting that would "operate to minimize
or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population" would raise a constitutional
question. Fortson, supra, 379 U. S., at 439 (emphasis
added). See also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 751
(1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 143 (1971); Burns
v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 88 (1966). Finally, in Gaffney
v. Cummings, supra, we upheld against an equal protection
political gerrymandering challenge a state legislative singlemember redistricting scheme that was formulated in a bipartisan effort to try to provide political representation on a
level approximately proportional to the strength of political
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parties in the state. In that case, we adjudicated the type of
purely political equal protection claim that is brought here,
although we did not, as a threshold matter, expressly hold
such a claim to be justiciable. Regardless of this lack of a
specific holding, our consideration of the merits of the claim
in Gaffney in the face of a discussion of justiciability in appellant's brief, combined with our repeated reference in other
opinions to the constitutional deficiencies of plans that dilute
the vote of political groups, at the least supports an inference
that these cases are justiciable.
In the years since Baker v. Carr, both before and after
Gaffney, however, we have also affirmed a number of decisions in which the lower courts rejected the justiciability of
purely political gerrymandering claims. In WMCA, Inc. v.
Lomenzo, 382 U. S. 4, aff'g 238 F. Supp. 916 (SD N.Y. 1965),
the most frequently cited of these cases, we affirmed the decision of a three-judge district court upholding a temporary
apportionment plan for the State of New York. The district
court had determined that political gerrymandering equal
protection challenges to this plan were non-justiciable. See
238 F. Supp., at 925-926. Justice Harlan, in his opinion concurring in the Court's summary affirmance, expressed his understanding that the affirmance was based on the Court's approval of the lower court's finding of non-justiciability. See
382 U. S., at 6. See also Jimenez v. Hidalgo County Water
Improvement District No. 2, 424 U. S. 950, aff'g 68 F. R. D.
668 (SD Tex. 1975); Ferrell v. Hall, 406 U. S. 939, aff'g 339
F. Supp. 73 (W. D. Okla. 1972); Wells v. Rockefeller, 398
U. S. 901, aff'g 311 F. Supp. 48 (SD N.Y. 1970). Although
these summary affirmances arguably support an inference
that these claims are not justiciable, there are other cases in
which federal or state courts adjudicated political gerrymandering claims and we summarily affirmed or dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question. See, e. g., Wiser v.
Hughes, 459 U. S. 962 (1982), dismissing for want of a substantial federal question an appeal from In re Legislative Dis-
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tricting, 475 A. 2d 428 (Md. 1982); Kelly v. Bumpers, 413
U. S. 901 (1973), aff'g 740 F.Supp 568 (ED Ark. 1972); Archer v. Smith, 409 U. S. 808 (1972), aff'g Graves v. Barnes,
343 F. Supp. 704, 734 (W. D. Tex. 1972).
These sets of cases may look in different directions, but to
the extent that our summary affirmances indicate the nonjusticiability of political gerrymander case, we are not bound
by those decisions. As we have observed before, "[i]t is not
at all unusual for the Court to find it appropriate to give full
consideration to a question that has been the subject of previous summary action." Washington v. Confederated Bands
and Tribes, 439 U. S. 463, 476 n. 20 (1979). See also
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 670-671 (1974). The
issue that the appellants would have us find to be precluded
by these summary dispositions is an important one, and it
deserves further consideration.
B

The outlines of the political question doctrine were described and to a large extent defined in Baker v. Carr. The
synthesis of that effort is found in the following passage in
the Court's opinion:
"It is apparent that several formulations which vary
slightly according to the settings in which the questions
arise may describe a political question, although each has
one or more elements which identify it as essentially a
function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the
surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
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ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from
the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non-justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of "political
questions," not one of "political cases." The courts cannot reject as "no law suit" a bona fide controversy as to
whether some action denominated "political" exceeds
constitutional authority. The cases we have reviewed
show the necessity for discriminating inquiry into the
precise facts and posture of the particular case, and the
impossibility of resolution by any semantic cataloguing."
369 U. S., at 217.
In Baker, the Court applied this analysis to an Equal Protection claim based on a state legislative apportionment that
allowed substantial disparities in the number of voters represented by each state representative. See 369 U. S., at
253-258 (Clark, J., concurring). In holding that claim to be
justiciable, the Court concluded that none of the identifying
characteristics of a political question were present:
"The question here is the consistency of state action with
the Federal Constitution. We have no question decided, or to be decided, by a political branch of government coequal with this Court. Nor do we risk
embarrassment of our government abroad, or grave disturbance at home if we take issue with Tennessee as to
the constitutionality of her action here challenged. Nor
need the appellants, in order to succeed in this action,
ask the Court to enter upon policy determinations for
which judicially manageable standards are lacking. Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are
well developed and familiar, and it has been open to
courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amend-
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ment to determine, if on the particular facts they must,
that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action." 369 U. S., at 226.
This analysis applies equally to the question now before us.
Disposition of this question does not involve us in a matter
more properly decided by a coequal branch of our government. There is no risk of foreign or domestic disturbance,
and in light of our cases since Baker we are not persuaded
that there are no judicially discernible and manageable standards by which political gerrymander cases are to be decided.
It is true that the type of claim that was presented in
Baker v. Carr was subsequently resolved in this Court by the
formulation of the "one person, one vote" rule. See, e. g.,
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 557-561 (1964). The mere
fact, however, that we may not now similarly perceive a
likely arithmetic presumption in the instant context does not
compel a conclusion that the claims presented here are nonjusticiable. The one person, one vote principle had not yet
been developed when Baker was decided. At that time, the
Court did not rely on the potential for such a rule in finding
justiciability. Instead, as the language quoted above clearly
indicates, the Court contemplated simply that legislative
line-drawing in the districting context would be susceptible of
adjudication under the applicable constitutional criteria.
Furthermore, in formulating the one-person, one-vote formula, the Court characterized the question posed by election
districts of disparate size as an issue of fair representation.
In such cases, it is not that anyone is deprived of a vote or
that any person's vote is not counted. Rather, it is that one
electoral district elects a single representative and another
district of the same size elects two or more-the elector's
vote in the former district having less weight in the sense
that he may vote for and his district be represented by only
one legislator, while his neighbor in the adjoining district
votes for and is represented by two or more. Reynolds accordingly observed:
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"Since the achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment, we conclude that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal
participation by all voters in the election of State legislators. Diluting the weight of votes because of place of
residence impairs basic constitutional rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious discrimination based upon factors such as race. . . ." 377
U. S., at 565-566.
Reynolds surely indicates the justiciability of claims going to
the adequacy of representation in state legislatures.
The issue here is of course different from that adjudicated
in Reynolds. It does not concern districts of unequal size.
Not only does everyone have the right to vote and to have his
vote counted, but each elector may vote for and be represented by the same number of lawmakers. Rather, the
claim is that each political group in a state should have the
same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any
other political group. Nevertheless, the issue is one of
representation, and we decline to hold that such claims are
never justiciable.
Our racial gerrymander cases such as White v. Regester
and Whitcomb v. Chavis indicate as much. In those cases,
there was no population variation among the districts, and no
one was precluded from voting. The claim instead was that
an identifiable racial or ethnic group had an insufficient
chance to elect a representative of its choice and that district
lines should be redrawn to remedy this alleged defect. In
both cases, we adjudicated the merits of such claims, rejecting the claim in Whitcomb and sustaining it in Regester.
Just as clearly, in Gaffney v. Cummings, where the districts
also passed muster under the Reynolds formula, the claim
was that the legislature had manipulated district lines to afford political groups in various districts an enhanced opportunity to elect legislators of their choice. Although advising
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caution, we said that "we must ... respond to [the] claims
... that even if acceptable populationwise, the ... plan was
invidiously discriminatory because a 'political fairness principle' was followed .... " 412 U. S., at 751-752 (emphasis
added). We went on to hold that the statute at issue did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
These decisions support a conclusion that this case is justiciable. As Gaffney demonstrates, that the claim is submitted by a political group, rather than a racial group, does not
distinguish it in terms of justiciability. That the characteristics of the complaining group are not immutable or that the
group has not been subject to the same historical stigma may
be relevant to the manner in which the case is adjudicated,
but these differences do not justify a refusal to entertain such
a case.
III
Having determined that the political gerrymandering claim
in this case is justiciable, we turn to the question whether the
District Court erred in holding that appellees had alleged and
proved a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
A

Preliminarily, we agree with the District Court that the
claim made by the appellees in this case is a claim that the
1981 apportionment discriminates against Democrats on a
statewide basis. Both the appellees and the District Court
have cited instances of individual districting within the State
which they believe exemplify this discrimination, but the appellees' claim as we understand it is that Democratic voters
over the State as a whole, not Democratic voters in particular
districts, have been subjected to unconstitutional discrimination. See, e. g., Complaint of Bandemer Plaintiffs at 3-7.
Although the statewide discrimination asserted here was allegedly accomplished through the manipulation of individual
district lines, the focus of the equal protection inquiry is nee-
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essarily somewhat different from that involved in the review
of individual districts.
We also agree with the District Court that in order to succeed the Bandemer plaintiffs were required to prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group
and an actual discriminatory effect on that group. See, e. g.,
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 67-68. Further, we are confident that if the law challenged here had discriminatory effects on Democrats, this record would support a finding that
the discrimination was intentional. Indeed, quite aside from
the anecdotal evidence, the shape of the House and Senate
Districts, and the alleged disregard for political boundaries,
we think it most likely that whenever a legislature redistricts, those responsible for the legislation will know the
likely political composition of the new districts and will have a
prediction as to whether a particular district is a safe one for
a Democratic or Republican candidate or is a competitive district that either candidate might win. As we said in Gaffney
v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 752-753 (1973):

"It would be idle, we think, to contend that any political consideration taken into account in fashioning a reapportionment plan is sufficient to invalidate it. Our
See White v.
cases indicate quite the contrary.
Regester, supra; Burns v. Richardson, Supra; Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra; Abate v. Mundt, supra. The
very essence of districting is to produce a different-a
more "politically fair"-result than would be reached
with elections at large, in which the winning party would
take 100% of the legislative seats. Politics and political
considerations are inseparable from districting and
apportionment. The political profile of a State, its party
registration, and voting records are available precinct by
precinct, ward by ward. These subdivisions may not be
identical with census tracts, but, when overlaid on a census map, it requires no special genius to recognize the
political consequences of drawing a district line along one
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street rather than another. It is not only obvious, but
absolutely unavoidable, that the location and shape of
districts may well determine the political complexion of
the area. District lines are rarely neutral phenomena.
They can well determine what district will be predominantly Democratic or predominantly Republican, or
make a close race likely. Redistricting may pit incumbents against one another or make very difficult the election of the most experienced legislator. The reality is
that districting inevitably has and is intended to have
substantial political consequences.
It may be suggested that those who redistrict and reapportion should work with census, not political, data
and achieve population equality without regard to political impact. But this politically mindless approach may
produce, whether intended or not, the most grossly gerrymandered results; and, in any event, it is most unlikely that the political impact of such a plan would
remain undiscovered by the time it was proposed or
adopted, in which event the results would be both known
and, if not changed, intended." 9
As long as redistricting is done by a legislature, it should not
be very difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of the reapportionment were intended.
9
This passage from Gaffney expresses a view similar to that of Robert
G. Dixon, Jr., one of the foremost scholars of reapportionment, who observed that
"[W]hether or not non population factors are expressly taken into account
in shaping political districts, they are inevitably everpresent and operative. They influence that all election outcomes in all sets of districts.
The key concept to grasp is that there are no neutral lines for legislative
districts ... every line drawn aligns partisans and interest blocs in a particular way different from the alignment that would result from putting the
line in some other place." Fair Criteria and Procedures for Establishing
Legislative Districts 7-8, in Representation and Redistricting Issues (Grofman, Lijphart, McKay, and Scarrow, eds. 1982).
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B

We do not accept, however, the District Court's legal and
factual bases for concluding that the 1981 Act visited a sufficiently adverse effect on the appellees' constitutionally protected rights to make out a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. The District Court held that because any apportionment scheme that purposely prevents proportional represen. tation is unconstitutional, Democratic voters need only show
that their proportionate voting influence has been adversely
affected. 603 F. Supp., at 1492. Our cases, however,
clearly foreclose any claim that the Constitution requires proportional representation or that legislatures in reapportioning must draw district lines to come as near as possible to
allocating seats to the contending parties in proportion to
what their anticipated statewide vote will be. Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 153, 156, 160 (1971); White v.
Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-66 (1973).
The typical election for legislative seats in the United
States is conducted in described geographical districts, with
the candidate receiving the most votes in each district winning the seat allocated to that district. If all or most of the
districts are competitive-defined by the District Court in
this case as districts in which the anticipated split in the
party vote is within the range of 45% to 55o/o-even a narrow
statewide preference for either party would produce an overwhelming majority for the winning party in the state legislature. This consequence, however, is inherent in winnertake-all, district-based elections, and we cannot hold that
such a reapportionment law would violate the Equal Protection Clause because the voters in the losing party do not have
representation in the legislature in proportion to the statewide vote received by their party candidates. As we have
said, "We are unprepared to hold that district-based elections
decided by plurality vote are unconstitutional in either singleor multi-member districts simply because the supporters of
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losing candidates have no legislative seats assigned to them."
Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 160. This is true of a racial
as well as a political group. White v. Regester, supra, at
765-766. It is also true of a statewide claim as well as an
individual district claim.
To draw district lines to maximize the representation of
each major party would require creating as many safe seats
for each party as the demographic and predicted political
characteristics of the state would permit. This in turn would
leave the minority in each safe district without a representative of its choice. We upheld this "political fairness" approach in Gaffney v. Cummings, despite its tendency to deny
safe district minorities any realistic chance to elect their own
representatives. But Gaffney in no way suggested that the
Constitution requires the approach that Connecticut had
adopted in that case.
In cases involving individual multi-member districts, we
have required a substantially greater showing of adverse effects than a mere lack of proportional representation to support a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution. Only where
there is evidence that excluded groups have "less opportunity
to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice" have we refused to approve the use of
multi-member districts. Rogers v. Lodge, supra, 458 U. S.,
at 624. See also United Jewish Organizations v. Carey,
supra, 430 U. S., at 167; White v. Regester, supra, 412 U. S.,
at 765-766; Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, 403 U. S., at 150.
In these cases, we have also noted the lack of responsiveness
by those elected to the concerns of the relevant groups. See
Rogers v. Lodge, supra, 458 U. S., at 625-629; White v.
Regester, 412 U.S., at 766-767. 10
10

Although these cases involved racial groups, we believe that the principles developed in these cases would apply equally to claims by political
groups in individual districts. We note, however, that the elements necessary to a successful vote dilution claim may be more difficult to prove in
relation to a claim by a political group. For example, historical patterns of

84-1244-0PINION
18

DAVIS v. BANDEMER

These holdings rest on a conviction that the mere fact that
a particular apportionment scheme makes it more difficult for
a particular group in a particular district to elect the representatives of its choice does not render that scheme constitutionally infirm. This conviction, in turn, stems from a perception that the power to influence the political process is not
limited to winning elections. An individual or a group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is usually deemed
to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and
to have as much opportunity to influence that candidate as
other voters in the district. We cannot presume in such a
situation, without actual proof to the contrary, that the candidate elected will entirely ignore the interests of those voters. This is true even in a safe district where the losing
group loses election after election. Thus, a group's electoral
power is not unconstitutionally diminished by the simple fact
of an apportionment scheme that makes winning elections
more difficult, and a failure of proportional representation
alone does not constitute impermissible discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U. 8., at 111 n. 7 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
As with individual districts, where unconstitutional vote
dilution is alleged in the form of statewide political gerrymandering, the mere lack of proportional representation will not
be sufficient to prove unconstitutional discrimination.
Again, without specific supporting evidence, a court cannot
presume in such a case that those who are elected will disregard the disproportionately underrepresented group.
Rather, unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when theJ
electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the
political process as a whole.
exclusion from the political processes, evidence which would support a vote
dilution claim, are in general more likely to be present for a racial group
than for a political group.
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Although this is a somewhat different formulation than we
have previously used in describing unconstitutional vote dilution in an individual district, the focus of both of these inquiries is essentially the same. 11 In both contexts, the question
is whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process.
In a challenge to an individual district, this inquiry focuses on
the opportunity of members of the group to participate in
party deliberations in the slating and nomination of candidates, their opportunity to register and vote, and hence their
chance to directly influence the election returns and to secure
the attention of the winning candidate. Statewide, however, the inquiry centers on the voters' direct or indirect influence on the elections of the state legislature as a whole.
And, as in individual district cases, an equal protection violation may be found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to
influence the political process effectively. In this context,
such a finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by
evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of
the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair
chance to influence the political process.
Based on these views, we wettld reject the District Court's
apparent holding that any interference with an opportunity
to elect a representative of one's choice would be sufficient to
allege or make out an equal protection violation, unless justified by some acceptable state interest that the state would be
required to demonstrate. In addition to being contrary to
the above-described conception of an unconstitutional political gerrymander, such a low threshold for legal action would
invite attack on all or almost all reapportionment statutes.
District-based elections hardly ever produce a perfect fit be11
Although this opinion relies on our cases relating to challenges by racial groups to individual multi-member districts, nothing herein is intended
in any way to suggest an alteration of the standards developed in those
cases for evaluating such claims.
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tween votes and representation. The one-person, one-vote
imperative often mandates departure from this result as does
the no-retrogression rule required by § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act. Inviting attack on minor departures from some supposed norm would too much embroil the judiciary in secondguessing what has consistently been referred to as a political
task for the legislature, a task that should not be monitored
too closely unless the express or tacit goal is to effect its removal from legislative halls. We decline to take a major step
toward that end, which would be so much at odds with our
history and experience.
The view that a prima facie case of illegal discrimination in
reapportionment requires a showing of more than a de
minimis effect is not unprecedented. Reapportionment
cases involving the one-person, one-vote principle such as
Gaffney v. Cummings and White v. Regester provide support
for such a requirement. In the present, considerably more
complex context, it is also appropriate to require allegations
and proof that the challenged legislative plan has had or will
have effects that are sufficiently serious to require intervention by the federal courts in state reapportionment
decisions. 12

c

The District Court's findings do not satisfy this threshold
condition to stating and proving a cause of action. In reaching its conclusion, the District Court relied primarily on the
results of the 1982 elections: Democratic candidates for the
State House of Representatives had received 51.9% of the
votes cast statewide and Republican candidates 48.1 %; yet,
out of the 100 seats to be filled, Republican candidates won 57
and Democrats 43. In the Senate, 53.1% of the votes were
cast for Democratic candidates and 46.9% for Republicans; of
12
The requirement of a threshold showing is derived from the peculiar
characteristics of these political gerrymandering claims. We do not contemplate that a similar requirement would apply to our Equal Protection
cases outside of this particular context.
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the 25 Senate seats to be filled, Republicans won 12 and Democrats 13. The Court also relied upon the use of multi-member districts in Marion and Allen counties, where Democrats
or those inclined to vote Democratic in 1982 amounted to
46.6% of the population of those counties but Republicans
won 86 percent-18 of 21-seats allocated to the districts in
those counties. These disparities were enough to require a
neutral justification by the state, which in the eyes of the District Court was not forthcoming. 13
Relying on a single election to prove unconstitutional discrimination is unsatisfactory. The District Court observed,
and the parties do not disagree, that Indiana is a swing state.
Voters sometimes prefer Democratic candidates, and sometimes Republican. The District Court did not find that because of the 1981 Act the Democrats could not in one of the
next few elections secure a sufficient vote to take control of
the assembly. Indeed, the District Court declined to hold
that the 1982 election results were the predictable consequences of the 1981 Act and expressly refused to hold that
those results were a reliable prediction of future ones. The
District Court did not ask by what percentage the statewide
Democratic vote would have had to increase to control either
the House or the Senate. The appellants argue here, with•• The District Court apparently thought that the political group suffering discrimination was all those voters who voted for democratic Assembly
candidates in 1982. Judge Pel!, in dissent, argued that the allegedly disfavored group should be defined as those voters who could be counted on to
vote Democratic from election to election, thus excluding those who vote
the Republican ticket from time to time. He would have counted the true
believers by averaging the Democratic vote cast in two different elections
for those statewide offices for which party-line voting is thought to be the
rule and personality and issue-oriented factors are relatively unimportant.
Although accepting Judge Pell's definition of Democratic voters would
have strongly suggested that the 1981 reapportionment had no discriminatory effect at all, there was no response to his position. The appellees
take up the challenge in this Court, claiming that Judge Pell chose the
wrong election years for the purpose of averaging the Democratic votes.
The dispute need not now be resolved.
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out a persuasive response from appellees, that had the Democratic candidates received an additional few percentage
points of the votes cast statewide, they would have obtained
a majority of the seats in both houses. Nor was there any
finding that the 1981 reapportionment would consign the
Democrats to a minority status in the Assembly throughout
the 1980's or that the Democrats would have no hope of doing
any better in the reapportionment that would occur after the
1990 census. Without findings of this nature, the District
Court erred in concluding that the 1981 Act violated the
Equal Protection Clause.
The District Court's discussion of the multi-member districts created by the 1981 Act does not undermine this conclusion. For the purposes of the statewide political gerrymandering claim, these districts appear indistinguishable
from safe Republican and safe Democratic single-member
districts. Simply showing that there are multi-member districts in the State and that those districts are constructed so
as to be safely Republican or Democratic in no way bolsters
the contention that there has been statewide discrimination
against Democratic voters. It could be, were the necessary
threshold effect to be shown, that multi-member districts
could be demonstrated to be suspect on the ground that they
are particularly useful in attaining impermissibly discriminatory ends; at this stage of the inquiry, however, the multimember district evidence does not materially aid the appellees' case.
Furthermore, in determining the constitutionality of multimember districts challenged as racial gerrymanders, we have
rejected the view that "any group with distinctive interests
must be represented in legislative halls if it is numerous
enough to command at least one seat and represents a minority living in an area sufficiently compact to constitute a single
member district." Whitcomb , supra, 403 U. S., at 156.
Rather, we have required that there be proof that the complaining minority "had less opportunity to participate in the
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political processes and to elect legislators of their choice."
ld., at 149. In Whitcomb, we went on to observe that there
was no proof that blacks were not allowed to register or vote,
to choose the political party they desired to support, to participate in its affairs or to be equally represented on those
occasions when candidates were chosen, or to be included
among the candidates slated by the Democratic Party.
Against this background, we concluded that the failure of the
minority "to have legislative seats in proportion to its population emerges more as a function of losing elections than of
built-in bias against poor Negroes. The voting power of
ghetto residents may have been 'cancelled out' as the District
Court held, but this seems a mere euphemism for political
defeat at the polls." ld., at 153. Whitcomb accordingly
rejected a challenge to multi-member districts in Marion
County, Indiana. A similar challenge was sustained in
White v. Regester, but only by employing the same criterion,
namely, that the plaintiffs must produce evidence to support
a finding "that the political processes leading to nomination
and election were not equally open to participation by the
group in question-that its members had less opportunity
than did other residents in the district to participate in the
political processes and to elect legislators of their choice."
412 U. S., at 766.
This participatory approach to the legality of individual
multi-member districts is not helpful where the claim is that
~uch districts discriminate against Democrats, for it could
hardly be said that Democrats, any more than Republicans,
are excluded from participating in the affairs of their own
' party or from the processes by which candidates are nominated and elected. For constitutional purposes, the Democratic claim in this case, insofar as it challenges vel non the
legality of the multi-member districts in certain counties, is
like that of the Negroes in Whitcomb who failed to prove a
racial gerrymander, for it boils down to a complaint that they
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failed to attract a majority of the voters in the challenged
multi-member districts. 14
D
In response to our approach, JUSTICE POWELL suggests an
alternate method for evaluating equal protection claims of political gerrymandering. In his view, courts should look at a
number of factors in considering these claims: the nature of
the legislative procedures by which the challenged redistricting was accomplished and the intent behind the redistricting;
the shapes of the districts and their conformity with political
subdivision boundaries; and "evidence concerning population
disparities and statistics tending to show vote dilution." Slip
op., at 12. The District Court in this case reviewed these
factors in reaching its ultimate conclusion that unconstitutional vote dilution had occurred, and JUSTICE POWELL concludes that its findings on these factors-and on the ultimate
question of vote discrimination-should be upheld. According to JusTICE POWELL, those findings adequately support a
conclusion that "the boundaries of the voting districts have
been distorted deliberately and arbitrarily to achieve illegitimate ends," id., at 5 (emphasis in original), and that an unconstitutional gerrymander has therefore occurred.
We disagree with JusTICE POWELL that the intentional
drawing of district boundaries for partisan ends and for no IJL.D/~ /),A>
other reason violates the Equal Protection Clause m and of
itself. "Yven if a state legislature redistricts with the specific
intention of disadvantaging one political party's election pros"It should be noted that even if the District Court correctly identified
constitutional shortcomings in the House districting, this did not automatically call for invalidating the provisions for the Senate. The only relevant
fact about the Senate appearing in the District Court's findings is that in
the 1982 elections to fill 25 Senate Seats, Democrats won 53.1% of the
statewide vote and elected 13 of their candidates. That on its face is
hardly grounds for invalidating the Senate districting, and we have counselled before against striking down an entire apportionment statute when
the constitutional evil could be cured by lesser means. Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S., at 160-161.
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pects, we do not believe that there has been an unconstitutional discrimination against members of that party unless
the redistrictin d es in fact isadvanta e it at the ~
Moreover, as we iscussed above, a mere lack ofJU:,OPortionate results in one elec 10 cannot suffice in this regard.
e ave reac e t 1s cone us1on in our cases involving challenges to individual multi-member districts, and it applies
equally here. In the individual multi-member district cases,
we have found equal protection violations only where a history of disproportionate results appeared in conjunction with
strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair
representation. See supra, at 17. In those cases, the racial
minorities asserting the successful equal protection claims
had essentially been shut out of the political process. In the
statewide political gerrymandering context, these prior cases
lead to the analogous conclusion that equal protection violations may be found only where a history (actual or projected)
of disproportionate results appears in conjunction with similar indicia. The mere lack of control of the General Assembly does not rise to the requisite level.
This requirement of more than a showing of possibly transitory results is }Vhere we appear to d!;.Part from J USTICE
PowELL~edof its "factors" verbiage, JusTICE PowELL's analysis turns on a determination that l! lack of p~
t~ election results can su port a finding of an equal pr tectwn vwlation,
at ~
east in some circumstances.
ere, the
~
only concrete effect on the Democrats in Indiana in terms of
election results that the District Court had before it was one
election in which the percentage of Democrats elected was
lower than the percentage of total Democratic votes cast. 15

--

••JuSTICE PowELL proffers additional election results from the 1984
elections in support of his conclusion. These results were not considered
by the District Court, and we decline to determine their significance without the benefit of any factual development as to their meaning in terms of
Democratic power overall or in the long run. Nevertheless, we note that
in terms of actual percentages, the 1984 House election results cited by

7
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In JUSTICE POWELL's view, this disproportionality, when
combined with clearly discriminatory intent on the part of the
1981 General Assembly and the manipulation of district lines
in the apportionment process, is sufficient to conclude that
fair representation has been denied.
The factors other than dis roportionate election results,
however , -'db not con nbute to a n ing t a emocra 1c voters have been disadvantaged in fact. They support a finding
that an intention to discriminate was present and that districts were drawn in accordance with that intention, but they
do not sho~c;ny a<;!ual disadvantage beyond that sh9wn:-'by
the election resufts: ft surely cannot '15e an actual disadvama~r~ of fair representation on a group level just
to be placed in a district with a supermajority of other Democratic voters or a district that departs from preexisting political boundaries. Only when such placement affects election
results and political power statewide has an actual disadvantage occurred.
Consequently, JuSTICE POWELL's view would allow a con- ~
stitutional violation to be found where the only proven effect
on a political party's electoral power was disproportionate results in one (or possibl two electi ns. T~er,
contams no exp ana IOn of why a lack of proportionate election results should suffice in these political gerrymandering
cases while it does not in the cases involving racial gerrymandering. In fact, JuSTICE POWELL's opinion is silent as to the
relevance of the substantive standard developed in the multimember district cases to these political gerrymandering
cases.
In rejecting JUSTICE POWELL's approach, we do not mean
to intimate that the factors he considers are entirely irrelevant. The election results obviously are relevant to a showexhibited less of a discrepancy between Democratic
votes cast and Democratic representatives elected than did the 1982 results (5 percent as opposed to 8 percent). This casts at least some doubt
on the import of the 1982 results.

JUSTICE POWELL
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ing of the effects required to prove a political gerrymandering claim under our view. And the district configurations
may ,be combined with vote projections to predict future election results, which are also relevant to the effects showing.
The other factors, even if not relevant to the effects issue,
might well be relevant to an equal protection claim. The
· e ual rotection ar ment would roce alon the following
lines:
,--. I there were a discriminatory effect and a discriminatory intent, then the legislation w~_ld be ~amined for_yalid
unde~ning~ Thus, evidence of:!e'xclusive legislative processa
Jtrberate drawing of district lines in accordance with
accepteA:;gerrymandering principles would be relevant to intent, a&r'evidence of valid and invalid configuration would be
relevant to whether the districting plan met legitimate state
interests.
This course is consistent with our equal protection cases
generally and is the course we follow here: We assumed that ~
there was discriminatory intent, found that there was msuffior effect to constitute an equal protection
{ cient discrimina
vio a wn, 16 and therefore di not reac
e uestwn of the
st~ter~ts ( egitimate or otherwise) serve by the particular distncts as they were created by the legislature. 2
Consequently, the valid or invalid confi~ration of !£le districts was an issue we d1d not neea to consider. 17
It seems mappropriate, owever, to v1ew these separate
components of an equal protection analysis as "factors" to be
considered together without regard for their separate functions or meaning. This undifferentiated consideration of the

readil~

16
In most cases, it is true, a discriminatoa effect will be
a_pparent..., and no heightened effect w1!T'be required, see note 12 supra, but that
is the only real difference between this type of equal protection claim and
others. - - - - - -
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various factors confuses the import of each factor and disguises the essential conclusion of-his)opmwn: that dispropor-fer~ tionate]election results alone are a sufficient effect to support
a finding of a constitutional violation.
In sum, we decline to adopt the approach enunciated by
JUSTICE POWELL. In our view, that approach departs from }
our past cases and invites judicial interference in legislative
districting whenever a political party suffers at the polls.
We recognize that our own view may be difficult of application. Determining when an electoral system has been "arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or
a group of voters' influence on the political process as a
whole," supra, at 18, is of necessity a difficult inquiry. Nevertheless, we believe that it recognizes the delicacy of intruding on this most political of legislative functions and is at the
same time consistent with our prior cases regarding individual multi-member districts, which have formulated a parallel
standard. 18
IV
In sum, we hold that political gerrymandering cases are
properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause. We
also conclude, however, that a th~imi
nat~,Y vote dilutiQP is required for a prima facie case of an
Equal Protection violation. In this case, the findings made
by ~ourt of an adverse effect on the appellees
I l l.
do not s
ou t t
r
irement. Consequently,
the judgment of the District Court is
Reversed.

I

8
' We are puzzled by JUSTICE POWELL's conclusion that we contemplate
a test under which only the "one person, one vote" requirement has any
relevance. This opinion clearly does not adopt such a limited review.
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